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Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Languages: English
Types: Article
Subjects: JZ, K1
Riding the wave of globalisation, scholars and practitioners envision global\ud governance as a legalised world order. This international rule of law movement\ud is centred on the idea of global constitutionalism. However, the constitutional\ud view of global governance raises fundamental questions pertaining to the nature\ud of international law, the culture of constitutional orders, and the future of global\ud governance: What is the added value for the international legal system to be\ud viewed in constitutional terms? How would comprehensiveness characteristic of\ud traditional constitutional orders figure in an increasingly fragmented world\ud order? Does the new era of constitutionalism herald a paradigm shift in\ud thinking constitutionalism? Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International\ud Law, and Global Governance, edited by Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Joel P. Trachtman,\ud attempts to illuminate the idea of global constitutionalism. Engaging with the contributors to the collection, this article aims to achieve two goals. In addition\ud to providing a typology of global constitutionalism to help discern the distinct\ud locales where global constitutionalism emerges and dissect its plural meanings,\ud this article argues that global constitutionalism sits at the crossroads of law and\ud language. The ambiguity between legal nomos and narrative language lies at\ud the heart of the current debates surrounding global constitutionalism.
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    • constitutionalism ................................................................................................................................ 30
    • constitutional conflicts?..................................................................................................................... 34 1 See J. L. Cohen, 'Whose Sovereignty? Empire Versus International Law' (2004) 18 Ethics &
    • International Affairs 1, 2. See also J. L. Goldstein et al. (eds), Legalization and World Politics (Cambridge,
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    • 1-3. For the predominance of national interest in realist international relations theories, see M. Koskenniemi,
    • The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge
    • University Press, 2001) 413-509. 3 See N. Walker, 'The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism' (2002) 65 MLR 317-359. See also G. W.
    • Anderson, Constitutional Rights after Globalization (Oxford: Hart, 2005) 39-151. 4 See eg C. Joerges and E.-U. Petersmann (eds), Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade Governance and
    • Social Regulation (Oxford, UK and Portland, OR: Hart, 2006); I. Pernice, 'The Treaty of Lisbon: Multilevel
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    • 'Constitutionalizing Multilevel Governance?' (2008) 6 I•CON 457. 5 See G. Teubner, 'Fragmented Foundations: Societal Constitutionalism beyond the Nation State' in P.
    • Dobner and M. Loughlin (eds), The Twilight of Constitutionalism? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010)
    • 327-341; G. Teubner, 'Societal Constitutionalism: Alternatives to State-Centred Constitutional Theory' in
    • C. Joerges et al. (eds), Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism (Oxford: Hart, 2004) 3-28. 6 See A.-M. Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004) 8. 7 See Cohen, n 1 above, 1-11. See also Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism, n 5 above;
    • K.-H. Ladeur (ed), Public Governance in the Age of Globalization (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004); D. Held,
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    • Arrangements (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998); C. Walter, 'Constitutionalizing (Inter)national
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    • 44 German Yearbook of International Law 170. 9 See N. Tsagourias (ed), Transnational Constitutionalism: International and European Perspectives
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    • 16 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 397. 10 See generally R. St. J. MacDonald and D. M. Johnston (eds), Towards World Constitutionalism: Issues
    • in the Legal Ordering of the World Community (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2005). See also R. A. Falk et al.,
    • World Peace (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1993) 3-12. 11 See eg M. Rosenfeld, 'Rethinking Constitutional Ordering in an Era of Legal and Ideological 15 See eg U. K. Preuss, 'The Exercise of Constituent Power in Central and Eastern Europe' in M.
    • Form (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 211, 213. 16 See A. von Bogdandy, 'Constitutionalism in International Law: Comment on a Proposal from
    • Germany' (2006) 47 Harvard International Law Journal 223, 233-236. Cf U. K. Preuss, 'Equality of
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    • 17, 41-45 (2008). 17 This ambiguity bears greatly on the Coverian nexus of nomos and narratives. See R. M. Cover, 'The
    • Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative' (1983) 97 Harvard Law Review 4-68. This 23 For the ambiguous meaning of constitutionalisation, see D. Z. Cass, The Constitutionalization of the
    • (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 15-18; K. Milewicz, 'Emerging Patterns of Global
    • Constitutionalization: Toward a Conceptual Framework' (2009) 16 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies
    • 413-436. Cf M. Loughlin, 'What Is Constitutionalisation?' in The Twilight of Constitutionalism?, n 5 above,
    • 47-69. 24 The EU as an umbrella regime consisted of three 'pillars' during the pre-Lisbon Treaty era, which had
    • been in place since the Maastricht Treaty of 1991. In a strict legal sense, Community law, which resided in
    • force of the Lisbon Treaty on December 1, 2009 has brought about the 'de-pillarisation' of the EU structure.
    • Structure' in J. Wouters at al. (eds), European Constitutionalism beyond Lisbon (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2009)
    • 283-306. 25 Case 26/62 NV Algemene Transporten Expeditie Onderneming Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse
    • Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1. 26 Case 6/64 Costa v. ENEL [1964] ECR 585. 27 Case 29/69 Stauder v. City of Ulm [1969] ECR 419. 28 Case 22/70 Commission v. Council (AETR) [1971] ECR 263.
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    • available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1533483 (last visited 23 March 2010). See
    • Concept?' in The Twilight of Constitutionalism?, n 5 above, 23, 26-29, 32-33; H. Lindahl, 'A-Legality:
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    • University Press, 3rd ed, 1966). 34 See D. Z. Cass, 'The 'Constitutionalization' of International Trade Law: Judicial Norm-Generation as
    • the Engine of Constitutional Development in International Trade' (2001) 12 EJIL 39, 49-52. 70 See also M. Claes, The National Court's Mandate in the European Constitution (Oxford: Hart, 2006). 71 See generally A.-M. Slaughter et al. (eds), The European Courts and National Courts: Doctrine and
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    • NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000) 10. 73 See J. Wouters at al., 'European Constitutionalism beyond Lisbon: Introductory Remarks' in
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    • (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 3, 7. See also W. Sadurski, 'Partnering with Strasbourg:
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    • 23, 33-38. 76 See Koskenniemi, n 50 above, 17. See also Koskenniemi (2007), n 2 above, 5, 10. 77 See Fisher-Lescano and Teubner, n 50 above. See also Breau, n 53 above, 551-557. 81 See Grimm, n 52 above, 449-453; Grimm, n 66 above, 7-11. 82 See also N. Walker, 'Beyond Boundary Disputes and Basic Grids: Mapping the Global Disorder of
    • Normative Orders' (2008) 6 I•CON 373-396. 83 In addition to Paulus (75-80, 90, 97, 108-109), Walker (155, 157), and Dunoff (201-202), who
    • be 'comprehensive' (322) or 'encompassing' (389). 84 See Kuo, n 32 above. See also M. Kumm, 'Who Is Afraid of the Total Constitution? Constitutional
    • Rights as Principles and the Constitutionalization of Private Law' (2006) 7 German Law Journal 341-369. 87 See Walker, n 3 above, 349. 88 ibid. 89 For the dialectical tension between constitutional lawmaking and judicial interpretation, see F. I.
    • Michelman, 'Morality, Identity and “Constitutional Patriotism”' (1999) 76 Denver University Law Review
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    • Michelman's Presentist Critique of Constitutional Authorship' (2009) 7 I•CON 683, 687-688. 90 See Walker, n 3 above, 349. In discussing the doctrine of implied power in his contribution to the
    • textually conferred power and the readiness of national constitutional courts to intervene (165). The
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    • Commentary 25, 72-89. On the other hand, Walker's reliance on the intervention of the national courts
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    • Exceptionalism and Human Rights (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005) 241-276. 103 See also Peters, n 9 above, 397. But cf M. P. Maduro, 'Europe and the Constitution: What If This Is
    • As Good As It Gets?' in European Constitutionalism beyond the State, n 58 above, 74-102. 104 M. Koskenniemi, 'The Politics of International Law - 20 Years Later' (2009) 20 EJIL 7, 13.
    • Press, 2008) 111-137. 105 This is illustrated in Advocate General Maduro's opinion in the Kadi decision, which indicates a
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    • the Elementary Divide between Legal Orders' (2008) 5 International Organizations Law Review 371, 372. 106 Although Waker notes that constitutional pluralism may encourage 'a striving for metaconstitutional
    • 'fundamentalist inclination' to the ties to sovereignty in state constitutionalism. See Walker, n 3 above, 358. 107 Cf de Búrca, n 105 above, 33. For a discussion on the relationship between language and cognition, 116 See A. P. Harris, 'Loving Before and After the Law' (2008) 76 Fordham Law Review 2821,
    • 2836-2838. 117 For the relationship between national military conscription and universal suffrage following the
    • York, NY: Knopf, 2002) 151-178. 118 For the relationship between the expansion of American political citizenship and the history of
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    • York, NY: Random House, 2005) 395-401, 419-428, 445-447.
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