LOGIN TO YOUR ACCOUNT

Username
Password
Remember Me
Or use your Academic/Social account:

CREATE AN ACCOUNT

Or use your Academic/Social account:

Congratulations!

You have just completed your registration at OpenAire.

Before you can login to the site, you will need to activate your account. An e-mail will be sent to you with the proper instructions.

Important!

Please note that this site is currently undergoing Beta testing.
Any new content you create is not guaranteed to be present to the final version of the site upon release.

Thank you for your patience,
OpenAire Dev Team.

Close This Message

CREATE AN ACCOUNT

Name:
Username:
Password:
Verify Password:
E-mail:
Verify E-mail:
*All Fields Are Required.
Please Verify You Are Human:
fbtwitterlinkedinvimeoflicker grey 14rssslideshare1
Languages: English
Types: Doctoral thesis
Subjects: HB, HG
This thesis comprises three chapters centered on two common themes.\ud The first theme is the application of non-cooperative game theory\ud to economic questions; the second is the study of the kind of\ud arrangements that can arise in the labour market as a response to\ud asymmetric information.\ud \ud The first chapter surveys recent developments in non-cooperative game\ud theory, and then attempts an extension of the recent results\ud characterising perfect equilibrium payoffs in repeated games without\ud discounting to more general games. We choose the dynamic game framework\ud for the generalisation, and shows that there are two jointly, but not\ud indi vidually sufficient condi tions for the generalisation to\ud go through.\ud \ud We then turn to an application of these ideas to the theory of longterm\ud contracts. The main motivation for this is that the view that\ud wages and employment are determined by risk-sharing implicit contracts\ud is now a well established alternative to fixed-price and marketclearing\ud theories. In general, long-term arrangements may mitigate\ud inefficiencies in the short-term contract that arise from various\ud sorts of asymmetric information which are likely to be prevalent in\ud worker-firm relationships. In this chapter two things are attempted;\ud first, we try to integrate the game-theoretic approach to contractinq\ud of Radner with the work of Townshend, Rogerson, Roberts and Manning\ud among others, and second, we characterise the optimal contract, and\ud obtain some new results.\ud \ud The labour market is also the topic of the third chapter. Here, we\ud attempt to extend a well-known model of "frictional" labour market\ud equilibrium to the case where onr or both sides of the market\ud differ in inherent characteristics (e.g. skills) which may be\ud observable or unobservable. We show first that the equilibrium\ud may be inefficient even in the absence of externalities which work\ud through the matching technology. Also, the model with unobservable\ud characteristics provides a framework for a theoretical anal;Tsis of\ud the practice of firms of screening workers by unemployment duration.\ud We show that in our model, there are screening equilibria, and also\ud investigate in some detail the impact of exogenous variables on the\ud equilibrium.
  • The results below are discovered through our pilot algorithms. Let us know how we are doing!

    • pissarides, C.A. (1 QR<;a) "Taxes, Subsidies, and Equilibrium lTnemployrnent", Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 52, pp.121-}1S
    • Spence, A M (19RO) "Multi-product, ()uantity-dependent Prices and Profitability Constraints", Review of Economic Studies, Vol 47
    • Taylor, J B (19RO) "Aggregate Dynamics and Staggered Contracts", Journal of Political Economy, Vol R8, p 1-23
    • Tobin, J (1972) "Inflation and Unemployment" American Economic Review Vol. h2, p.1-17
  • No related research data.
  • No similar publications.

Share - Bookmark

Cite this article