Remember Me
Or use your Academic/Social account:


Or use your Academic/Social account:


You have just completed your registration at OpenAire.

Before you can login to the site, you will need to activate your account. An e-mail will be sent to you with the proper instructions.


Please note that this site is currently undergoing Beta testing.
Any new content you create is not guaranteed to be present to the final version of the site upon release.

Thank you for your patience,
OpenAire Dev Team.

Close This Message


Verify Password:
Verify E-mail:
*All Fields Are Required.
Please Verify You Are Human:
fbtwitterlinkedinvimeoflicker grey 14rssslideshare1
Long, Iain W. (2017)
Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell
Languages: English
Types: Article
Policies targeted at high-crime neighbourhoods may have unintended consequences in the presence of organized crime. Whilst they reduce the incentive to commit crime at the margin, those who still choose to join the criminal organization have relatively high criminal propensities. Large organizations take advantage of this, substituting away from membership size towards increased individual criminal activity. Aggregate crime may rise. However, as more would-be recruits move into the formal labour market, falling revenue causes a reversal of this effect. Thereafter, the policy reduces both size and individual activity simultaneously.
  • The results below are discovered through our pilot algorithms. Let us know how we are doing!

    • Anderson, J. E. and Bandiera, O. (2005). Private Enforcement and Social Efficiency , Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 77, No. 2, pp. 341-366.
    • Baccara, M. and Bar-Isaac, H. (2008). How to Organize Crime , The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 75, No. 4, pp. 1039-1067.
    • Ballester, C., Calvo-Armengol, A. and Zenou, Y. (2010, 03). Delinquent Networks , Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 34-61.
    • Becker, G. S. (1968). Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach , The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 76, No. 2, pp. 169-217.
    • Bell, B., Jaitman, L. and Machin, S. (2014). Crime Deterrence: Evidence from the London 2011 Riots , The Economic Journal, Vol. 124, No. 576, pp. 480-506.
    • Booth, A. and Schiantarelli, F. (1987). The Employment Effects of a Shorter Working Week , Economica, Vol. 54, No. 214, pp. 237-248.
    • Buonanno, P., Durante, R., Prarolo, G. and Vanin, P. (2015). Poor Institutions, Rich Mines: Resource Curse in the Origins of the Sicilian Mafia , The Economic Journal, Vol. 125, No. 586, pp. F175-F202.
    • Calmfors, L. (1985). Work Sharing, Employment and Wages , European Economic Review, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 293-309.
    • Calvo-Armengol, A. and Zenou, Y. (2004). Social Networks and Crime Decisions: The Role of Social Structure in Facilitating Delinquent Behavior , International Economic Review, Vol. 45, No. 3, pp. 939-958.
    • Carvalho, L. S. and Soares, R. R. (2016). Living on the Edge: Youth Entry, Career and Exit in Drug-Selling Gangs , Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 121, pp. 77-98.
    • Centre for Social Justice. (2012). Time to Wake Up: Tackling Gangs One Year After the Riots . Policy paper.
    • Chang, J.-J., Lu, H.-C. and Chen, M. (2005). Organized Crime or Individual Crime? Endogenous Size of a Criminal Organization and the Optimal Law Enforcement , Economic Inquiry, Vol. 43, No. 3, pp. 661-675.
    • Cook, P. J., Ludwig, J., Venkatesh, S. and Braga, A. A. (2007). Underground Gun Markets , The Economic Journal, Vol. 117, No. 524, pp. F588-F618.
    • Dixit, A. (2007). Lawlessness and Economics: Alternative Modes of Governance. The Gorman Lectures in Economics, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.
    • Freeman, R. B. (2000). Work-Sharing to Full Employment: Serous Option or Populist Fallacy , in Gottschalk, P. T. and Freeman, R. B. (Eds.), Generating Jobs: How to Increase Demand for Less-Skilled Workers, New York, NY, Russell Sage Foundation, pp. 195-222.
    • Fryer, R. G., Jr. (2011). Financial Incentives and Student Achievement: Evidence from Randomized Trials , The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 126, No. 4, pp. 1755-1798.
    • Gambetta, D. (1996). The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press.
    • Garoupa, N. (1997). The Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement , Journal of Economic Surveys, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 267-295.
    • Garoupa, N. (2000). The Economics of Organized Crime and Optimal Law Enforcement , Economic Inquiry, Vol. 38, No. 2, pp. 278-288.
    • Garoupa, N. (2007). Optimal Law Enforcement and Criminal Organization , Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 63, No. 3, pp.461-474.
    • Heckman, J. J., Moon, S. H., Pinto, R., Savelyev, P. A. and Yavitz, A. (2010). The Rate of Return to the Highscope Perry Preschool Program , Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 94, No. 1-2, pp. 114-128.
    • Home Office. (2013). Ending Gang and Youth Violence: Annual Report 2013 . Report to Parliament.
    • Jankowski, M. S. (1991). Islands in the Street: Gangs and American Urban Society. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA, University of California Press.
    • Kugler, M., Verdier, T. and Zenou, Y. (2005). Organized Crime, Corruption and Punishment , Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 89, Nos. 9-10, pp. 1639-1663.
    • Lee, L. W. (1993). Would Harassing Drug Users Work? , Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 101, No. 5, pp. 939-959.
    • Levitt, S. D. and Venkatesh, S. A. (2000). An Economic Analysis of a DrugSelling Gang s Finances , The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 115, No. 3, pp. 755-789.
    • Mansour, A., Marceau, N. and Mongrain, S. (2006). Gangs and Crime Deterrence , Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 315-339.
    • Mocan, H. N., Billups, S. C. and Overland, J. (2005). A Dynamic Model of Differential Human Capital and Criminal Activity , Economica, Vol. 72, No. 288, pp. 655-681.
    • Paoli, L. (2003). Mafia Brotherhoods: Organized Crime, Italian Style. Studies in Crime and Public Policy, Oxford, UK, Oxford University Press.
    • Polinsky, A. M. and Shavell, S. (2000). The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law , Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 38, No. 1, pp. 45-76.
    • Polo, M. (1997). Internal Cohesion and Competition Among Criminal Organisations , In: Fiorentini, G. and Peltzman, S. (Eds.), The Economics of Organised Crime. CEPR Conference Series. Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press, pp. 87-104.
    • Poret, S. (2002). Paradoxical Effects of Law Enforcement Policies: The Case of the Illicit Drug Market , International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 465-493.
    • Poret, S. and Tejedo, C. (2006). Law Enforcement and Concentration in Illicit Drug Markets , European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 99-114.
    • Poutvaara, P. and Priks, M. (2009). Hooliganism and Police Tactics , Journal of Public Economic Theory, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 441-453.
    • Poutvaara, P. and Priks, M. (2011). Unemployment and Gang Crime: Can Prosperity Backfire? , Economics of Governance, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 259-273.
    • Sah, R. K. (1991). Social Osmosis and Patterns of Crime , The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 99, No. 6, pp. 1272-1295.
    • Skaperdas, S. and Syropoulos, C. (1997). Gangs as Primitive States , In: Fiorentini, G. and Peltzman, S. (Eds.), The Economics of Organised Crime. CEPR Conference Series. Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press, pp. 61-82.
    • Yang, D. (2008). Can Enforcement Backfire? Crime Displacement in the Context of Customs Reform in the Philippines , The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 90, No. 1, pp. 1-14.
  • No related research data.
  • No similar publications.

Share - Bookmark

Cite this article