Remember Me
Or use your Academic/Social account:


Or use your Academic/Social account:


You have just completed your registration at OpenAire.

Before you can login to the site, you will need to activate your account. An e-mail will be sent to you with the proper instructions.


Please note that this site is currently undergoing Beta testing.
Any new content you create is not guaranteed to be present to the final version of the site upon release.

Thank you for your patience,
OpenAire Dev Team.

Close This Message


Verify Password:
Verify E-mail:
*All Fields Are Required.
Please Verify You Are Human:
fbtwitterlinkedinvimeoflicker grey 14rssslideshare1
Morris, Michael (2009)
Publisher: University of Arkansas Department of Philosophy
Languages: English
Types: Article
Subjects: B, BD, B1
John McDowell has attempted to defend himself against the charge that the view presented in his influential book Mind and World is idealist. This paper argues that in spite of that defence, there is a clear way in which the view does depend on a form of idealism. McDowell is committed to the thought that the world is ‘conceptually organized’. I consider what this means, and argue that, although it does not formally imply idealism, it is only defensible from a broadly idealist view—one which is in fact in tension with important claims made by McDowell in other works.
  • The results below are discovered through our pilot algorithms. Let us know how we are doing!

    • Hume, D. (1975) Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals, L. A. Selby-Bigge, ed., 3rd ed revised by P. H. Nidditch
    • LePore, E. (1986) Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson (Oxford: Blackwell)
    • McDowell, J. (1994) Mind and World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press) - (1998a) 'Having the World in View: Sellars, Kant, and Intentionality', Journal of Philosophy 95: 431-91 - (1998b) Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press) - (1998c) Mind, Value, and Reality (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press) - (1998d) 'On the Sense and Reference of a Proper Name', in McDowell (1998b): 171-98 - (1998e) 'Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following', in McDowell (1998c): 198- 218 - (1998f) 'Meaning, Communication, and Knowledge', in McDowell (1998b): 29-50 - (1998g) 'In Defence of Modesty', in McDowell (1998b): 87-107 - (1998h) 'Might There be External Reasons?', in McDowell (1998c): 95-111
    • Morris, M. (1992) The Good and the True (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
    • Quine, W. V. (1960) Word and Object (Cambridge MA: MIT Press)
    • Rorty, R. (1986) 'Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth', in Lepore (1986): 333-55
    • Strawson, P. F. (1980) 'Reply to McDowell', in Z. van Straaten, ed., Philosophical Subjects: Essays presented to P .F. Strawson (Oxford: Oxford University Press): 282-7
    • Wittgenstein, L. (1922) Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. C. K. Ogden (London : Routledge and Kegan Paul)
    • Wittgenstein, L. (2001) Philosophical Investigations, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell)
  • No related research data.
  • No similar publications.

Share - Bookmark

Cite this article