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Effective and efficient corporate tax enforcement

Effective and efficient corporate tax enforcement
ARC | Discovery Projects
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  • Number of Sellers and Quantal Response Equilibrium Prices

    This paper studies the effects of increasing the number of sellers on Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) prices in homogeneous product Bertrand oligopoly markets. We show that the two most commonly used choice functions (power and logistic) lead to qualitatively different comparative-static predictions with respect to the relationship between number of firms and prices.

    Explaining Price Dispersion and Dynamics in Laboratory Bertrand Markets

    Ralph-C. Bayer; Hang Wu; Mickey Chan (2013)
    Projects: ARC | Effective and efficient corporate tax enforcement (DP120101831)
    This paper develops a quantal-response adaptive learning model which combines sellers' bounded rationality with adaptive belief learning in order to explain price dispersion and dynamics in laboratory Bertrand markets with perfect information. In the model, sellers hold beliefs about their opponents’ strategies and play quantal best responses to these beliefs. After each period, sellers update their beliefs based on the information learned from previous play. Maximum likelihood estimation sug...

    On the Credibility of Punishment in Repeated Social Dilemma Games

    Various experimental studies have shown that the availability of a punishment option can increase the prevalence of cooperative behaviour in repeated social dilemmas. A punishment option should only matter if it is a credible threat. We investigate if the degree of credibility depends on standard strategic equilibrium considerations (i.e. SPNE or NE logic) or stems from a non-strategic motivation such as reciprocity. We find that for punishment to be credible non-strategic motivations are suf...

    Learning from Inferred Foregone Payoffs

    A player's knowledge of her own actions and the corresponding own payoffs may enable her to infer or form belief about what the payoffs would have been if she had played differently. In studies of low-information game settings, however, players' ex-post inferences and beliefs have been largely ignored by quantitative learning models. For games with large strategy spaces, the omission may seriously weaken the predictive power of a learning model. We propose an extended payoff assessment learni...

    Do We Learn from Our Own Experience or from Observing Others?

    Learning in real life is based on different processes. Humans learn to a certain extent from their own experience but also learn by observing what non directly related others have done. In this paper we propose a generalized payoff assessment learning (GPAL) model which enables us to evaluate the relative influences of these two different models of learning. We apply GPAL to a homogeneous good Bertrand duopoly experiment with random matching and population pricing information. The model expla...

    The Occurrence of Tax Amnesties: Theory and Evidence

    Ralph-C. Bayer; Harald Oberhofer; Hannes Winner (2014)
    Projects: ARC | Effective and efficient corporate tax enforcement (DP120101831)
    This paper presents a theoretical model and empirical evidence to explain the occurrence of tax amnesties. We treat amnesties as endogenous, resulting from a strategic game between many taxpayers discounting future payments from punishment and a government that balances costs and benefits of amnesty programs. From the model we derive hypotheses about the factors that should influence the occurrence of tax amnesties. To test these predictions empirically, we rely on amnesty information from US...

    Cooperation and Distributive Conflict

    If either property rights or institutions are weak, agents who create wealth by cooperating will later have an incentive to fight over the distribution of it. In this paper we investigate theoretically and experimentally the circumstances under which welfare losses from investment in distributional contests destroy welfare gains from voluntary cooperation. We find that in situations, where the return to cooperation is high, subjects cooperate strongly and welfare exceeds the predicted non-coo...
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