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Cartwright, Edward (2004)
Publisher: Economics Letters
Languages: English
Types: Article
Subjects: H

Classified by OpenAIRE into

arxiv: Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory
We consider the stability of the risk-dominant equilibrium in a two-strategy coordination game when players behave myopically. The case of a lattice matching network is compared to that of a random network. We demonstrate that the risk-dominant equilibrium is unstable given a lattice network and stable given a random network.

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