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Olaizola Ortega, María Norma

Last name
Olaizola Ortega
First name
María Norma
  • An Approach to the stability of international environmental agreements: the absorbing sets solution

    We study international environmental negotiations when agreements between countries can not be binding. A problem with this kind of negotiations is that countries have incentives for free-riding from such agreements. We develope a notion of equilibrium based on the assumption that countries can create and dissolve agreements in their seeking of a larger welfare. This approach leads to a larger degree of cooperation compared to models based on the internal-external stability approach.

    Network formation under institutional constraints

    We study the effects of institutional constraints on stability, efficiency and network formation. An exogenous "societal cover" consisting of a collection of possibly overlapping subsets covering the set of players specifies the social organization in different groups or "societies". It is assumed that a player may imitiate links only with players that belong to at least one society that she also belongs to, thus restricting the feasible strategies and networks. In this setting, we examine th...

    Lehia ez perfektua-ri buruzko notak

    Para quien es de utilidad: - Alumnos de Tª Microeconómica IV, curso 3º LE. - Alumnos de las asignaturas de Tª de Juegos y Organización Industrial del Máster en Economía: Instrumentos del Análisis Económico. Estas notas sobre competencia imperfecta están dedicadas al estudio de estructuras de mercado caracterizadas por la existencia de poder de mercado. Se estudia en primer lugar el monopolio, dedicando una atención especial a los diferentes tipos de discriminación de precios. A c...

    Efficiency vs. Stability in a Mixed Network Formation Model

    Documentos de Trabajo The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, the incomplete results relative to effciency in a transitional model introduced in a previous paper, distinguishing two types of links, strong or doubly-supported and weak or singly-supported, are completed with a full-characterization. Second, as it turns out, effcient structures are stable only for a small range of values of the parameters within the much wider range where they are effcient. This motivates the study of th...

    The impact of liberalizing cost-saharing on basic models of network formation

    This paper studies the impact of "liberalizing " the cost-sharing of links on some basic models of network formation. This is done in a setting where both doubly supported and singly supported links are possible, and which includes the two seminal models of network formation by Jackson and Wolinsky and Bala and Goyal as extreme cases. In this setting, the notion of pairwise stability is extended and it is proved that liberalizing cost-sharing for doubly supported links widens the range of val...

    A Marginalist Model of Network Formation

    We develop a network-formation model where the quality of a link depends on the amount invested in it and is determined by a link-formation "technology" , an increasing strictly concave function which is the only exogenous ingredient in the model. The revenue from the investments in links is the information that the nodes receive through the network. Two approaches are considered. First, assuming that the investments in links are made by a planner, the basic question is that of the efficient...

    Unilateral vs. Bilateral link-formation: Bridging the gap

    We provide a model that bridges the gap between two benchmark models of strategic network formation: Jackson and Wolinsky' s model based on bilateral formation of links, and Bala and Goyal's two-way fl ow model, where links can be unilaterally formed. In the model introduced and studied here a link can be created unilaterally. When it is only supported by one of the two players the fl ow through the link suffers a certain decay, but when it is supported by both the fl ow runs without frict...

    Internal Organization of Firms and Cartel Formation

    We introduce and characterize a new solution concept for TU games. The new soluction is called SD-prenucleolus and is a lexicographic value although is not a weighted prenucleolus. The SD-prenucleolus satisfies several desirable poperties and is the only known solution that satisfies core stability, strong aggegate monotonicity and null player out property in the class of balanced games. The SD-prenucleolus is the only known solution that satisfies core stability continuity and is monotonic i...

    A Unifying model of strategic network formation

    Documento de trabajo We provide a model that merges two basic models of strategic network formation and incorporates them as extreme cases: Jackson and Wolinsky' s connections model based on bilateral formation of links, and Bala and Goyal' s two-way flow model, where links can be unilaterally formed. In our model a link can be created unilaterally, but when it is only supported by one of the two players the flow through it suffers some friction or decay, but more than when it is support...

    Choice of Flexible Production Technologies Under Strategic Delegation

    This work analyzes a managerial delegation model in which firms can choose between a flexible production technology which allows them to produce two different products and a dedicated production technology which limits production to only one product. We analyze whether the incentives to adopt the flexible technology are smaller or greater in a managerial delegation model than under strict profit maximization. We obtain that the asymmetric equilibrium in which only one firm adopts the flexible...
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