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Publisher: Department of Economics, University of Sheffield
Languages: English
Types: Book
This paper evaluates the impact of the ‘A-day’ pensions simplification legislation introduced in the UK in 2006. This reform exogenously affected the cost of pension provision for firms whose executives had accumulated pensions benefits in excess of the prescribed limit. We find a strong reaction in the form of pension provision in a sample of UK executive directors. After A-day, many executives saw their defined benefit scheme replaced with supplementary cash payments. This had the unintended consequence of significantly decreasing the relationship between executive pay and firm performance for those executives affected by the reform.
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