LOGIN TO YOUR ACCOUNT

Username
Password
Remember Me
Or use your Academic/Social account:

CREATE AN ACCOUNT

Or use your Academic/Social account:

Congratulations!

You have just completed your registration at OpenAire.

Before you can login to the site, you will need to activate your account. An e-mail will be sent to you with the proper instructions.

Important!

Please note that this site is currently undergoing Beta testing.
Any new content you create is not guaranteed to be present to the final version of the site upon release.

Thank you for your patience,
OpenAire Dev Team.

Close This Message

CREATE AN ACCOUNT

Name:
Username:
Password:
Verify Password:
E-mail:
Verify E-mail:
*All Fields Are Required.
Please Verify You Are Human:
fbtwitterlinkedinvimeoflicker grey 14rssslideshare1
Languages: English
Types: Doctoral thesis
Subjects: BF0309
This thesis identifies, in Nancy’s The Fall of Sleep, a crucial critique of phenomenology. A criticism that demarcates, or limits, phenomenology in declaring: “There is no phenomenology of sleep”. Taking-up this challenge, we consider a number of ways that phenomenologists have, and could, approach sleep. Our thesis, however, does not simply\ud offer possible responses to the problem but also finds, in these answers, important insights into the essence of the charge itself. Sleep and phenomenology are found to be mutually de-limiting – each binds the other, whilst offering foundational insights into its counterpart. Fundamentally, we bring phenomenologies of sleep, as opposed to simply phenomenology, into dialogue with this, Nancean, critique of phenomenology and with Nancy’s account of sleep itself. We describe the distinctly different slumbering interpretations of sleep present, and conspicuously absent, in the work of: Husserl, Heidegger, and Levinas. Part I, after initially elaborating the challenge, presents a direct Husserlian counter, via a recent reconstituting of Husserl’s late notes on sleep. The strengths and weaknesses of this phenomenological investigation sharpens the problem of sleep and leads us to pull back from consciousness-centred accounts. Part II, in contrast, develops our own hypothetical Heideggerian answer. This Part, the longest, uses Heidegger’s existential and comparative analytics to ask ‘Does Dasein sleep?’ This question reveals internal ambiguities of sleep – positioned between existence, life, and death. Part III withdraws from Heideggerian thinking through Levinas’s incisive, and early, interpretation of sleep. This Levinasian retracting opens the possibility of returning to Nancy’s challenge and corresponding description of sleep. Now this radical account is located in relation to, and in communication with, the somnological-phenomenological findings we have awakened in our thesis. The thesis ends by indicating a possible, future, return back from sleep to phenomenology – a dream, still hazy from sleep, of a somnolent phenomenology.
  • The results below are discovered through our pilot algorithms. Let us know how we are doing!

    • Derrida, Jacques. Edmund Husserl's Origin of Geometry, an Introduction. Translated by John P Leavey. Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1989.
    • Staehler, Tanja. 'How is a Phenomenology of Fundamental Moods Possible?'. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15.3 (2007): 415-433.
  • No related research data.
  • No similar publications.

Share - Bookmark

Download from

Cite this article