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Clark, D.; Hunt, S.; Malacaria, P. (2005)
Publisher: Elsevier
Journal: Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science
Languages: English
Types: Article
Subjects: Theoretical Computer Science, Computer Science(all), QA75
We show how information theory can be used to give a quantitative definition of interference between variables in imperative programming languages. In this paper we focus on a particular case of this definition of interference: leakage of information from private variables to public ones in While language programs. The major result of the paper is a quantitative analysis for this language that employs a use-definition graph to calculate bounds on the leakage into each variable.
  • The results below are discovered through our pilot algorithms. Let us know how we are doing!

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