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Discovery Projects - Grant ID: DP140101900

Title
Discovery Projects - Grant ID: DP140101900
Funding
ARC | Discovery Projects
Contract (GA) number
DP140101900
Start Date
2014/01/01
End Date
2016/12/31
Open Access mandate
no
Organizations
-
More information
http://purl.org/au-research/grants/arc/DP140101900

 

  • Peer punishment promotes enforcement of bad social norms

    Abbink, Klaus; Gangadharan, Lata; Handfield, Toby; Thrasher, John (2017)
    Projects: ARC | Discovery Projects - Grant ID: DP140101900 (DP140101900), ARC | Discovery Projects - Grant ID: DP150100242 (DP150100242)
    Social norms are an important element in explaining how humans achieve very high levels of cooperative activity. It is widely observed that, when norms can be enforced by peer punishment, groups are able to resolve social dilemmas in prosocial, cooperative ways. Here we show that punishment can also encourage participation in destructive behaviours that are harmful to group welfare, and that this phenomenon is mediated by a social norm. In a variation of a public goods game, in which the retu...

    Charitable Giving and Intermediation

    Charitable donations are often made through intermediaries who can fund themselves from these same donations. Donors who purchase charitable output through an intermediary incur a principal-agent problem with unobservable prices. We compare charitable giving in an experiment with and without intermediation. Overall, donors give less when an intermediary is introduced, a decision which can only be partly explained by donors’ beliefs about the price of charitable output. However, this overall r...
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