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fbtwitterlinkedinvimeoflicker grey 14rssslideshare1
Bhaumik, Sumon Kumar; Dimova, Ralitza
Publisher: Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Bonn
Languages: English
Types: Article
Subjects: D23, D02, D24, stochastic frontier model, institutional quality, Industriestaaten, Produktivität, Technische Effizienz, Institutionelle Infrastruktur, Textilindustrie, institutional quality, production efficiency, stochastic frontier model, production efficiency, Institutionalismus, Wirtschaftliche Effizienz
jel: jel:D02, jel:D24, jel:D23
ddc: ddc:330
Using firm-level data from nine developing countries, we demonstrate that certain institutions, like restrictive labour market regulations, that are considered bad for economic growth might be beneficial for production efficiency, whereas good business environment, which is considered beneficial for economic growth, might have an adverse impact on production efficiency. We argue that our results suggest that there might be significant difference in the macro- and micro-impacts of institutional quality, such that the classification of institutions into ‘good’ and ‘bad might be premature.
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