LOGIN TO YOUR ACCOUNT

Username
Password
Remember Me
Or use your Academic/Social account:

CREATE AN ACCOUNT

Or use your Academic/Social account:

Congratulations!

You have just completed your registration at OpenAire.

Before you can login to the site, you will need to activate your account. An e-mail will be sent to you with the proper instructions.

Important!

Please note that this site is currently undergoing Beta testing.
Any new content you create is not guaranteed to be present to the final version of the site upon release.

Thank you for your patience,
OpenAire Dev Team.

Close This Message

CREATE AN ACCOUNT

Name:
Username:
Password:
Verify Password:
E-mail:
Verify E-mail:
*All Fields Are Required.
Please Verify You Are Human:
fbtwitterlinkedinvimeoflicker grey 14rssslideshare1
Publisher: Department of Economics, University of Warwick
Languages: English
Types: Book
Subjects: QA, HB
If decision-makers (DMs) do not always do what is in their best interest, what do choices reveal about welfare? This paper shows how observed choices can reveal whether the DM is acting in her own best interest. We study a framework that relaxes rationality in a way that is common across a variety of seemingly disconnected positive behavioral models and admits the standard rational choice model as a special case. We model\ud a behavioral DM (boundedly rational) who, in contrast to a standard DM (rational), does not fully internalize all the consequences of her own actions on herself. We provide\ud an axiomatic characterization of choice correspondences consistent with behavioral and standard DMs, propose a choice experiment to infer the divergence between choice and\ud welfare, state an existence result for incomplete preferences and show that the choices of behavioral DMs are, typically, sub-optimal.
  • The results below are discovered through our pilot algorithms. Let us know how we are doing!

    • [1] Akerlof, George, and William Dickens. 1982. "The Economic Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance." American Economic Review, 72(3), 307-319.
    • [2] Arrow, Keneth. 1959. "Rational Choice Functions and Orderings." Economica, 26, 121-127
    • [4] Bergstrom, Theodore. 1975. "Maximal elements of acyclic relations on compact sets." Journal of Economic Theory, 10(3), 403-404.
    • [5] Bernheim, B. Douglas. 2009. "Behavioral Welfare Economics." Journal of the European Economic Association, 7 (2-3):267-319
    • [8] Beshears, John, James J. Choi, David Laibson and Brigitte C. Madrian. 2008. "How are preferences revealed?" Journal of Public Economics, 92, 1787-1794.
    • [9] Bracha, Anat. and Donald J. Brown. 2007. "A¤ective Decision Making: A Behavioral Theory of Choice." Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1633.
    • [10] Cherepanov, Vadim, Timothy Feddersen and Alvaro Sandroni. 2008. “Rationalization." mimeo, Northwestern University.
    • [11] Cherno¤, Herman. 1954. "Rational Selection of Decision Functions." Econometrica, 22, 4, 422-443.
    • [12] Dalton, Patricio S. and Sayantan Ghosal. 2010. "Decisions with Endogenous Frames." mimeo, University of Warwick.
    • [13] Dalton, Patricio S., Anandi Mani and Sayantan Ghosal. 2010. "Poverty and Aspirations Failure," CAGE Working Paper Series, 2010-22
    • [14] Debreu, Gerard. 1959. Theory of Value, Wiley, New York
    • [15] Geanakoplos, John, David Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti. 1989. "Psychological Games and Sequential Rationality." Games and Economic Behavior, 1, 60-79.
    • [21] Hiriart-Urruty, Jean Baptiste, and Claude Lemarechal. 2000. Fundamentals of Convex Analysis. Springer, Berlin.
    • [22] Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. 1979. "Prospect Theory: An analysis of Decision under Risk." Econometrica, 47(2), 263-91.
    • [23] Kahneman, Daniel, Peter P. Wakker and Rakesh. Sarin. 1997. "Back to Bentham? Explorations of Experienced Utility." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, 375-406
    • [24] Koszegi, Botond. 2010. "Utility from Anticipation and Personal Equilibrium." Economic Theory, 44, 415–444
    • [25] Koszegi, Botond and Mathew Rabin. 2006. "A model of reference-dependent preferences." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(4), 1133-1165.
    • [26] _____________________.2007. "Reference-Dependent Risk Attitudes." American Economic Review,. 97(4), 1047-1073
    • [27] _____________________.2008. "Choices, situations and happiness." Journal of Public Economics, 92, 1821-1832
    • [33] Mandler, Michael. 2005. "Incomplete preferences and rational intransitivity of choice." Games and Economic Behavior, 50, 255-277.
    • [34] Manzini, Paola. and Marco Mariotti. 2007. "Sequentially Rationalizable Choice." American Economic Review, 97(5), 1824-1839.
    • [35] _______________________. 2009. "Categorize Then Choose: Boundedly Rational Choice and Welfare." mimeo, Queen Mary, University of London.
    • [44] Sen, Amartya. 1985. Commodities and Capabilities, North Holland, Amsterdam.
    • [45] Shafer, Wayne. and Hugo Sonnenschein. 1975. "Equilibrium in Abstract Economies without Ordered Preferences." Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2, 345-348.
    • [46] Shalev, Jonathan. 2000. "Loss Aversion Equilibrium." International Journal of Game Theory, 29, 269-87.
    • 1 (a; p) = f(a0; p0) 2 A
  • No related research data.
  • No similar publications.

Share - Bookmark

Cite this article