Remember Me
Or use your Academic/Social account:


Or use your Academic/Social account:


You have just completed your registration at OpenAire.

Before you can login to the site, you will need to activate your account. An e-mail will be sent to you with the proper instructions.


Please note that this site is currently undergoing Beta testing.
Any new content you create is not guaranteed to be present to the final version of the site upon release.

Thank you for your patience,
OpenAire Dev Team.

Close This Message


Verify Password:
Verify E-mail:
*All Fields Are Required.
Please Verify You Are Human:
fbtwitterlinkedinvimeoflicker grey 14rssslideshare1
Hammond, Peter J. (2008)
Publisher: University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Languages: English
Types: Book
Subjects: HB

Classified by OpenAIRE into

ACM Ref: ComputingMilieux_PERSONALCOMPUTING, TheoryofComputation_GENERAL, TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUS
arxiv: Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory
Von Neumann (1928) not only introduced a fairly general version of the extensive form game concept. He also hypothesized that only the normal form was relevant to rational play. Yet even in Battle of the Sexes, this hypothesis seems contradicted by players' actual behaviour in experiments. Here a refined Nash equilibrium is proposed for games where one player moves first, and the only other player moves second without knowing the first move. The refinement relies on a tacit understanding of the only credible and straightforward perfect Bayesian equilibrium in a corresponding game allowing a predictable direct form of cheap talk.
  • The results below are discovered through our pilot algorithms. Let us know how we are doing!

    • Amershi, A.H., Sadanand, A.B., and Sadanand, V. (1985) \Manipulated Nash Equilibria I: Forward Induction and Thought Process Dynamics in Extensive Form" University of British Columbia, Economics Working Paper 928.
    • Amershi, A.H., Sadanand, A.B, and Sadanand, V. (1989a) \Manipulated Nash Equilibria II: Some Properties" University of Guelph, Economics Discussion Paper 1989-5.
    • Amershi, A.H., Sadanand, A.B, and Sadanand, V. (1989b) \Manipulated Nash Equilibria III: Applications and a Preliminary Experiment" University of Guelph, Economics Discussion Paper 1989-6.
    • Amershi A.H., A. Sadanand and V. Sadanand (1992) \Player Importance and Forward Induction" Economics Letters 38, 291{297.
    • Asheim, G. and M. Dufwenberg (2003) \Deductive Reasoning in Extensive Games" Economic Journal 113, 305{325.
    • Aumann, R.J. (1987) \Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality" Econometrica 55, 1{18.
    • Aumann, R. J. and S. Hart (2003) \Long Cheap Talk" Econometrica, 71, 1619{ 1660.
    • Battigalli, P. (1997) \On Rationalizability in Extensive Games" Journal of Economic Theory 74, 40{60.
    • Battigalli, P. and D. Siniscalchi (1999) \Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic games" Journal of Economic Theory 88, 188{230.
    • Battigalli, P. and D. Siniscalchi (2002) \Strong Belief and Forward-Induction Reasoning" Journal of Economic Theory 106, 356{391.
    • Bernheim, B.D. (1984) \Rationalizable Strategic Behavior" Econometrica 52, 1007{ 1028.
    • Cooper, R., Dejong, D.V., Forsythe, R., and Ross, T.W. (1989) \Communication in the Battle-of-the-Sexes Games: Some Experimental Evidence" Rand Journal of Economics 20, 568{587.
    • Cooper, R., Dejong, D.V., Forsythe, R., and Ross, T.W. (1993) \Forward Induction in the Battle-of-the-Sexes Games" American Economic Review 83, 1303{1315.
    • Forges, F. (1986) \An Approach to Communication Equilibria" Econometrica 54, 1375{1385.
    • Guth, W., Huck, S., and Rapoport, A. (1998) \The Limitations of the Positional Order E ect: Can it Support Silent Threats and Non-Equilibrium Behavior?" Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 34, 313{325.
    • Hammond, P. J. (1982) \Sophisticated Dynamic Equilibria for Extensive Games" Economics Technical Report, Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University.
    • Hammond, P. J. (1993) \Aspects of Rationalizable Behavior" in K. Binmore, A.P. Kirman, and P. Tani (eds.) Frontiers of Game Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T Press, 1993), ch. 14, pp. 277{305.
    • Hammond, P. J. (2007) \Schumpeterian Innovation in Modelling Decisions, Games, and Economic Behaviour" History of Economic Ideas 15, 179{195.
    • Kolmogorov, A.N. (1933, 1956) Grundbegri e der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung (Berlin: Springer); translated as Foundations of Probability (New York: Chelsea).
    • Kreps, D. (1990) Game Theory and Economic Modelling (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
    • Kreps, D. M. and R. Wilson (1982) \Sequential Equilibrium" Econometrica 50, 863{894.
    • Kuhn, H.W. (1953) \Extensive Games and the Problem of Information" Contributions to the Theory of Games, II, 193{216; reprinted in H.W. Kuhn (ed.) Classics in Game Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).
    • Kumar, P. (1985) \Consistent Mechanism Design and the Noisy Revelation Principle" in Essays on Intertemporal Incentives and Signalling Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of Economics, Stanford University.
    • Mailath, G.J., L. Samuelson and J.M. Swinkels (1993) \Extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games" Econometrica 61, 273{302.
    • Muller, R.A. and A. Sadanand (2003) \Order of Play, Forward Induction, and Presentation E ects in Two-Person Games" Experimental Economics 6, 5{ 25.
    • Myerson, R.B. (1978) \Re nements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept" International Journal of Game Theory 7, 73{80.
    • Myerson, R. (1982) \Optimal Coordination Mechanisms in Generalized Principal{ Agent Problems" Journal of Mathematical Economics 10, 67{81.
    • Pearce, D. (1984) \Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection" Econometrica 52, 1029{1050.
    • Rapoport, A. (1997) \Order of Play in Strategically Equivalent Games in Extensive Form" International Journal of Game Theory 26, 113{136.
    • Sadanand, A. and V. Sadanand (1995) \Equilibria in Non-cooperative Games II: Deviations Based Re nements of Nash Equilibrium" Bulletin of Economic Research 47, 93{113.
    • Schotter, A., Weigelt, K., and Wilson, C. (1994) \A Laboratory Investigation of Multiperson Rationality and Presentation E ects" Games and Economic Behavior 6, 445{468.
    • Selten, R. (1965) \Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfragetragheit" Zeitschrift fur die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 121, 301{324 and 667{689.
    • Selten, R. (1975) \Re-examination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games" International Journal of Game Theory 4, 25{ 55.
    • Von Neumann, J. (1928) \Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele" Mathematische Annalen, 100, 295{320; reprinted in A.H. Taub (ed.) Collected Works of John von Neumann, Vol. VI (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1963), pp. 1{26; translated as \On the Theory of Games of Strategy" in A.W. Tucker and R.D. Luce (eds.) Contributions to the Theory of Games, Vol. IV (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), pp. 13{42.
    • Von Neumann, J. and O. Morgenstern (1943, 1953) Theory of Games and Economic Behavior 3rd. ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
    • Weber, R.A., Camerer, C.F., and Knez, M. (2004) \Timing and Virtual Observability in Ultimatum Bargaining and `Weak Link' Coordination Games" Experimental Economics 7: 25{48.
    • Zermelo, E. (1912) \ Uber eine Anwendung der Mengenlehre auf die Theorie des Schachspiels" Proceedings of the Fifth International Congress of Mathematicians, Vol. II, pp. 501{504.
  • No related research data.
  • No similar publications.

Share - Bookmark

Cite this article