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Brañas-Garza, Pablo; Espinos, Maria Paz (2011)
Publisher: MDPI Basel
Languages: English
Types: Article
Subjects: public good games, experiments, Public good game, H, Technology, beliefs, public good game, end game effect, beliefs., T, Social Sciences, public good games; end-game effects; beliefs; experiments, End game effect, end-game effects
jel: jel:D64, jel:H41, jel:C70, jel:C91, jel:C73, jel:C72, jel:C71, jel:C, jel:C7
ddc: ddc:330

Classified by OpenAIRE into

mesheuropmc: human activities
Identifiers:doi:10.3390/g2040434
This paper provides experimental evidence on how players predict end-game effects in a linear public good game. Our regression analysis yields a measure of the relative importance of priors and signals on subjects’ beliefs on contributions and allows us to conclude that, first, the weight of the signal is relatively unimportant, while priors have a large weight and, second, priors are the same for all periods. Hence, subjects do not expect end-game effects and there is very little updating of beliefs. We argue that the sustainability of cooperation is related to this pattern of belief formation.