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Vanzo, Alberto
Publisher: Bloomsbury Press
Languages: English
Types: Part of book or chapter of book
Subjects: B1
This chapter discusses the relation between Kant’s views on the foundations of syllogistic inference in ‘The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures’, the views of eighteenth-century German authors who wrote on syllogism, and the conception of metaphysics that Kant developed in 1762-1764. Kant’s positions are, on the whole, rather original, even though they are not as independent from the intellectual context as Kant’s later, Critical philosophy. Despite Kant’s polemical tone, his views on syllogism are not primarily motivated by polemical purposes. They are strongly influenced by his views on the method of metaphysics.
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    • of Kant's Enthymematic Treatment of the Second and Third Figures', Kant-Studien, 66 (1975), 404-
    • 417, 413; Mirella Capozzi, 'Osservazioni sulla riduzione delle figure sillogistiche in Kant', Annali
    • della Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia dell'Università di Siena, 1 (1980), 79-98, 88-91; Theodor Ebert,
    • General Philosophy of Science, 40 (2009), 357-372, 367-368. On whether Kant admits the
    • Kant', 87, 89; Lorenzo Pozzi, Da Ramus a Kant: Il dibattito sulla sillogistica, Milan 1981, 98; Johan
    • 4.-9. Sept. 2005 in São Paulo, Berlin 2008, vol. 5, 163-174, 164n3. 7 See Capozzi's and Myrstad's criticisms of Wilson and the debate between Theodor Ebert and
    • Science, 40 (2009), 341-355; Michael Wolff, 'Vollkommene Syllogismen und reine
    • Teil 2', Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 41 (2010), 359-371; Theodor Ebert, 'Michael
    • Philosophy of Science, 41 (2010), 373-382. 8 Spitzf., 2:58 might suggest that this is the case. Pozzi (Da Ramus a Kant, 100) and Myrstad ('Kant's
    • Treatment of the Bocardo and Barocco Syllogisms', 172) deny it. 9 See esp. Wolfgang Malzkorn, 'Kants Kritik an der traditionellen Syllogistik', History and Philosophy
    • of Logic, 16 (1995), 75-88; Marco Sgarbi, Logica e metafisica nel Kant precritico: L'ambiente
    • intellettuale di Königsberg e la formazione della filosofia kantiana, Frankfurt a. M. 2010, 185-218. 10 Silvestro Marcucci, 'Introduzione', in Immanuel Kant, La falsa sottigliezza delle quattro figure
    • sillogistiche, ed. Silvestro Marcucci, Pisa 2001, 9-18, 17, see 16. 11 Adolfo León Gómez, 'La silogística en Leibniz y Kant, y su parentesco', Ideas y Valores, 92-93
    • (1993), 41-46, 43. 12 Nicholas Rescher, Galen and the Syllogism: An Examination of the Thesis That Galen Originated the
    • 1966, 37. 13 Wolff, 'Volkommene Syllogismen und reine Vernunftschlüsse', 354-355. 30 Wolff, Philosophia rationalis, §§ 44-45. 31 See Wolff, Gedancken von den Kräfften, Ch. 4, §§ 2, 4; Georg Friedrich Meier, Vernunftlehre, ed.
    • Günter Schenk, Halle/Saale 1997 [1752], § 401; Georg Friedrich Meier, Auszug aus der
    • Vernunftlehre, in Kant, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 16, § 363. 32 Crusius clearly explains this interpretation of the dictum in his Weg zur Gewißheit, § 282. 33 Wolff, Philosophia rationalis, § 380n. 34 Wolff, Philosophia rationalis, § 353n. Additionally, Wolff formulates foundational principles for
    • second- and third-figure syllogisms (Philosophia rationalis, §§ 381, 389). The principle of second-
    • to obtain them from first-figure syllogisms. 35 Wolff, Philosophia rationalis, §§ 347n, 348n; Gedancken von den Kräfften, Ch. 4, § 5. As Matt
    • Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2008 Edition,
    • entries/wolff-christian/, § 6). According to Wolff, this is the case for the dictum. 36 See Christian Wolff, Philosophia prima sive ontologia, Frankfurt a.M. 1736, repr. in Wolff,
    • Gesammelte Werke, sect. 1, vol. 3, § 54. 37 Meier, Vernunftlehre, § 400. 38 Daries, Introductio in artem inveniendi, Praecognita § 19n; Analytica §§ 252-253. 39 Reimarus, Vernunftlehre, §§ 138-139. 40 Reimarus, Vernunftlehre, § 139. Reimarus could employ the second- and third-figure syllogisms
    • discussed in Section 2.2 as examples. 41 Meier, Vernunftlehre, §§ 402-404; Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre, §§ 364-366. According to Meier,
    • these principles follow from the law of contradiction (Vernunftlehre, § 400). 42 Crusius, Weg zur Gewißheit, §§ 273-296. 43 See Johann Heinrich Lambert, Neues Organon oder Gedanken über die Erforschung und
    • Bezeichnung des Wahren und dessen Unterscheidung vom Irrthum und Schein, Leipzig 1764, vol. 1,
    • 142-143; Johann Georg Heinrich Feder, Logik und Metaphysik, 4th ed., Göttingen 1774, § 43.
    • not access, was published in 1769. 44 Anon., review of Immanuel Kant, Die falsche Spitzfindigkeit der vier syllogistischen Figuren, Briefe,
    • die Neueste Litteratur betreffend, 22 (1765), 147-158, 150-151. Tonelli, following Erich Adickes,
    • states that the author of this review was Moses Mendelssohn. See Tonelli, Elementi metodologici e 69 On this distinction, see Houston Smit, 'Kant on Marks and the Immediacy of Intuition',
    • Philosophical Review, 109 (2000), 235-266, 248-251. Kant's ambiguous use of “mark” might lead
    • logisch mathematische Untersuchung über den Begriff der Zahl, ed. Christian Thiel, Hamburg 1988
    • [1884]; trans. The Foundations of Arithmetic: A Logico-Mathematical Enquiry into the Concept of
    • Number, ed. J. L. Austin, Oxford 1974, § 53). Related objections against Kant's principle of
    • syllogisms are discussed in Wolff, 'Volkommene Syllogismen und reine Vernunftschlüsse', 348-
    • 350; Ebert, 'Michael Wolff über Syllogismen bei Aristoteles und Vernunftschlüsse bei Kant', 365-
    • 366. 70 Spitzf., 2:47. 71 I argue that Kant uses a broad notion of object, which includes non-existent items, in 'Kant on
    • Existential Import', Kantian Review, 19 (2014), 207-232, 221-223. 72 Spitzf., 2:47. 73 Kant uses stronger terms than “non-belonging” to designate the relation between subject and
    • widespricht, widerstreitend] (Spitzf., 2:47). These and other expressions may suggest that for Kant,
    • ca.1762, all truths are analytic. Charles Nussbaum, among others, holds this. See his 'Critical and
    • Pre-Critical Phases in Kant's Philosophy of Logic', Kant-Studien, 83 (1992), 280-293, 280, 284. I do
    • not take a stand on this issue. 74 Spitzf., 2:47. 75 Further, for every object a and every property P, that belongs to a, P is a mediate mark of a if and
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