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Publisher: British International Studies Association
Languages: English
Types: Article
Subjects:
Why do great powers expand? Offensive realist John Mearsheimer claims that states wage an eternal struggle for power, and that those strong enough to seek regional hegemony nearly always do. Mearsheimer's evidence, however, displays a selection bias. Examining four crises between 1814 and 1840, I show that the balance of power restrained Russia, Prussia and France. Yet all three also exercised self-restraint; Russia, in particular, passed up chances to bid for hegemony in 1815 and to topple Ottoman Turkey in 1829. Defensive realism gives a better account of the Concert of Europe, because it combines structural realism with non-realist theories of state preferences.
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    • 5 See notably Paul W. Schroeder, 'Did the Vienna Settlement Rest upon a Balance of Power?' American Historical Review, 97 (June 1992), pp. 683-706.
    • 6 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979), p. 91.
    • 7 Cf. Randall L. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), p. 89; Schweller, 'Neorealism's Status Quo Bias', pp. 106-7.
    • 8 Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, 'Is Anybody Still A Realist?' International Security, 24 (Fall 1999), pp. 5-55; Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 27-34.
    • 9 Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, 'Correspondence: Brother, Can You Spare a Paradigm? (Or, Was Anybody Ever a Realist?)', International Security, 25 (Summer 2000), pp. 188-91; cf. Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, ibid., p. 181.
    • 10 Mearsheimer, Tragedy, pp. 2-3, 33-5, 44-5, 211-13, 233, ch. 9.
    • 11 Colin Elman, 'Horses for Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?' Security Studies, 6 (Autumn 1996), pp. 27-8; Eric J. Labs, 'Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims', Security Studies, 6 (Summer 1997), pp. 9-11.
    • 12 Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, 'Security Seeking Under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited', International Security, 25 (Winter 2000/1), p. 152.
    • 13 Zakaria, Wealth to Power, p. 184.
    • 14 Cf. Elman, 'Horses for Courses', pp. 28-9; Taliaferro, 'Security Seeking Under Anarchy', p. 154.
    • 15 Tragedy, pp. 21, 39-40, 210-13.
    • 16 Ibid., chs. 6-7.
    • 17 Glenn H. Snyder, 'Mearsheimer's World: Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security', International Security, 27 (Summer 2002), p. 161.
    • 18 Mearsheimer, Tragedy, pp. 78-9. If in 1970 Bonn had announced plans to go nuclear and told American troops to go home, would Washington have gone to war to stop it?
    • 24 Louis de Viel-Castel, Histoire de la restauration, vol. 2 (Paris: Michel Lévy frères, 1860), p. 217; Paul W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics 1763-1848 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 524-38; Charles Webster, The Congress of Vienna 1814-1815 (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1966 [1919]), pp. 124-34.
    • 25 Edward Vose Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power: A Case History of the Theory and Practice of One of the Great Concepts of European Statecraft (New York: W. W. Norton, 1967 [1955]), p. 243; Klothilde von Olshausen, Die Stellung der Grossmächte zur sächsischen Frage auf dem Wiener Kongress und deren Rückwirkung auf die Gestaltung der preussischen Ostgrenze (Quakenbrück: C. Trute, 1933), pp. 95-104, 117, 121-2; N. K. Shil'der, Imperator Aleksandr Pervyi: ego zhizn' i tsarstvovanie, vol. 3 (St. Petersburg: A. S. Suvorin, 1897-98), p. 283.
    • 26 Schroeder, Transformation, pp. 534-8.
    • 27 Mearsheimer, Tragedy, pp. 30, 45, 350-1, quotation from p. 30.
    • 28 Olshausen, Sächsische Frage, pp. 32, 88, 103, 117; cf. Karl Griewank, Der Wiener Kongress und die europäische Restauration, 1814/15 (Leipzig: Koehler & Amelang, 1954), pp. 247-8.
    • 29 French delegation at Vienna to Jaucourt, 16 October 1814, in Duc de Broglie (ed.), M[emoirs] of the Prince de T[alleyrand], vol. 2 (London: Griffith Farran Okeden and Welsh, 1891-92), p. 258; Count Münster to the Prince Regent, 27 November 1814, in C. K. Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh 1812-1815 (London: G. Bell, 1931), pp. 551-4, and ibid., pp. 356, 369; Enno E. Kraehe, Metternich's German Policy, vol. II: The Congress of Vienna, 1814-1815 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), pp. 258-9, and 259, n. 70; Olshausen, Sächsische Frage, pp. 47-50, 55-6, 72-7, 81, 90, 101-2, 105, 114-16; Viel-Castel, Histoire de la Restauration, vol. 2, pp. 201-2.
    • 30 Reports to Hager, 9 October 1814, in Commandant M.-H. Weil (ed.), Les d[essous] du c[ongrès] de V[ienne]: d'après les documents originaux des archives du ministère impérial et royal de l'intérieur à Vienne, vol. 1 (Paris: Payot, 1917), p. 254; Stein to Hardenberg, beginning of November 1814, in Heinrich Friedrich Karl, Freiherr vom und zum Stein, Briefe und amtliche Schriften, vol. 5 (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1957-74), pp. 184-5; Stein diary entry, 29 October-7 November 1814, ibid., p. 332; Olshausen, Sächsische Frage, pp. 12, 65, 77-81; Webster, Castlereagh, p. 354.
    • 31 French delegation at Vienna to Jaucourt, 16 October, 14 December 1814, and Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 17 October 1814: MT, vol. 2, pp. 257-8, 263, 362; Castlereagh to Liverpool, 5 December 1814, in C. K. Webster (ed.), B[ritish] D[iplomacy], 1813-1815: Select Documents Dealing with the Reconstruction of Europe (London: G. Bell, 1921), p. 253; Olshausen, Sächsische Frage, pp. 41-4, 53, 97-8; Viel-Castel, Histoire de la Restauration, vol. 2, pp. 203-5.
    • 32 Schroeder, Transformation, pp. 530-1.
    • 33 Wellington to Castlereagh, 9 October, 5 November 1814, in Charles Vane, Marquess of Londonderry (ed.), Memoirs and [c]orrespondence of Viscount [C]astlereagh, second Marquess of Londonderry, vol. 10 (London: H. Colburn, 1848-53), pp. 161, 183-5; same to same, 10, 25 October 1814, in Duke of [W]ellington (ed.), S[upplementary] D[espatches], Correspondence, and Memoranda of Field Marshal Arthur, Duke of Wellington, K.G., vol. 9 (London: John Murray, 1858-72), pp. 326, 370-1.
    • 34 Schroeder, Transformation, p. 530, n. 14.
    • 35 Castlereagh to Vansittart, 11 November 1814: CC, vol. 10, p. 200; French delegation at Vienna to Jaucourt, 23 November 1814, and Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 24 November 1814: MT, vol. 2, pp. 333, 342. Schroeder (Transformation, p. 532) seems to misinterpret Castlereagh's letter.
    • 36 Castlereagh to Liverpool, 5 December 1814: BD, pp. 253-4; Viel-Castel, Histoire de la Restauration, vol. 2, p. 218; Webster, Castlereagh, pp. 351-74.
    • 37 Olshausen, Sächsische Frage, p. 113.
    • 38 Griewank, Wiener Kongress, pp. 249-50.
    • 39 Report to Hager, 11 October 1814: DCV, vol. 1, p. 267. Emphasis in original.
    • 40 Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 25 October 1814: MT, vol. 2, p. 277, but contrast same to same, 17 November 1814, ibid., pp. 325-6.
    • 41 Mavrojeni to the Prince of Moldavia, 1 November 1814, intercepted: DCV, vol. 1, pp. 453-4, Hegardt to Engestroem, intercepted, 12 November 1814, ibid., p. 518; Castlereagh to Liverpool, 25 November 1814: WSD, vol. 9, p. 451; contrast Olshausen, Sächsische Frage, p. 56.
    • 42 Reports to Hager, 3, 7, 12, 16 November 1814, and 'M.G.' to Hager, 22 December 1814: DCV, vol. 1, pp. 461, 485, 511-12, 541, 712; Count Münster to the Prince Regent, 28 November 1814, in Webster, Castlereagh, p. 555; 'F' to Hager, 4 January 1815: DCV, vol. 2, pp. 3-4.
    • 43 Instructions for Razumovskii, in Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv drevnikh aktov (Moscow), f. 15 (Diplomaticheskii otdel), d. 533, l. 10. This passage was probably composed in early 1815, and may have been intended as talking points for the Russian official.
    • 44 O. to Hager, 22 December 1814: DCV, vol. 1, 714-15. Emphasis in original.
    • 45 Nesselrode to Pozzo-di-Borgo, 15/27 September 1814, in Charles Pozzo di Borgo (ed.), Correspondance diplomatique du comte Pozzo di Borgo, ambassadeur de Russie en France et du comte de Nesselrode depuis la restauration des Bourbons jusqu'au congrès d'Aix-la-Chapelle, 1814-1818, vol. 1 (Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1890), p. 83.
    • 46 Chernyshev memorandum to Alexander I, November 1814, in 'Bumagi A. I. Chernysheva za tsartsvovanie Imperatora Aleksandra I. 1809-1825 gg.', Sbornik imperatorskago russkago istoricheskago obshchestva, 121 (1906), p. 282.
    • 47 Chernyshev to Arakcheev, 13/25 December 1814, in N. Dubrovin (ed.), 'Otechestvennaia voina v pis'makh sovremennikov (1812-1815 gg.)', Zapiski imperatorskoi akademii nauk, 43 (1882), pp. 540-1.
    • 48 Olshausen, Sächsische Frage, p. 88.
    • 49 Paul W. Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy at Its Zenith, 1820-1823 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1962), p. 238, n. 1; Harold Temperley, The Foreign Policy of Canning, 1822-1827: England, the Neo-Holy Alliance, and the New World (London: G. Bell, 1925), p. 323; see also Henry A. Kissinger, A World Restored (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1964 [1957]), p. 288; Schroeder, Transformation, p. 618.
    • 50 Matthew Rendall, 'Russia, the Concert of Europe, and Greece, 1821-29: A Test of Hypotheses About the Vienna System', Security Studies, 9 (Summer 2000), pp. 59-63.
    • 51 Kissinger, A World Restored, ch. 16; Rendall, 'Russia, the Concert, and Greece', pp. 64-71; Eberhard Schütz, Die europäische Allianzpolitik Alexanders I. und der griechische Unabhängigkeitskampf 1820-1830 (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1975); Grégoire Yakschitch (ed.), 'La Russie et la Porte Ottomane de 1812 à 1826', Revue historique, 93 (January-April 1907), p. 80; 'Zapiska grafa Ioanna Kapodistriia o ego sluzhebnoi dieatel'nosti', Sbornik russkago istoricheskago obshchestva, 3 (1868), p. 285.
    • 52 G. D. Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question: Missolonghi to Gallipoli (London: University of London Press, 1971), pp. 54-5, quotation from p. 55; Vernon John Puryear, France and the Levant: From the Bourbon Restoration to the Peace of Kutiah (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1941), pp. 86-9; Rendall, 'Russia, the Concert, and Greece', pp. 76-7.
    • 53 V. N. Vinogradov, 'Les discussions sur la Grèce à Londres durant la guerre de 1828-1829', in Les relations gréco-russes pendant la domination turque et la guerre d'indépendance grecque (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1983), p. 150.
    • 54 John C. K. Daly, Russian Seapower and 'The Eastern Question', 1827-41 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991), pp. 33-6, 180; Puryear, France and the Levant, p. 86.
    • 55 Rendall, 'Russia, the Concert, and Greece', pp. 73, 77.
    • 56 Nesselrode to Nicholas I, report for 1831-32, 30 March/10 April 1833, A[rkhiv] V[neshnei] P[olitiki] R[ossiiskoi] I[mperii], (Moscow), f. 137 (Otchety MID), op. 475, 1831-32, d. 2, ll. 161 ob.-162.
    • 57 Rendall, 'Russia, the Concert, and Greece', p. 84.
    • 58 Ibid., pp. 77-9.
    • 59 Nesselrode memorandum, 4/16 September 1829, in V[neshniaia] p[olitika] R[ossii] XIX i nachala XX veka: Dokumenty Rossiiskogo Ministerstva inostrannykh del, vol. 16 (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1960-), p. 284; Rendall, 'Russia, the Concert, and Greece', pp. 77-9, 84-5; cf. Daly, Russian Seapower, pp. 32-3.
    • 60 Rendall, 'Russia, the Concert, and Greece', pp. 74, 77-9, 84-5, quotation from p. 74; Schroeder, Transformation, p. 659.
    • 61 Matthew Rendall, 'Restraint or Self-Restraint of Russia: Nicholas I, the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, and the Vienna System, 1832-1841', International History Review, 24 (March 2002) pp. 39-44, 62.
    • 62 Ibid., pp. 46-8.
    • 63 Ibid., pp. 50-1, 59.
    • 64 Handwritten memorandum by Nicholas I, dated 1830 but probably from 1831, in A. M. Z[aionchkovskii], Vostochnaia voina 1853-1856 gg., v sviazi s sovremmenoi ei politcheskoi obstanovkoi: P[rilozheniia], vol. 1 (St. Petersburg: Ekspeditsiia zagotovleniia gosudarstvennykh bumag, 1908), p. 121. On the memorandum's date, see J. A. Betley, Belgium and Poland in International Relations, 1830-1831 (The Hague: Mouton, 1960), p. 238, n. 101.
    • 65 Rendall, 'Restraint or Self-Restraint', pp. 58-61. S. S. Tatishchev identifies the memorandum's intended recipient: Vnieshniaia politika imperatora Nikolaia pervago: vvdenie v istoriiu vnieshnikh snoshenii Rossii v epokhu sevastopol'skoi voiny (St Petersburg: I. N. Skorokhodov, 1887), p. 384.
    • 66 Lawrence J. Baack, Christian Bernstorff and Prussia: Diplomacy and Reform Conservatism, 1818-1832 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1980), p. 225.
    • 67 J. S. Fishman, Diplomacy and Revolution: The London Conference of 1830 and the Belgian Revolt (Amsterdam: CHEV, 1988), pp. 46-61; Wolfgang Heuser, Kein Krieg in Europa. Die Rolle Preussens im Kreis der europäischen Mächte bei der Entstehung des belgischen Staates (1830-1839) (Pfaffenweiler: Centaurus, 1992), pp. 95-107, 159; Reiner Marcowitz, Grossmacht auf Bewährung: die Interdependenz französicher Innen- und Aussenpolitik und ihre Auswirkungen auf Frankreichs Stellung im europäischen Konzert 1814/15-1851/52 (Stuttgart: Thorbecke, 2001), p. 114.
    • 68 Betley, Belgium and Poland, p. 56; F. de Martens, Recueil des traités et conventions conclus par la Russie avec les puissances étrangères, vol. 11 (Nendeln/Liechtenstein: Kraus, 1969 [1874-1909]), pp. 437-8; 'Mezhdu dvumi voinami. Epizod iz tsarstvovaniia imperatora Nikolaia. 1830 g.', Russkaia starina, 31 (1881), pp. 388-9, 395-7; O.V. Orlik et al., Istoriia vneshnei politiki Rossii: pervaia polovina XIX veka (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1995), pp. 287-8.
    • 69 Betley, Belgium and Poland, p. 56; Martens, Recueil, vol. 8, pp. 171-2, and vol. 11, pp. 442. Theodor Schiemann credits both the cholera and Poland. Geschichte Russlands unter Kaiser Nikolaus I, vol. 3 (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1904-19), pp. 28-30.
    • 70 Orlik et al., Istoriia vneshnei politiki Rossii, p. 288.
    • 71 Betley, Belgium and Poland, p. 48-9; Fishman, Diplomacy and Revolution, pp. 61, 83.
    • 72 Nesselrode to Nicholas I, annual report for 1830, 18/30 April 1831, AVPRI, f. 137 (Otchety MID), op. 475, d. 1, ll. 39 ob.-40, quotation from l. 39 ob. Emphasis in original.
    • 73 Nicholas I to Chernyshev, 5/17 October 1830, in N. K. Shil'der, Imperator Nikolai Pervyi: ego zhizn' i tsarstvovanie, vol. 2 (St Petersburg: A. S. Suvorin, 1903), p. 575; 'Mezhdu dvumi voinami', pp. 393-5; cf. Schiemann, Geschichte Russlands, vol. 3, p. 26.
    • 74 Nesselrode to Nicholas I, annual report for 1830, 18/30 April 1831, AVPRI, f. 137 (Otchety MID), op. 475, d. 1, ll. 42-42 ob.
    • 75 Nesselrode to Nicholas I, 3/15, 6/18 and 8/20 October 1830, AVPRI, f. 133 (Kantselariia), op. 469, 1830, d. 74, ll. 314-314 ob., 320-320 ob., 369, 371 ob., 385, 391-391 ob., 403; 'Mezhdu dvumi voinami', pp. 387-8, 393-5.
    • 76 Nesselrode to Nicholas I, annual report for 1830, 18/30 April 1831, AVPRI, f. 137 (Otchety MID), op. 475, d. 1, ll. 40-40 ob., quotation from l. 40 ob.
    • 77 Heuser, Kein Krieg in Europa, p. 90, n. 26.
    • 78 Nicholas I to Chernyshev, 5/17 October 1830, in Shil'der, Imperator Nikolai Pervyi, vol. 2, pp. 574-5; Heuser, Kein Krieg in Europa, pp. 90, 208.
    • 79 Quotation from Fl. de Lannoy, Histoire diplomatique de l'indépendance belge (Brussels: Albert Dewit, 1930), pp. 24-5; Baack, Bernstorff, pp. 178-93; Werner Gronemann, Die Haltung Preussens in der belgischen Frage 1830-32 (Berlin-Spandau: Stückrath, 1928), pp. 4-10, 30; Heuser, Kein Krieg in Europa, pp. 120-44, 153; Kurt M. Hoffmann, Preussen und die Julimonarchie 1830-1834 (Berlin: Emil Ebering, 1936), pp. 34-5; Thomas Stamm-Kuhlmann, König in Preussens grosser Zeit: Friedrich Wilhelm III. der Melancholiker auf dem Thron (Berlin: Siedler, 1992), p. 531.
    • 80 Baack, Bernstorff, pp. 194, 336-7; Gronemann, Haltung Preussens, p. 8; Heuser, Kein Krieg in Europa, pp. 129-30, 149, 153-4; Harald Müller, Im Widerstreit von Interventionsstrategie und Anpassungszwang: Die Aussenpolitik Österreichs und Preussens zwischen dem Wiener Kongress 1814/15 und der Februarrevolution 1848, vol. 1 (Berlin: Akademie der Wissenschaften der DDR, 1990), pp. 232, 236-7, 282.
    • 81 Brunnow memorandum, ZP, vol. 1, p. 32.
    • 82 Baack, Bernstorff, pp. 97, 142, 152-3, 163, 176-7; Gronemann, Haltung Preussens, pp. 3-4; Heuser, Kein Krieg in Europa, pp. 123-5, 152-7, 162-76, 362, 452-3, quotations from pp. 152-3; Reinhard Wolf, 'How Partners Become Rivals: Testing Neorealist and Liberal Hypotheses', Security Studies, 12 (Winter 2002/3), pp. 17-18.
    • 83 Contrast Branislav L. Slantchev, 'Territory and Commitment: The Concert of Europe as Self-Enforcing Equilibrium', Security Studies, 14 (October-December 2005), pp. 594-6.
    • 84 Bernstorff, pp. 229, 338. Emphasis added.
    • 85 Excerpt from Bresson to Talleyrand, 7 January 1832: MT, vol. 4, p. 259.
    • 86 Matthew Rendall, ' ''The Sparta and the Athens of our Age at Daggers Drawn'': Polities, Perceptions and Peace', International Politics, 41 (December 2004), pp. 589-91; Paul W. Schroeder, Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War: The Destruction of the European Concert (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1972), p. 95.
    • 87 Rendall, 'Sparta and Athens', pp. 591, 597-9.
    • 88 Thiers to Cochelet, 9 October 1840, very confidential, in François Charles-Roux, Thiers et Méhémet-Ali (Paris: Plon, 1951), p. 231; see also ibid., pp. 167-70, 174, 178-85.
    • 89 Rendall, 'Sparta and Athens', p. 598.
    • 90 Louis-Philippe to Thiers, 21 August 1840, Bibliothèque Nationale (Paris), nouvelles acquisitions françaises, 20611, f. 194.
    • 91 H.A.C. Collingham, The July Monarchy: A Political History of France, 1830-1848, ed. R. S. Alexander (London: Longman, 1988), p. 233.
    • 92 Roger Bullen, 'France and Europe, 1815-48: the Problem of Defeat and Recovery', in Alan Sked (ed.), Europe's Balance of Power 1815-1848 (London: Macmillan, 1979), pp. 123-7, 143-4; Collingham, July Monarchy, pp. 186-9, 326; Douglas Johnson, Guizot: Aspects of French History 1787-1874 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), pp. 267-8, 292-3, 318; Marcowitz, Grossmacht auf Bewährung, pp. 115, 125, 164-8, 172-6.
    • 93 Bullen, 'France and Europe', pp. 132-3; Volker Sellin, 'France, the Vienna Settlement, and the Balance of Power', in Peter Krüger and Paul W. Schroeder (eds.), 'The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848': Episode or Model in Modern History? (Münster: Lit Verlag, 2002), pp. 227-34; cf. Slantchev, 'Territory and Commitment', pp. 596-9.
    • 94 Transformation, p. 675.
    • 95 'Territory and Commitment', pp. 573-4, 577, 591, quotation from p. 591. Inasmuch as Slantchev recognises that fear of a blocking coalition restrained potential aggressors, it is odd that he argues that the post-Vienna peace cannot be explained by the balance of power.
    • 96 'Introduction', in Sked, Europe's Balance of Power, pp. 12-13; see also Joe D. Hagan, 'Domestic Political Sources of Stable Peace: The Great Powers, 1815-1854', in Arie M. Kacowicz et al. (ed.), Stable Peace Among Nations (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), pp. 36-54.
    • 97 Nesselrode to Nicholas I, 20 December 1827/1 January 1828: VPR, vol. 15, p. 331. 'These acquisitions', the foreign minister continued, 'could moreover not be equivalent to those which would necessarily be reserved for England. . . .'
    • 98 Paul Thureau-Dangin, Histoire de la Monarchie de Juillet, vol. 4 (Paris: E. Plon, Nourrit, 1884-92), pp. 330, 342.
    • 99 Rendall, 'Restraint or Self-Restraint'.
    • 100 Joseph R. Gochal and Jack S. Levy, 'Crisis Mismanagement or Conflict of Interests? A Case Study of the Origins of the Crimean War', in Zeev Maoz et al. (eds.), Multiple Paths to Knowledge in International Relations: Methodology in the Study of Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 2004), pp. 309-42. On tragedy versus evil, see Michael Spirtas, 'A House Divided: Tragedy and Evil in Realist Theory', in Frankel, Realism, pp. 385-423.
    • 101 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), pp. 77, 79, quotation from p. 77; also Kissinger, A World Restored, pp. 173, 318. Similarly, Charles Ingrao argues that peace in the 1720s rested on 'respect for dynastic legitimacy, backed by the deterrence of a stable, multilateral balance of power'. 'The Balance of Power: From Paradigm to Practice', in Krüger and Schroeder, Episode or Model, p. 80.
    • 102 Cf. Kissinger, A World Restored, pp. 138-46; Slantchev, 'Territory and Commitment', pp. 590, 605-6. In my view Slantchev accurately characterises the motives of four of the five powers, but exaggerates Prussian revisionism - at least in the period covered by the present article.
    • 103 John A. Vasquez, 'The Vienna System: Why It Worked and Why It Broke Down', in Krüger and Schroeder, Episode or Model, p. 239.
    • 104 Zakaria, Wealth to Power, pp. 27-8.
    • 105 Kenneth N. Waltz, 'Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics', in Robert O. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 331; also Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 71-2, 122.
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