Remember Me
Or use your Academic/Social account:


Or use your Academic/Social account:


You have just completed your registration at OpenAire.

Before you can login to the site, you will need to activate your account. An e-mail will be sent to you with the proper instructions.


Please note that this site is currently undergoing Beta testing.
Any new content you create is not guaranteed to be present to the final version of the site upon release.

Thank you for your patience,
OpenAire Dev Team.

Close This Message


Verify Password:
Verify E-mail:
*All Fields Are Required.
Please Verify You Are Human:
fbtwitterlinkedinvimeoflicker grey 14rssslideshare1
Williams, JRG (2017)
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Languages: English
Types: Article
Sometimes it is indeterminate what an agent morally ought do. This generates a Decision Ought Challenge — to give moral guidance to agents in such a scenario. This paper is a field guide to the options for a theory of the decision - ought for cases of indeterminacy. Three categories of view are evaluated, and the best representative for each is identified.
  • The results below are discovered through our pilot algorithms. Let us know how we are doing!

    • 2. Timothy Williamson, Vagueness (London: Routledge, 1994).
    • 3. See J. Robert G. Williams, “Nonclassical Minds and Indeterminate Survival,” Philosophical Review 123 (2014): 379-428, and “Indeterminacy, Angst and Conflicting Values,” Ratio 29 (2016): 412-33.
    • 4. See J. Robert G. Williams, “Decision Making under Indeterminacy,” Philosopher's Imprint 14 (2014): 1-34.
    • 5. Williams, “Indeterminacy, Angst and Conflicting Values.”
    • 21. See Jane Friedman, “Rational Agnosticism and Degrees of Belief,” in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, ed. Tamar Gender and John Hawthorne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 4:57-81.
    • 22. A very helpful survey of formal models of (quotidian) uncertainty can be found in Joseph Y. Halpern, Reasoning about Uncertainty, rev. ed. (2003; repr., Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005).
    • 23. See Ruth Chang, “Parity, Interval Value and Choice,” Ethics 115 (2005): 315-50.
    • 24. Schoenfield, “Decision Making in the Face of Parity,” develops an interesting argument against using imprecise beliefs (at least as standardly modeled with sets of probability functions) as a model of uncertainty characteristic of value aggregation. Her point, if correct, would also refute the indeterminacy-based model defended in my “Indeterminacy, Angst and Conflicting Values” and discussed in Sec. V below.
    • 25. Compare the discussion of moral twin earth and moral vagueness in Miriam Schoenfield, “Moral Vagueness Is Ontic Vagueness,” Ethics 126 (2015): 257-82.
    • 26. See Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons, “Troubles on Moral Twin Earth: Moral Queerness Revived,” Synthese 92 (1992): 221-60.
    • 27. Another argument in the literature, found in Constantinescu's “Moral Vagueness” and prefigured in Tom Dougherty's “Vague Value” (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 [2013]: 352-72), is the charge that epistemicism about moral matters, with its implica34 (2000): 1-30 (repr. Truth and the Absence of Fact [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001], 278-311). But of course this is exactly what Barnes and Cameron must deny.
    • 32. Derek Parfit, On What Matters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 2:559-60.
  • No related research data.
  • No similar publications.

Share - Bookmark

Funded by projects


Cite this article