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Publisher: American Economic Association
Languages: English
Types: Article
Subjects: QA, HD28
This paper explores the implications of costly information acquisition in a strategic communication setting. We show that equilibrium decisions based on a biased expert's advice may be more precise than when information is directly acquired by the decision maker, even if the expert is not more efficient than the decision maker at acquiring information. This result bears important implications for organization design. Communication by an expert to a decision maker may often outperform delegation of the decision-making authority to the expert, as well as centralization by the decision maker of both information acquisition and decision-making authority.
  • The results below are discovered through our pilot algorithms. Let us know how we are doing!

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