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Leifeld, Philip; Schneider, Volker (2012)
Publisher: Wiley
Languages: English
Types: Article
Subjects: JA
Information exchange in policy networks is usually attributed to preference similarity, influence reputation, social trust, and institutional actor roles. We suggest that political opportunity structures and transaction costs play another crucial role and estimate a rich statistical network model on tie formation in the German toxic chemicals policy domain. The results indicate that the effect of preference similarity is absorbed by institutional, relational, and social opportunity structures. Political actors choose contacts who minimize transaction costs while maximizing outreach and information. We also find that different types of information exchange operate in complementary, but not necessarily congruent, ways.
  • The results below are discovered through our pilot algorithms. Let us know how we are doing!

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    • print(summary(model8))
    • print(model8$mle.lik) # also print the log likelihood sink()
    • # goodness-of-fit assessment as shown in figure 1
    • gof2 <- gof(model2 ~ idegree + espartners + distance, verbose = FALSE, burnin = 1e+5, interval = 1e+5)
    • gof4 <- gof(model4 ~ idegree + espartners + distance, verbose = FALSE, burnin = 1e+5, interval = 1e+5)
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