Remember Me
Or use your Academic/Social account:


Or use your Academic/Social account:


You have just completed your registration at OpenAire.

Before you can login to the site, you will need to activate your account. An e-mail will be sent to you with the proper instructions.


Please note that this site is currently undergoing Beta testing.
Any new content you create is not guaranteed to be present to the final version of the site upon release.

Thank you for your patience,
OpenAire Dev Team.

Close This Message


Verify Password:
Verify E-mail:
*All Fields Are Required.
Please Verify You Are Human:
fbtwitterlinkedinvimeoflicker grey 14rssslideshare1
Xeni Dassiou; Dionysius Glycopantis (2013)
Publisher: Hindawi Publishing Corporation
Journal: Game Theory
Languages: English
Types: Article
Subjects: Mathematics, HB, QA1-939
The paper has as a starting point the work of the philosopher Professor D. Lewis. We provide a detailed presentation and complete analysis of the sender/receiver Lewis signaling game using a game theory extensive form, decision tree formulation. It is shown that there are a number of Bayesian equilibria. We explain which equilibrium is the most likely to prevail. Our explanation provides an essential step for understanding the formation of a language convention. The informational content of signals is discussed and it is shown that a correct action is not always the result of a truthful signal. We allow for this to be reflected in the payoff of the sender. Further, concepts and approaches from neighbouring disciplines, notably economics, suggest themselves immediately for interpreting the results of our analysis (rational expectations, self-fulfilling prophesies).
  • The results below are discovered through our pilot algorithms. Let us know how we are doing!

    • [8] J. Farrell, “Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games,” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 514-531, 1993.
    • [9] R. van Rooij, “Conversational implicatures and communication theory,” in Current and New Directions in Discourse and Dialogue, J. van Kuppevelt and R. W. Smith, Eds., pp. 282-303, Kluwer Academic, Dodrecht, The Netherlands, 2004.
    • [10] R. van Rooij, “Signaling games select Horn strategies,” Linguistics and Philosophy, vol. 27, pp. 493-527, 2004.
    • [11] P. D. Taylor and L. B. Jonker, “Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics,” Mathematical Biosciences, vol. 40, no. 1-2, pp. 145-156, 1978.
    • [12] S. M. Huttegger, “Evolutionary explanations of indicatives and imperatives,” Erkenntnis, vol. 66, no. 3, pp. 409-436, 2007.
    • [13] K. Binmore, Fun and Games: A Text on Game eThory , D.C. Heath and Company, 1992.
    • [14] M. J. Osborne and A. Rubinstein, A Course in Game eThory , eTh MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass, USA, 1994.
    • [15] K. Binmore, Playing for Real: A Text on Game eThory , Oxford University Press, New York, NY, USA, 2007.
    • [16] E. Rasmusen, Games and Information, Blackwell Publishing Company, London, UK, 4th edition, 2007.
    • [17] J. A. Barrett, “eTh evolution of coding in signaling games,” ehTory and Decision , vol. 67, no. 2, pp. 223-237, 2009.
    • [18] P. Parikh, “Radical semantics: a new theory of meaning,” Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 35, no. 4, pp. 349-391, 2006.
    • [19] B. Skyrms, Evolution of the Social Contract, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1996.
    • [20] R. J. Herrnstein, “On the law of eefct,” Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, vol. 13, pp. 243-266, 1970.
    • [21] G. Aggarwal, A. Fiat, A. V. Goldberg, J. Hartline, N. Immorlica, and M. Sudan, “Derandomization of auctions,” in Proceedings of the 37th ACM Symposium on eThory of Computing (STOC '05) , 2005.
    • [22] A. Bannerjee, “A simple model of herd behaviour,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 107, pp. 797-817, 1992.
    • [23] A. Bikhchandani, D. Hirshleifer, and I. Welch, “A theory of fads, fashion, customs and cultural change as informational cascades,” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 100, pp. 992-1026, 1992.
    • [24] C. J. Choi, X. Dassiou, and S. Gettings, “Herding behaviour and the size of customer base as a commitment to quality,” Economica, vol. 67, no. 267, pp. 375-398, 2000.
    • [25] I. Welch, “Sequential sales, learning, and cascades,” Journal of Finance, vol. 47, pp. 695-732, 1992.
    • [26] D. Glycopantis, A. Muir, and N. C. Yannelis, “On extensive form implementation of contracts in diefrential information economies,” Economic eThory , vol. 21, no. 2-3, pp. 495-526, 2003.
  • No related research data.
  • No similar publications.

Share - Bookmark

Cite this article