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Publisher: University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Journal: Journal of Political Economy
Languages: English
Types: Article
Subjects: HB, QA76
Identifiers:doi:10.1086/676597
We study a novel mechanism design model in which agents each\ud arrive sequentially and choose one action from a set of actions with\ud unknown rewards. The information revealed by the principal affects\ud the incentives of the agents to explore and generate new information.\ud We characterize the optimal disclosure policy of a planner whose goal\ud is to maximize social welfare. One interpretation of our result is the\ud implementation of what is known as the "wisdom of the crowd". This\ud topic has become increasingly relevant with the rapid spread of the\ud Internet over the past decade.\ud