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Aguirre Pérez, Iñaki

Last name
Aguirre Pérez
First name
Iñaki
Country
-
  • Joan Robinson Was Almost Right: Output under Third-Degree Price Discrimination

    In this paper, we show that in order for third-degree price discrimination to increase total output, the demands of the strong markets should be, as conjectured by Robinson (1933), more concave than the demands of the weak markets. By making the distinction between adjusted concavity of the inverse demand and adjusted concavity of the direct demand, we are able to state necessary conditions and sufficient conditions for third-degree price discrimination to increase total output. Financial ...

    Multimarket Competition and Welfare Effects of Price discrimination

    The paper investigates the effects on welfare of price discrimination when a multimarket seller faces competition in one of its two markets. With respect to uniform pricing, price discrimination changes competition in such a way, that even with linear demands, price discrimination can be welfare-improving, both under strategic substitutes and strategic complements. Financial support from Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación and FEDER (ECO2009-07939, and from the Departamento de Educación, Un...

    Imperfect Competition

    Para quien es de utilidad: •Alumnos de Tª Microeconómica IV, curso 3º LE. •Alumnos de las asignaturas de Tª de Juegos y Organización Industrial del Máster en Economía: Instrumentos del Análisis Económico. Estas notas sobre competencia imperfecta están dedicadas al estudio de estructuras de mercado caracterizadas por la existencia de poder de mercado. Se estudia en primer lugar el monopolio, dedicando una atención especial a los diferentes tipos de discriminación de precios. A conti...

    Competencia imperfecta

    De utilidad para:•Alumnos de Tª Microeconómica IV, curso 3º LE. •Alumnos de las asignaturas de Tª de Juegos y Organización Industrial del Máster en Economía: Instrumentos del Análisis Económico. Estas notas sobre competencia imperfecta están dedicadas al estudio de estructuras de mercado caracterizadas por la existencia de poder de mercado. Se estudia en primer lugar el monopolio, dedicando una atención especial a los diferentes tipos de discriminación de precios. A continuación s...

    On the economics of the "meeting competition defense" under the Robinson-Patman Act

    Documento de trabajo In this paper we analyze the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination when competitive pressure varies across markets. In particular, we study the economic aspects of the Robinson-Patman Act associated with the “meeting competition defense.” Using equilibrium models, the main result we find is that this defense might be used successfully in cases of primary line injury precisely when it should not be used, namely when price discrimination reduces social ...

    Lehia ez perfektua-ri buruzko notak

    Para quien es de utilidad: - Alumnos de Tª Microeconómica IV, curso 3º LE. - Alumnos de las asignaturas de Tª de Juegos y Organización Industrial del Máster en Economía: Instrumentos del Análisis Económico. Estas notas sobre competencia imperfecta están dedicadas al estudio de estructuras de mercado caracterizadas por la existencia de poder de mercado. Se estudia en primer lugar el monopolio, dedicando una atención especial a los diferentes tipos de discriminación de precios. A c...

    Countervailing incentives in adverse selection models. A synthesis

    In this paper we propose a simple method of characterizing countervailing incentives in adverse selection problems. The key element in our characterization consists of analyzing properties of the full information problem. This allows solving the principal problem without using optimal control theory. Our methodology can also be applied to different economic settings: health economics, monopoly regulation, labour contracts, limited liabilities and environmental regulation. The Ministerio...

    Product Differentiation with Consumer Arbitrage

    Also published as Working Paper DFAEII 2003-01 We analyze the consequences of consumers behavior concerning personal arbitrage in a spatial discrimination context where firms know the consumers distribution but cannot distinguish them by location. The firms' equilibrium pricing policies provide incentives for consumers not to demand their preferred varieties of products but rather to purchase more standard varieties. This behavior may explain a decrease in observed market diversity: the de...

    Monopoly price discrimination with constant elasticity demand

    This paper presents new results on the welfare e¤ects of third-degree price discrimination under constant elasticity demand. We show that when both the share of the strong market under uniform pricing and the elasticity di¤erence between markets are high enough,then price discrimination not only can increase social welfare but also consumer surplus. The Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad(ECO2012-31626, an from the Departamento de Educación, Política Lingüística y Cultua del Gobiern...

    On the strategic choice of spatial price policy: the role of the pricing game rules

    In this paper, whe show that the strategic choice of spatial price policy under duopoly crucially depends on the rules of price competition. Thisse and Vives (1988) show that spatial price discrimination is a dominant strategy when the mill pricing firm is the leader and the discriminatory firm is the follower. When the leader-follower roles are reversed we find that equilibrium pricing policies depend on the consumer's reservation value. The pricing policy game has two equilibria in pure str...
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