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fbtwitterlinkedinvimeoflicker grey 14rssslideshare1
Noto La Diega, Guido (2016)
Publisher: Larcier
Languages: English
Types: Article
Subjects: M100, M200, M900
This article sheds light on the main consumer law aspects of the sharing economy through an empirical analysis of online platforms. Given the recent European consultation with the purpose of understanding (whether, or, more likely) how to regulate platforms, it is critical that consumer law considerations will be part of future regulations. For instance, it is hardly acceptable that the consumer acts in the belief that the contractual party (thus the potentially liable party) is the platform, but in reality the former disclaims any responsibility and claims to be a mere intermediary , which only seldom actually is. After a critical analysis of the Italian legislative proposal on platforms and collaborative economy, the articles moves on to illustrate the use case of Uber, the $60 billion ride-hailing platform, which is acting at the margin of existing laws, thus giving rise to protests and debate around the world. After an assessment of the Italian ruling preventing Uber to provide the UberPop service in Italy, the use case is the perfect tool to show the main reasons for concern of consumers is the lack of awareness of their rights and obligations. This articles deals with two factors of the said lack: the contractual quagmire and the corporate labyrinth. In the conclusions, it is presented an ambitious, albeit feasible, practical proposal. It is suggested the development of a mobile app that helps the consumers to assess the legal quality of the contracts they are entering in order to access the services offered through the platform. At the same time, this app, called 'Awareness by Design', should contribute to raise awareness in consumers, thus creating critical mass and making platforms understand that trust, transparency, and accountability are competitive advantages.\ud \ud Cet article met en lumière les principaux aspects de droit de la consommation de l'écono-mie de partage à travers une analyse empirique des plates-formes en ligne. Compte tenu de la consultation européenne récente dans le but de comprendre (si, ou, plus probablement) la façon de réglementer les plates-formes, il est essentiel que les considérations de droit de la consommation fassent partie des futurs règlements. Par exemple, il est difficilement acceptable que le consommateur agisse dans la conviction que le cocontractant (donc la partie potentiel-lement responsable) est la plate-forme, alors qu'en réalité, celle-ci décline toute responsabilité et prétend être un simple intermédiaire. Après une analyse critique de la proposition législative italienne sur les plates-formes et de l'économie collaborative, les articles illustrent le cas d'uti-lisation de Uber, la plate-forme de covoiturage à 60 milliards de dollars, qui agit à la marge des lois en vigueur, ce qui donne lieu à des protestations et des débats autour du monde. Après une évaluation de la décision italienne empêchant Uber de fournir le service de UberPop en Ita-lie, l'examen de ce régime est l'outil idéal pour exposer que le principal motif de préoccupation des consommateurs concerne la connaissance de leurs droits et obligations. Cet article traite de deux facteurs qui sont à la base de cette difficulté : la multitude des contrats et le labyrinthe des entreprises. Dans les conclusions, il sera présenté une proposition pratique ambitieuse, mais réalisable. Il sera suggéré de développer une application mobile qui aide les consommateurs évaluer la qualité juridique des contrats qu'ils souscrivent dans le but d'accéder aux services offerts par la plate-forme. Dans le même temps, cette application, appelée « conscience by Design », devrait contribuer à sensibiliser les consommateurs, créant ainsi une masse critique et à faire comprendre aux plates-formes que la confiance, la transparence et la responsabilité sont des avantages concurrentiels.
  • The results below are discovered through our pilot algorithms. Let us know how we are doing!

    • 2 European Commission, Public consultation on the regulatory environment for platforms, online intermediaries, data and cloud computing and the collaborative economy-, 24  Septem ber 2015, https://ec.europa.eu/digistianlg-lem-arket/en/news/publicco-nsultatiorne-gulatoryenvironmentp-latformso-nlinei-ntermediarieds-ataa-nd-cloud. All the URLs of this paper have been accessed on 24 April 2016. The consultation was subject to many criticism, such as EDRI and Access, Key points for a successful consultation on internet platforms, Letter to the European Commission, 4  September 2015, https://edri.org/files/platforms_consultation20150904.pdf. Cf.  S.  McLean and M.  Samavi, “EC's consultation on online platforms proves controversial”, E-Commerce Law & Policy 2015, 17(12), 6-8.
    • 3 In this respect, a useful document which has been recently leaked is a joint letter from Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuan-ia, Luxem bourg, Poland, Slovenia, Sweden and United Kingdom to the Minister of Economic Affairs of The Netherlands in preparation of the Transport, Telecommunications and Energ-y and Com petitiveness Councimleetings 26  May 2016. The full text is available at https://regmedia. co.uk/2016/05/23/dsm-jointl-etter.pdf. The fourteen Member States stress that “[a]lternatives to regulation should be investigated rather than adding new burdensome regulation of businesses. Any regulatory proposals would have to be considered carefully”. It would seem that this view is shared by the European Commission.
    • 4 House of Lords EU Internal Market CSoumb-mittee, 17  September 2015, www.parliament. uk/business/committees/committeeas--z/lords-elect/eui-nternaml-arkets-ubcommittee/newsparliament2-015/onlinep-latformisn-quiryl-aunch, and Autorità per le Garanzie nelle -Comuni cazioni, 11  November 2015, www.agcom.it/documents/10179/2185185/Delibera-+153-57 CONS/9de98850-5624-404d-ba47-2c8ca6533556?version=1.0.
    • 5 See House of Lords Select Committee on European Union, 10th Report of Sess-i2o0n162,0O15nline Platforms and the Digital Single Market, April 2016, available at www.publications.parliament.uk/ pa/ld201516/ldselect/ldeucom/129/129.pdf, and Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni, Allegato A alla delibera n. 165/16/CONS I Consummer Communications Services, May 20-16, avail able at www.agcom.it/documents/10179/5054337/Allegat-o6+-220916/9d7168c6-6205-47e7- a2d9-23cccdc1df59?version=1.0. However, the latter is just the first of a forthcoming number of reports; it is limited to the messaging mobiles apps.
    • 6 See article 22 of the draft statute on a digital Republic on the “Loyalty of platforms” which amends article L. 11-15-1 of theCode de la consommation (www.assembleen-ationale.fr/14/projets/pl3318. asp). The projet de loi pour une République numérique, output of an extensive online consultation, has been adopted by thAessemblée nationale on 26  January 2016 (first reading). The discussion in séance publique is set to take place on 26, 27, 28  April and 3  May 2016. The second alinéa of article L. 11-15-1 will read:to“ut opérateur de plateforme en ligne est tenu de délivrer au consommateur une information loyale, claire et transparente sur les conditions générales d'utilisation du service d'intermédiation qu'il propose et sur les modalités de référencement, de classement et de déréférencement des contenus, biens ou
    • 12 Cf. I. Graef, “Market definition and market power in data: the case of online plWaotrflodrCmoms”-, petition 2015, 38(4), 473-505.
    • 13 K.  Dervodeja et al., The Sharing Economy Accessibility Based Business Models for Peer-to-Peer Markets, European Commission Business Innovation Observatory, September 2013.
    • 14 COM(2016)288, para. 2.
    • 15 COM(2016)288, para. 5(iii).
    • 16 Ibid.
    • 17 Ibid.
    • 18 A. Strowel and W. Vergote, Fix the Economics First, Then Focus on the Right Regulation, Written ev-i dence (OPL0087), Digital Platforms: To Regulate or Not To Regulate?, http://data.parliament.uk/ writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocumenint/terun-aml-arkets-ubcommittee/ onlinep-latformsa-nd-the-eu-digitals-inglem-arket/written/26643.html.
    • 20 For instance, cropslsa-tform tracking, encryption, lack of clarity on information inp-uts and out puts, etc.Cf. G. Schmid and T. Gausling, “Data protection and the right of personality with regard to rating platforms: decisions of the German Federal SupremeJCouornuarlto”f,Intellectual Property Law & Practice 2016, 11(1), 46-48.
    • 21 Some contractual issues related to online platforms are lack of awareness of the other contracti party, distance sales, asymmetry, etc.
    • 22 For instance, machine learning algorithmbsl,ogcekoin-g, usegre-nerated content,  eItch.ave dealt with intellectual property and cloud platformostion LGa. DNiega, “Le idee e il muro del suono. I programmi per elaboratore nella più recente giurisprudenza eEuurroopapeead”i,ritto privato 2013, II, 543-596. For some specific perspectives see C.a Csalonga and A. Gevorkian, “The liability battle over online videsoh-aring platformIsn”t,ellectual Property Magazine 2012, Sep, 44-45; T. Basheer and W. Smith, “The impact of new streaming platforms on music anEd-CIPo”m,merce Law & Policy 2015, 17(7), 15-16; M. Ferrante, “E-commerce platforms: liability for trade mark infringement reflections on Chinese courts' practice and remedies against the sale of counterfeits on thJoeuirnatlerofnet”, Intellectual Property Law & Practice 2015, 10(4), 255-261; P. Goldstein, “Future platforms for c-opy right licensingIn”,ternational Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 2015, 46(2), 153-154; L. Scaife, “A game of two halves: the issues presented by trading standards law when exploiting image rights via social media platforEmnst”e,rtainment Law Review 2013, 24(4), 120-124.
    • 23 For instance, the issues related to digital labour and the qualification of the workers as “users” t circumvent the employees protections.
    • 24 It is interesting the analysis of mpulalytie-r online games and (even child) pornography enabl-ed by vir tual reality techniques (VR), as carried outoinerTe.n H,“The European liability and responsibility of providers of onlipnlea-tforms such as 'Second LifeJo'u”,rnal of Information, Law & Technology 2009, 1. For other criminal law aspeccf.t sA, .  Fong, “Dissemination of libel by online social platforms: reinterpreting laws to meet the informationIntaegrnea”t,ional Company and Commercial Law Review 2014, 25(2), 39-44; Z. Akhtar, “Malicious communications, media platforms and legal sanctions”, Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 2014, 20(6), 179-187.
    • 25 There are many issues that are not strictly of consumer law, but can nevertheless affect consumers. These aspects will not be covered in this study. See, e.gr.,auJ.g Chan, D. Palmer and E. Reid, “Online lending platforms and securitisation: bringing the wholesale market to thBeuti-ndividual”, terworths Journal of International Banking & Financial Law 2015, 30(6), 348-352 and W. Maycock and C. Hill, “New rules enhance clarity for platforms andCuomseprlisa”n,ce Monitor 2013, Jun, 14-15.
    • 26 See, for instance, G. oNto La Diega, The British perspectives on the Internet of Things. The Clouds of Things-Health use case, in Internet of Things: Legal Issues and Challenges towards a Hyperconnected World, ed. Centre for Law & Public Utilities of the Seoul National University-,9290;1G5., N45oto La Diega and I. Walden, “Contracting for the 'Internet of Things': Looking into tohp.e cNit.est”,
    • 27 For a range of possible meanings of “private ordering” saesetlDe. (Ced.), The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology Innovation, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2009, 312, especially no-t4e4s. 42
    • 28 European Commission, com. “A Digital Single Market Strategy for Eoup.rcoitp.e,”3,.3.1.
    • 29 Commission Staff Working DocumeAnDt,igital Single Market Strategy for Europe - Analysis and Evidence Accompanyng, COM(2015) 192 final, SWD(2015) 100 final, 6.5.2015, 4.5.
    • 30 D. Cardon and A. Casilli, Qu'est-ce que le Digital Labor?, INA, Bry-sur-Marne, 2015, for instance, see the activity of posting as a job that deserves to be remunerated.
    • 40 Cf., on the legal basis of the domestic legislation, Article 3 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. On the nseocnt-orial scope of the provision see Corte di Cassazione, ordinanza, 25 November 2011, no. 24906,Nuova giurisprudenza civile commentata, I, 2012, 298.
    • 44 Decreto legislativo, 6  September 2005, no.  206,codice del consumo, as recently amended bdyecreto legislativo 15 January2016, no. 8.
    • 45 Supra, note 28.
    • 46 On 24  February 2015, the term has entered the French Wiktionary, which now defines it as the adoption of a commerce model where one provides resources to the clients via their smartphones on demand and reatlim-e. However, the wordinugbe“risation” is more common in France. For some legal issues related to the “uberification”, syeedN,“.R Segulating UberificatioCno”m,puter and Telecommunications Law Review, 2016, 22(1), 14-25.
    • 47 T. Siegel and B. Kit, “Hollywood Studios Race to Release Uber TheCmoemde-dies”, The Hollywood Reporter 20 April 2016 (9 April of the hard copy), www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/competinguber-themed-comedies-works8-85647.
    • 48 C.  Blackman et al., Towards a future Internet: Interrelations between technological, social and economic trends, Final Report for DG Information Society and Media, November 2010, http://cordis.europa. eu/fp7/ict/fire/docs/tafifni-alr-eport_en.pdf.
    • 49 Cf., for instance, S.a Brratt and J. Morgan, “Uber and above?”J,ournal of the Law Society of Scotland 2016, 61(3), 26-27; N. Brown, “Uber: TfL and the taxonomy of taximeteCrosm”,puters & Law 2015, 25(4), 23-26; N. Syed, “The rise of Uberification: getting thaehegaod- in LondonPr”actical Law Companies, 2015, 26(10); J. van der Luit-Drummond, “Defining a driver as an employee or a 'partner'”, Solicitors Journal 2015, 159(30), 8; F. Heinemann and M. Shume, “Uber, Airbnb, Netflix... Aust-ra lia's steps to tax the sharing and digital econoTm.Pi.eI.sI”.,T. 2015, 13(7), 13-15; V. Barnett and L. Tomlinson, “The Uber app: the legal background to the outEr-Caogmem”,erce Law & Policy 2014, 16(10), 8.
    • 50 See, e.g., the protest of taxi drivers in Budapest on 26 April 2016 and in Rio de Janeiro on 1 April 2016. Below, I will analyse an Italian case regarding the qualification of Uber services as taxies.
    • 51 Whereas according to the company, Uber drivers earn more than $100,000, it has been estimated that they actually earn $8.77 per hour after exCpf.e nDs.e Ms.acmillan, “Uber Cuts Deals to Lower Car Costs”,The Wall Streets Journal Blog, 25 November 2013, and C. O'Donovan and J. SingerVine, “How Much Uber Drivers Actually Make Per HBouuzrzF”,eed, 23 June 2016.
    • 53 See Growing and growing up, 21 April 2016, https://newsroom.uber.com/growainndg-g-rowingu-p. In exchange of the status of independent contracts, drivers will receive $84  milli-on and, sub sequently, $16  million if Uber goes public. The settlement regaOr'dCsontnhoer case andHakan Yucesoy et al v Uber Technologies, Travis Kalanick, and Ryan Graves (4:15-cv-00262-EMC). On the issue of the qualification as an employee see, e.gva.,nJ.d er Luit-Drummond, “Defining a driver as an employee or a 'partnerS'o”l,icitors Journal 2015, 159(30), 8. More generally on the decline of employment contracts (with express reference to Uber), seesbSit. tN,“Is employment becoming obsolete?”,Employment Law Journal 2016, 169(Apr), 14-16.
    • 54 On the topic of liability see aSr. rBatt and J. Morgan, “Uber and above?”J,ournal of the Law Society of Scotland 2016, 61(3), 26-27.
    • 55 Cf., for instance, C&R, “Uber under threat of ban in France and at home for breach of regulations”, Compliance & Risk 2015, 4(4), 1,15.
    • 56 Cf. F. Heinemann and M. Shume, “Uber, Airbnb, Netflix... Australia's steps to tax the sharing and digital economiesT”,.P.I.I.T. 2015, 13(7), 13-15.
    • 57 See, e.g., F. Nyman, “Innovation Uber alliePso”s,t Magazine 2015, May 14, 28-30.
    • 58 For a first recocnf., N. Syed, “Regulating UberificatioCno”m,puter and Telecommunications Law Review 2016, 22(1), 14-25; from some insight in the company and the work ofhiotussine-department see K. Dowell, “Along for the ridLea”w,yer 2016, 30(8), 12-13.
    • 59 J.  Hempel, “The inside story of Uber's radical rebrandWinirged”,2  February 2016, www.wired. com/2016/02/thei-nside-storyb-ehind-ubers-colorfurle-design/?mbid=nl_ozy.
    • 60 There are many disputes that can indirectly affect Uber. See, forPiantsritcaknCcoett,er et al. v Lyft, Inc, et al, case no. 3:13c-v-04065, available at https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2796429/ ChhabriaR-ejection.pdf.
    • 61 Tribunale di Milano, Sezione specializzata in materia di impreosardi“nAan”,za, 25  May 2015, available at www.giureta.unipa.it/Trib_Milano_25052015.pdf and Tribunale di Milano, Sezione specializzata in materia di impresa “oAr”d,inanza, 2  July 2015 (the appealr,eclamo), available at www.dimt.it/wpc-ontent/uploads/2015/07/ordinasnuz-rae-clamoU- ber.pdf. There is a another (unpublished) order, where Judge Marina Tavassi, President of the deciding court, has rejected the claim with which Uber asked the suspension of the blocking of the app, while one waited for the final decision on threeclamo. For a deeper analysis of the first case, seeuDrd. iS, “Concorrenza sleale e nuove forme di trasporto condiviso: il Tribunale di Milano inibisce 'URbeivrisPtaopd'i”,Diritto dell'Economia, dei Trasporti e dell'Ambiente 2015, 375.
    • 62 Transport for London v Uber London Ltd and others [2015] All ER (D) 137 (Oct).Cf. V. Barnett and L. Tomlinson, “The Uber app: the legal background to the outEr-Caogmem”,erce Law & Policy 2014, 16(10), 8; N. Syed, “The rise of Uberification: getting thaehegaod- in LondonPr”actical Law Compa-
    • 73 Last updated on 11 January 2016, the T&C are available at www.uber.com/legal/terms/gb. It is noteworthy that the previous version was of 4 December 2015: the good practice of lea-ving the pre vious versions of the legals available would have enabled us to understand the need to change afte such a short time. The US version has been updated on 2 January 2016, whereas the previous version, not available any longer, was of 8 April 2015 (www.uber.com/legal/terms/us).
    • 74 Last updated on 15 July 2015, see www.uber.com/legal/privacy/users/en.
    • 75 Effective as of 15 July 2015, see www.uber.com/legal/privacy/dnroivneu-rss/-en.
    • 76 Effective as of 15 July 2015, www.uber.com/legal/privacy/cookies/en.
    • 77 www.uber.com/legal/copyright/global/. There are three versions: global, US, and Germany.
    • 78 www.uber.com/legal/other/zteorloe-rancpeo- licy.
    • 79 www.uber.com/legal/other/ndoisncr-iminationpo-licy.
    • 80 www.uber.com/legal/other/fireaprrmosh-ibitionpo-licy.
    • 81 www.uber.com/legal/other/guidelfionrel-sa-we-nforcement.
    • 82 www.uber.com/legal/other/servoifc-lee-gald-ocuments. In the version read on 10  December 2015, there was no reference to the service of legal documents.
    • 83 Last updated on 14  February 2016, www.uber.com/legal/commercial/protmnoct-nionu-senglish/201-602-04. This document did not exist during the study conducted on 10  December 2015. Alongside the Promotion Terms and Conditions, the US users should take into account also UberEATS General Terms and Conditiownws,w.uber.com/legal/commercial/uberEAtnTcSu-s/ eats-tnc-2016-02-24.
    • 84 The Promotion Terms and Conditions open by saying “These Promotion Terms and Conditions ('Promotion Terms') are expressly incorporated into and made a part of the Promotion Agreement Cover Sheet ('Cover Sheet')”. The Cover Sheet, however, is not publicly available.
    • 85 Last updated on 2  February 2016, www.uber.com/legal/other/accesstsaibtielmiteyn-t. In the list of “other documents” the name is “Accessibility Statement”. This document did not exist during the study conducted on 10 December 2015.
    • 108 We are not referring now to the three categories of users, neither to all the actor-s providing com plementary services (cloud storage, redundancy, etc.), nor to all the actors related to the apps tha interoperate with Uber.
    • 109 As one can read searching this company in the registry held by the California Secretary of State, the company filed the application on 9 August 2010, is not registered under no. C3318029, and falls under the Delaware jurisdiction (the search engine is available at http://kepler.sos.ca.gov).
    • 110 http://fortune.com/2015/10/22/ubtearx--shell. It is impossible to have a precise number of subsidiaries, affiliates, etc. For instance, according to other sources the US parent has incorporated more than thirty different foreign subsidiaries since 2012 (www.scribd.com/doc/232316744/UberIreland2--of-4).
    • 111 In respect of the Private Hire Vehicles (London) Act 1998, Uber London is the holder of the relevant private hire vehicle (PHV) operator's licence.
    • 112 In respect of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976, Uber Britann-ia is the hol der of the relevant PHV operator's licence in each of the district councils (other than- the Metropol tan Police District and the City of London) in which it operates. In respect of the Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982, Uber Britannia is the holder of the relevant booking office licences.
    • 113 Uber B.V. provides the software application and related services.
    • 114 In respect of the Taxis Act (Northern Ireland) 2008, Uber NIR is the holder of the rel-evant opera tor's licence.
    • 115 By using the serach engine of the UK Companies House, one finds Uber UK Limited, which has no relation to the company here analysed. More information on the former can be found at www.uberuk.com/aboutus.
    • 116 It may seem that the main defendant should be Uber Technologies, Inc. (http://blogs.wsj.com/ law/2014/10/17/ubert-echnologiefsig-htsf-renchc-ourtr-uling).
    • 117 www.licensedtransportuncovered.com/muabnerch-estera-nd-the-globalp-aper-trail.
    • 118 UberMarketplace.co.uk (the “Marketplace”) is operated by Uber B.V. (“Uber”), a compan- y registe red in the Netherlands under number 56317441 with a registered address of Vijzelstraat 68, 1017 HL Amsterdam. Use of the Marketplace will constitute acceptance of these Terms and Conditions... The Marketplace enables Uber partdnreirv-ers, who are independent contractors using the Uber Platform in the United Kingdom, as well as new drivers not yet on the Uber platform but that intend to join the Uber platform (“Drivers”) to be eligible to receive certain products, services and/or discounts
    • 139 Schrems (Judgment) [2015] EUECJ C3-62/14 (6 October 2015) [2016] 2 CMLR 2.
    • 140 www.snapchat.com/terms; www.whatsapp.com/legal/; www.spotify.com/us/leguaselr/-endagreement/plain/; www.apple.com/legal/inteserrnveitc-es/itunes/.
    • 141 According to Nr. tIi, “Scambi senza accordoR”,ivista trimestrale di diritto e procedura civile 1994, II, 347, the decline of the agreement, stemming from the crisis of the word and of dialogue, dilutes the contract and transforms it into the mere combination of two unilateral acctfs..GH.o Owpepvoe,r, “Disumanizzazione del contratRtiovi”s,ta di diritto civile 1998, I, 525.
    • 142 While I am finalising this article, I am reading that, on 26  April P2o0w1e6rs, eitnal v  Richard et al, the 24th  Judicial District Court has dismissed a lawsuit from Jefferson Parish taxi drivers who claimed that Uber drivers had carried out unfair trade practiceosb.lWes,.P“I.n NUber challenge, taxi drivers lose Jefferson Parish lawTshueitT”i,mes-Picayune 26 April 2016, www.nola.com/crime/ index.ssf/2016/04/uber_jefferson_parish_drivers.html, informs as well that there is a similar suit in New Orleans between cab drivers and UberX drivers, and a pending Jefferson Parish government suit against the company for allegedly violating parish ordinances.
    • 143 D. Cadbury et al., “A disruptive influencCeo”mpetition Law Insight, 2015, 14(12), 13-15, examine how the United Kingdom, the European Union, Belgium, France, Germany and Italy are attempting to regulate Uber.
    • 144 Alongside the analysed legislative proposal on online platforms and the letter of the AGCM, furthe research is needed on the activity of regulators. For instance, see Autorità di regolazione dei traspor (Transport AuthoritAyt)t,o di segnalazione al Governo e al Parlamento sull'autotrasporto di persone non di linea: taxi, noleggio con conducente e servizi tecnologici per la mobilità, 21 May 2015, (http://www.autoritatrasporti.it/wcpo-ntent/uploads/2015/06/Atdtio-s-egnalazione_signed.pdf). On car pooling, see, e.g. decreto ministeriale 1 February 2013 (Ministero delle Infrastrutture e dei TraspDoirfftuis)ioonned“ei sistemi di trasporto intelligenti (ITS) in Italia”, which implements directive 2010/40/EU on the framework
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