LOGIN TO YOUR ACCOUNT

Username
Password
Remember Me
Or use your Academic/Social account:

CREATE AN ACCOUNT

Or use your Academic/Social account:

Congratulations!

You have just completed your registration at OpenAire.

Before you can login to the site, you will need to activate your account. An e-mail will be sent to you with the proper instructions.

Important!

Please note that this site is currently undergoing Beta testing.
Any new content you create is not guaranteed to be present to the final version of the site upon release.

Thank you for your patience,
OpenAire Dev Team.

Close This Message

CREATE AN ACCOUNT

Name:
Username:
Password:
Verify Password:
E-mail:
Verify E-mail:
*All Fields Are Required.
Please Verify You Are Human:
fbtwitterlinkedinvimeoflicker grey 14rssslideshare1
Publisher: Brill
Languages: English
Types: Article
Subjects:
Many of us read Peter Singer’s work on our obligations to those in desperate need with our students. Famously, Singer argues that we have a moral obligation to give a significant portion of our assets to famine relief. If my own experience is not atypical, it is quite common for students, upon grasping the implications of Singer’s argument, to ask whether Singer gives to famine relief. In response it might be tempting to remind students of the (so called) ad hominem fallacy of attacking the person advancing an argument rather than the argument itself. In this paper I argue that the “ad hominem reply” to students’ request for information about Singer is misguided. First I show that biographical facts about the person advancing an argument can constitute indirect evidence for the soundness/unsoundness of the argument. Second, I argue that such facts are relevant because they may reveal that one can discard the argument without thereby incurring moral responsibility for failing to act on its conclusion even if the argument is sound.
  • The results below are discovered through our pilot algorithms. Let us know how we are doing!

    • Carbonell, V., (2012). "The Ratcheting-Up Effect" Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 93(2):228- 254
    • Cholbi, M., (2009) “Moore's Paradox and Moral Motivation” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (5):495-510
    • Cohen, G. A., (2006) “Casting the First Stone: Who Can, and Who Can't, Condemn the Terrorists?” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements 81 (58):113-136
    • ------ (1992) “Incentives, Inequality and Community”, The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 261-329
    • Daniels, N., (2011) "Reflective Equilibrium", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = .
    • Dworkin, G., (2000) 'Morally Speaking' in Ullmann-Margalit (ed.) (2000) Reasoning Practically, OUP
    • FitzPatrick, W. (2008) 'Moral Responsibility and Normative Ignorance: Answering a New Skeptical Challenge' Ethics 118(4):589-613
    • Guerrero, A. (2007) 'Don't Know, Don't Kill: Moral Ignorance, Culpability, and Caution' Philosophical Studies 136:59-97
    • Hills, A., (2010) 'Utilitarianism, Contractualism and Demandingness' Philosophical Quarterly 60 (239):225-242.
    • Hitchcock, D., (2007) 'Why there is no argumentum ad hominem fallacy', in Frans H. van Eemeren, J. Anthony Blair, Charles A. Willard and Bart Garssen (eds.), Proceedings of the
    • Hooker, B., (2009) 'The Demandingness Objection” in Chappell, T., (ed.) (2009) The Problem of Moral Demandingness: New Philosophical Essays, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 148-162
    • ------ (1990) 'Rule-Consequentialism', Mind 99(393):67-77
    • Kagan, S., (2001) 'Thinking about Cases', Social Philosophy and Policy 18:44-63.
    • Moody-Adams, M. (1994) 'Culture, Responsibility, and Affected Ignorance' Ethics 104(2):291-309
    • Pagin, P., "Belief and Assertion", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = < http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/assertion/beliefknowledge/>.
    • Regan, T. and Singer P. (eds.), (1989) Animal Rights and Human Obligations, 2/e (Prentice Hall)
    • Rosen, G., (2003), 'Culpability and Ignorance' Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103:61- 84
    • Walton, D. N. (1987) 'The Ad Hominem Argument as an Informal Fallacy' Argumentation 1(3):317-331.
    • Williams, B., (2005/1978) Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry, Routledge (1978 edition Penguin)
  • No related research data.
  • No similar publications.

Share - Bookmark

Cite this article