LOGIN TO YOUR ACCOUNT

Username
Password
Remember Me
Or use your Academic/Social account:

CREATE AN ACCOUNT

Or use your Academic/Social account:

Congratulations!

You have just completed your registration at OpenAire.

Before you can login to the site, you will need to activate your account. An e-mail will be sent to you with the proper instructions.

Important!

Please note that this site is currently undergoing Beta testing.
Any new content you create is not guaranteed to be present to the final version of the site upon release.

Thank you for your patience,
OpenAire Dev Team.

Close This Message

CREATE AN ACCOUNT

Name:
Username:
Password:
Verify Password:
E-mail:
Verify E-mail:
*All Fields Are Required.
Please Verify You Are Human:
fbtwitterlinkedinvimeoflicker grey 14rssslideshare1
Faulkner, Paul (2008)
Languages: English
Types: Doctoral thesis
Subjects: PHI
In Conspiracies and Lyes I aim to provide an epistemological account of testimony as one of our faculties of knowledge. I compare testimony to perception and memory. Its similarity to both these faculties is recognised. A fundamental difference is stressed: it can be rational to not accept testimony even if testimony is fulfilling its proper epistemic function because it can be rational for a speaker to not express a belief; or, as I say, it can be rational for a speaker to lye. \ud This difference in epistemic function provides the basis for a sceptical argument against testimony. Scepticism is presented as a method rather than a problem: considering how to refute the sceptical argument is taken to be a means of evaluating theories as to how testimonial beliefs are warranted. I consider two strategies for refuting scepticism and, correlatively, two accounts of how testimonial beliefs are warranted. I show these accounts to be neutral across all theories of justification that entertain the project of investigating our faculties of knowledge.\ud A reductionist account explains the warrant supporting our testimonial beliefs in terms of our inductive ground for accepting testimony. An anti-reductionist account explains the warrant supporting our testimonial beliefs in terms of our possessing an entitlement to accept testimony. I show how both positions can be intuitively motivated. In presenting reductionism I appeal to probability theory, empirical psychology and invoke David Hume. In presenting anti-reductionism I invoke John McDowell and Tyler Burge.\ud A refutation of scepticism is provided by a hybrid of reductionism and anti-reductionism. The hybrid is conceived as part social externalism and part individual internalism. In developing this account I provide a means of conceptualising the dynamic that exists between individual knowers and communities of knowledge.
  • The results below are discovered through our pilot algorithms. Let us know how we are doing!

    • ADLER, J. 1994. 'Testimony, Trust and Knowing', The Journal of Philosophy, 91: 264-75.
    • ---- 1997. 'Lying, Deceiving, or Falsely Implicating', The Journal of Philosophy, 94: 435-52.
    • ALSTON, W. 1986. 'Epistemic Circularity', repr. in Alston (1989): 319-49.
    • ---- 1988. 'An Internalist Externalism', Synthese, 74: 265-83.
    • ---- 1989. Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge, (Cornell University Press; Ithaca, N.Y.).
    • ANSCOMBE, G.E.M. 1973. 'Hume and Julius Caesar', repr. in Anscombe (1981): 86-92.
    • ---- 1981. Collected Papers vol. I: From Parmenides to Wittgenstein, (Basil Blackwell; Oxford).
    • AUDI, R. 1997. 'The Place of Testimony in the Fabric of Knowledge and Justification', American Philosophical Quarterly, 34: 405-422.
    • AUSTIN, J.L. 1946. 'Other Minds', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 20: 148-87.
    • ---- 1962. How To Do Things With Words: the William James lectures delivered at Harvard University 1955, (Clarendon Press; Oxford).
    • BAIER, A. 1986. 'Trust and Antitrust', Ethics, 96: 231-60.
    • BALLARD, J.G. 1973. Crash, (Jonathan Cape; London).
    • BARRETT, R. and GIBSON, R.F. 1990. (eds). Perspectives on Quine, (Basil Blackwell; Oxford).
    • BHATTACHARYYA, S. 1994. 'Epistemology of Testimony and Authority: Some Indian Themes and Theories', in Matilal (1994): 69-97.
    • BOGHOSSIAN, P. 1994. 'The Transparency of Mental Content', in Tomberlin (1994): 33-50.
    • ---- 1996. 'Analyticity Reconsidered', Nous, 30: 360-91.
    • BONJOUR, L. 1980. 'Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge', in French (1980): 53-73.
    • ---- 1985. The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, (Harvard University Press; Cambridge, Mass.).
    • BRANDOM, R. 1995. 'Knowledge and the Social Articulation of the Space of Reasons', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 55: 895-908.
    • ---- 1997. 'Precis of Making it Explicit', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 57: 153-56 and 189-204.
    • BURGE, T. 1979. 'Individualism and the Mental', in French (1979b): 73-121.
    • ---- 1988. 'Individualism and Self-Knowledge', Journal of Philosophy, 85: 649- 63.
    • ---- 1993. 'Content Preservation', Philosophical Review, 102: 457-488.
    • ---- 1996. 'Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 69: 91-116.
    • ---- 1997. 'Interlocution, Perception, and Memory', Philosophical Studies, 86: 21-47.
    • CAREY, S. 1985. Conceptual Change in Childhood, (The MIT Press; Cambridge, Mass.).
    • CHAKRABARTI, A. 1994. 'Telling as Letting Know', in Matilal (1994): 99-124.
    • CHILD, W.C. 1994. Causality, Interpretation and the Mind, (Clarendon Press; Oxford).
    • CHISHOLM, R. 1966. Theory of Knowledge, (Prentice-Hall; Englewood Cliffs N.J.).
    • CHRISTENSEN, D. and KORNBLITH, H. 1997. 'Testimony, Memory and the Limits of the Apriori', Philosophical Studies, 86: 1-20.
    • CLARKE, P. and HALE, B. 1994. (eds). Reading Putnam, (Basil Blackwell; Oxford).
    • van CLEVE, J. 1979. 'Foundationalism, Epistemic Principles, and the Cartesian Circle', The Philosophical Review, 88: 55-91.
    • COADY, C.A.J. 1973. 'Testimony and Observation', American Philosophical Quarterly, 10: 149-155.
    • ---- 1992. Testimony: A Philosophical Study, (Clarendon Press; Oxford).
    • CODE, L. 1991. What Can She Know?, (Cornell University Press; Ithaca, N.Y.).
    • COLLIER, J.A.B., LONGMORE, J.M. and HODGETTS, T.J. 1995. Oxford Handbook of Clinical Specialities, (Oxford University Press; Oxford).
    • COOPER, D.E. 1987. 'Assertion, Phenomenology and Essence', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 61: 85-106.
    • COSTA, M.J. 1981. 'Hume and Justified Belief', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 11: 219-228.
    • DANCY, J. 1985. Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, (Basil Blackwell; Oxford).
    • ---- 1995. 'Arguments from Illusion', The Philosophical Quarterly, 45: 421-438.
    • DAVIDSON, D. 1966. 'Emeroses by Other Names', repr. in Davidson (1980): 225-8.
    • ---- 1973. 'Radical Interpretation', repr. in Davidson (1984): 125-140.
    • ---- 1974a. 'Belief and the Basis of Meaning', repr. in Davidson (1984): 141-154.
    • ---- 1974b. 'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme', repr. in Davidson (1984): 183-198.
    • ---- 1975. 'Thought and Talk', repr. in Davidson (1984): 155-170.
    • ---- 1977. 'The Method of Truth in Metaphysics', repr. in Davidson (1984): 199- 214.
    • ---- 1980. Essays on Actions and Events, (Clarendon Press; Oxford).
    • ---- 1983. 'A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge', repr. in LePore (1986): 307-319.
    • ---- 1984. Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, (Clarendon Press; Oxford).
    • ---- 1986. 'The Myth of the Subjective', in Krausz (1989): 159-172.
    • ---- 1987a. 'Afterthoughts, 1987', in Malachowski (1990): 134-138.
    • ---- 1987b. 'Knowing One's Own Mind', Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 61: 441-458.
    • ---- 1990a. 'Meaning, Truth and Evidence', in Barrett (1990): 68-79.
    • ---- 1990b. 'The Structure and Content of Truth', Journal of Philosophy, 87: 279-328.
    • ---- 1991. 'Three Varieties of Knowledge', in Griffiths (1991): 153-166.
    • ---- 1994. 'The Social Aspect of Language', in McGuinness (1991): 1-16.
    • ---- 1996. 'The Folly of Trying to Define Truth', Journal of Philosophy, 93: 263-278.
    • DESCARTES, R. 1641. 'Meditations in First Philosophy', trans. Anscombe and Geach, in Descartes: Philosophical Writings, (Nelson's University Paperbacks; Sunbury-on-Thames, Middlesex 1954): 59-124.
    • DRETSKE, F. 1970. 'Epistemic Operators', The Journal of Philosophy, 67: 1007- 1023.
    • ---- 1981. Knowledge and the Flow of Information, (Basil Blackwell; Oxford).
    • DUMMETT, M. 1993a. 'Testimony and Memory', in Dummett (1993b): 411- 428.
    • ---- 1993b. The Seas of Language, (Clarendon Press; Oxford).
    • DURKHEIM, E. 1912. The Elementary Forms of Religious Life: a Study in Religious Sociology, trans. Ward-Swain, (Allen and Unwin; London 1954).
    • EKMAN, P. 1985. Telling Lies: Clues to deceit in the marketplace, marriage, and politics, (W.W. Norton; New York).
    • ---- 1988. 'Why Lies Fail and What Behaviours Betray a Lie', in Yuille (1988): 71-82.
    • EKMAN, P. and FRIESEN, W.V. 1969. 'Nonverbal Leakage and clues to deception', Psychiatry, 32: 88-105.
    • ---- 1974. 'Detecting deception from body or face', Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 29: 288-98.
    • EVANS, G. 1982. The Varieties of Reference, (ed.). McDowell, (Clarendon Press; Oxford).
    • EVANS, G. and MCDOWELL, J. 1976. (eds). Truth and Meaning, (Clarendon Press; Oxford).
    • EVANS-PRITCHARD, E.E. 1940. The Nuer: A description of the modes of livelihood and political institutions of a Nilotic people, (Oxford University Press; Oxford).
    • FELDMAN, R. 1995. 'In Defense of Closure', The Philosophical Quarterly, 45:467-474.
    • FELDMAN, S. 1997. 'Second-Person Scepticism', The Philosophical Quarterly, 47: 80-84.
    • FOLEY, R. and FUMERTON, R. 1985. 'Davidson's Theism?', Philosophical Studies, 48: 83-89.
    • FOSTER, J. 1976. 'Meaning and Truth Theory', in Evans (1976): 1-32.
    • FREGE, G. 1892. 'On Sense and Reference', in Geach (1952): 56-78.
    • FRENCH, P. 1979a. (ed.). Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language, (D.Reidel; Dordrecht).
    • FRENCH, P., UEHLING, J.T.E. and WETTSTEIN, H.K. 1979b. (eds). Midwest Studies in Philosophy Vol. IV: Studies in Metaphysics, (University of Minnesota Press; Minneapolis).
    • ---- 1980. (eds). Midwest Studies in Philosophy Vol. V: Studies in Epistemology, (University of Minnesota Press; Minneapolis).
    • FRICKER, E. 1987. 'The Epistemology of Testimony', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Vol. 61: 57-83.
    • ---- 1994. 'Against Gullibility', in Matilal (1994): 125-61.
    • ---- 1995. 'Telling and Trusting: Reductionism and Anti-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony', Mind, 104: 393-411.
    • FRIEDMAN, M. 1996. 'Exorcising the Philosophical Tradition: Comments on John McDowell's Mind and World', The Philosophical Review, 105: 427- 467.
    • GEACH, P. and BLACK, M. 1952. (eds). Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottolob Frege, (Basil Blackwell; Oxford).
    • GELMAN, S.A. and WELLMAN, H.M. 1986. 'Categories and induction in young children', Cognition, 23: 183-209.
    • GETTIER, E.L. 1963. 'Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?', Analysis, 23: 121- 123.
    • GOLDMAN, A. 1979. 'What Is Justified Belief?', in Pappas, (1979): 1-23.
    • ---- 1986. Epistemology and Cognition, (Harvard University Press; Cambridge, Mass.).
    • ---- 1993. 'Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology', Philosophical Issues, 3: 271-84.
    • GOODMAN, N. 1955. Fact, Fiction and Forecast, (Harvard University Press; Cambridge, Mass.).
    • GOPNIK, A. and MELTZOFF, A,N. 1997. Words, Thoughts, and Theories, (The MIT Press; Cambridge, Mass.).
    • GRANDY, R. 1973. 'Reference, Meaning and Belief', Journal of Philosophy, 70: 439-452.
    • GRAYLING, A.C. 1995. (ed.). Philosophy: a guide through the subject, (Oxford University Press; Oxford).
    • GRECO, J. 1993. 'Virtues and Vices of Virtue Epistemology', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 23: 413-432.
    • GRICE, P. 1957. 'Meaning', repr. in Grice (1989): 213-223.
    • ---- 1989. Studies in the Way of Words, (Harvard University Press; Cambridge, Mass.).
    • GRIFFITHS, A.P. 1991. (ed.). A.J. Ayer Memorial Essays, (Cambridge University Press; New York).
    • HAMILTON-BART, W. 1858. (ed.). The Works of Thomas Reid, (Maclachlan and Stewart; Edinburgh).
    • HARDWIG, J. 1985. 'Epistemic Dependence', The Journal of Philosophy, 82: 335-349.
    • ---- 1991. 'The Role of Trust in Knowledge', The Journal of Philosophy, 88: 693-708.
    • HARMAN, G. 1980. 'Reasoning and Explanatory Coherence', American Philosophical Quarterly, 17: 151-7.
    • HOLTON, R. 1994. 'Deciding to Trust, Coming to Believe', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 72: 63-76.
    • HORWICH, P. 1982. Probability and Evidence, (Cambridge University Press; Cambridge).
    • HUME, D. 1740. A Treatise of Human Nature, (ed.) Selby-Bigge, (Clarendon Press; Oxford).
    • ---- 1777. Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, (ed.) Selby-Bigge, (Clarendon Press; Oxford).
    • JACK, J. 1994. 'The Role of Comprehension', in Matilal (1994): 163-193.
    • JACKSON, F. 1975. 'Grue', Journal of Philosophy, 72: 113-31.
    • KAHNEMAN, D., SLOVIC, P. and TVERSKY, A. 1982. (eds). Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, (Cambridge University Press; Cambridge).
    • KANT, I. 1787. Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Kemp-Smith (Macmillan; London 1929).
    • KENNER, H. 1971. The Pound Era, (Pimlico; London).
    • KORNBLITH, H. 1993. Inductive Inference and its Natural Ground: An Essay in Naturalistic Epistemology, (The MIT Press; Cambridge, Mass.).
    • KRAUSZ, M. 1989. (ed.). Relativism: Interpretations and Confrontation, (University of Notre Dame Press; Notre Dame, Ind.).
    • KYBURG JNR., H. 1961. Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief, (Wesleyan University Press; Middletown, Conn.).
    • LEHRER, K. 1975. (ed.). Analysis and Metaphysics, (D.Reidel; Dordrecht).
    • ---- 1994. 'Testimony, Justification and Coherence', in Matilal (1994): 51-58.
    • LEHRER, K. and COHEN, S. 1983. 'Justification, Truth, and Coherence', Synthese, 55: 191-207.
    • LEPORE, E. 1986. (ed.). Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, (Basil Blackwell; Oxford).
    • LEVI-STRAUSS, C. 1949. The Elementary Structures of Kinship, trans. Bell, Von Sturmer and Needham, (Beacon Press; Boston 1969).
    • LOCKE, J. 1689. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, (ed.) P.Nidditch, (Clarendon Press; Oxford).
    • MALACHOWSKI, A. 1990. (ed.). Reading Rorty, (Basil Blackwell; Oxford).
    • ---- 1993. 'Methodological Scepticism, Metaphysics and Meaning', International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 1: 302-312.
    • MARTIN, C.B. and DEUTSCHER, M. 1966. 'Remembering', Philosophical Review, 75: 161-96.
    • MARTIN, M.G.F. 1997. 'The Reality of Appearances', in Sainsbury (1997): 81- 106.
    • MATILAL, B.K. and CHAKRABARTI, A. 1994. (eds). Knowing From WordsWestern and Indian Philosophical Analysis of Understanding and Testimony, (Kluwer Academic Publishers; Dordrecht).
    • McDOWELL, J. 1977. 'On the Sense and Reference of a Proper Name', Mind, 86: 159-85.
    • ---- 1980. 'Meaning, Communication and Knowledge', in van Straaten (1980): 117-139.
    • ---- 1981. 'Anti-Realism and the Epistemology of Understanding', in Parret (1981): 226-248.
    • ---- 1982. 'Criteria, Defeasibility and Knowledge', Proceedings of the British Academy, 68: 455-79.
    • ---- 1986. 'Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space', in Pettit (1986): 137-168.
    • ---- 1994a. 'Knowledge by Hearsay', in Matilal (1994): 195-224.
    • ---- 1994b. Mind and World, (Harvard University Press; Cambridge, Mass.).
    • ---- 1995. 'Knowledge and the Internal', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 55: 877-893.
    • MCGUINNESS, B. and GIANLUIGI, O. 1994. (ed.). The Philosophy of Michael Dummett, (Kluwer Academic Publishers; Dordrecht).
    • MEDIN, D. L. and ORTONY, A. 1989. 'Psychological Essentialism', in Vosniadou (1989): 179-195.
    • MILOSZ, C. 1953. The Captive Mind, trans. Zielonko (Penguin Books; London 1953).
    • NISBETT, R. and ROSS, L. 1980 Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgement, (Prentice-Hall; Englewood Cliffs N.J.).
    • NOZICK, R. 1981 Philosophical Investigations, (Harvard University Press; Cambridge, Mass.).
    • OLIN, D. 1995. 'Hume, Miracles and Prior Probabilities', in Tweyman (1995): 416-426.
    • OWEN, D. 1987 'Hume versus Price on Miracles and Prior Probabilities', The Philosophical Quarterly, 37: 187-202.
    • PAPPAS, G. 1979. (ed.). Justification and Knowledge, (D.Reidel; Dordrecht).
    • PARRET, H. and BOUVERESSE, J. 1981. (eds). Meaning and Understanding, (Walter de Gruyter; Berlin and N.Y.)
    • PEACOCKE, C. 1986. Thoughts: an essay on content, (Basil Blackwell; Oxford).
    • PETTIT, P. and MCDOWELL, J. 1986. (eds). Subject, Thought, and Context, (Clarendon Press; Oxford).
    • PLANTINGA, A. 1988. 'Positive Epistemic Status and Proper Function', Philosophical Perspectives, 2: 1-51
    • ---- 1993a. Warrant: The Current Debate, (Oxford University Press; Oxford).
    • ---- 1993b. Warrant and Proper Function, (Oxford University Press; Oxford).
    • POLLOCK, J.L. 1968. 'What is an Epistemological Problem?', American Philosophical Quarterly, 5: 183-190.
    • ---- 1986. Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, (Rowman and Littlefield; Totowa N.J.).
    • ---- 1990. Nomic Probability and the Foundations of Induction, (Oxford University Press; Oxford).
    • PRICE, H.H. 1969. Belief, (Allen and Unwin; London).
    • PUTNAM, H. 1975a. 'The meaning of 'meaning'', repr. in Putnam (1975b): 215- 271.
    • ---- 1975b. Mind, Language and Reality - Philosophical Papers Volume 2, (Cambridge University Press; Cambridge).
    • ---- 1978. Meaning and the Moral Sciences, John Locke Lectures 1976, (Routledge and Kegan Paul; London).
    • REICHENBACH, H. 1949. A Theory of Probability: an inquiry into the logical and mathematical foundations of the calculus of probability, (University of California Press; Berkeley).
    • REID, T. 1764. 'An Inquiry into the Mind on the Principles of Common Sense', in Hamilton-Bart (1858): 97-211.
    • RESCHER, N. 1988. Rationality - A Philosophical Inquiry into the Nature and Rationale of Reason, (Clarendon Press; Oxford).
    • ROBINSON, P. 1991. 'McDowell Against Criterial Knowledge', Ratio (New Series), 4: 59-75.
    • ROOT, M. 1989. 'Miracles and the Uniformity of Nature', American Philosophical Quarterly, 26: 333-42.
    • RORTY, R. 1980. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, (Basil Blackwell; Oxford).
    • ROSS, A. 1986. 'Why Do We Believe What we are Told?', Ratio, 28: 69-88.
    • ROSS, J.F. 1975. 'Testimonial Evidence', in Lehrer (1975): 35-55.
    • ROSS, L. and ANDERSON, C. 1982. 'Shortcomings in the attribution process: on the origins and maintenance of erroneous social assessments', in Kahneman (1982): 129-152.
    • RUSSELL, B. 1912. The Problems of Philosophy, (Oxford University Press; Oxford).
    • SAINSBURY, M. 1988. Paradoxes, (Cambridge University Press; Cambridge).
    • ---- 1997, (ed.), Thought and Ontology, (Franco Angeli; Milan).
    • SAMPSON, G. 1980. Making Sense, (Oxford University Press; Oxford).
    • SCHMITT, F.F. 1987. 'Justification, Sociality and Autonomy', Synthese, 73: 43- 85.
    • SELLARS, W. 1963a. 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind', in Sellars (1963b): 127-97.
    • ---- 1963b. Science, Perception and Reality, (Routledge and Kegan Paul; London)
    • SHOEMAKER, S. 1963. Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity, (Cornell University Press; Ithaca, N.Y.).
    • SOSA, E. 1980. 'The foundations of foundationalism', repr. in Sosa (1995): 149- 164.
    • ---- 1985 'Knowledge and Intellectual Virtue', The Monist, 68: 224-45.
    • ---- 1986. ''Circular' Coherence and 'Absurd' Foundations', in LePore (1986): 387-397.
    • ---- 1988. 'Intellectual Virtue in Perspective', repr. in Sosa (1995): 270-293.
    • ---- 1991. 'Reliabilism and Intellectual Virtue', repr. in Sosa (1995): 131-145.
    • ---- 1993. 'Proper Functionalism and Virtue Epistemology', Nous, 27: 51-65.
    • ---- 1994a. 'Philosophical Scepticism and Epistemic Circularity', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24: 263-90.
    • ---- 1994b. 'Testimony and Coherence', repr. in Sosa (1995): 215-222.
    • ---- 1995. Knowledge in Perspective, (Cambridge University Press; Cambridge) ---- 1997. 'How to Resolve the Pyrrhonian Problematic: A Lesson from Descartes', Philosophical Studies, 85: 229-249.
    • STANLEY, P. 1935. 'The Scepticisms of David Hume', repr. in Tweyman (1995): 188-197.
    • STEVENSON, L. 1993. 'Why Believe What People Say?', Synthese, 94: 429-451.
    • van STRAATEN, Z. 1980. (ed.). Philosophical Subjects: Essays Presented to P.F. Strawson, (Clarendon Press; Oxford).
    • STRAWSON, P.F. 1994. 'Knowing From Words', in Matilal (1994): 23-7.
    • STROUD, B. 1984. The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism, (Oxford University Press; Oxford).
    • ---- 1994. 'Scepticism, 'Externalism', and the Goal of Epistemology', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 68: 291- 307.
    • STURGEON, S. 1995. 'Knowledge', in Grayling (1995): 10-26.
    • ---- 1997a. 'Rational Mind and Its Place in Nature', in Sainsbury (1997): 43-62.
    • ---- 1997b. 'Reliabilism', Unpublished Manuscript: Birkbeck College
    • TAYLOR, C. 1980. 'Theories of Meaning', in Taylor (1985): 248-292.
    • ---- 1985. Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers Volume One, (Cambridge University Press; Cambridge).
    • TOMBERLIN, J.E. 1994. (ed.). Philosophical Perspectives vol. 8: Language and Logic, (Ridgeview Publishing Co.; Atascadero, Cal.).
    • TRAIGER, S. 1993. 'Humean Testimony', Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 74: 135-49.
    • TVERSKY, A. 1977. 'Features of Similarity', Psychological Review, 84: 327-352.
    • TWEYMAN, S. 1995. (ed.). David Hume: Critical Assessments, (Routledge; London).
    • TYMOCZKO, T. 1992. 'The Exorcist's Nightmare: A Reply to Crispin Wright', Mind, 101: 543-552.
    • VENDLER, Z. 1972. Res Cogitans, (Cornell University Press; Ithaca, N.Y.).
    • ---- 1979. 'Telling the Facts', in French (1979a): 220-232.
    • VERMAZEN, B. 1983. 'The Intelligibility of Massive Error', Philosophical Quarterly, 33: 69-74.
    • VLADISLAV, J. 1986. (ed.). Vaclav Havel: Living in Truth, (Faber and Faber; London).
    • VOSNIADOU, S. 1989 (ed.). Similarity and Analogical Reasoning, (Cambridge University Press; Cambridge).
    • WALTON, K.L. 1990. Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts, (Harvard University Press; Cambridge, Mass.).
    • WEBB, M.O. 1993. 'Why I know about as much as you: a reply to Hardwig', The Journal of Philosophy, 90: 260-70.
    • WELBOURNE, M. 1979. 'The Transmission of Knowledge', The Philosophical Quarterly, 29: 1-9.
    • ---- 1981. 'The Community of Knowledge', The Philosophical Quarterly, 31: 302-314.
    • ---- 1986. The Community of Knowledge, (Aberdeen University Press; Aberdeen).
    • ---- 1994. 'Testimony, Knowledge and Belief', in Matilal (1994): 297-313.
    • WILLIAMS, B. 1960. 'Bodily continuity and personal identity', repr. in Williams (1973): 19-25.
    • ---- 1973. Problems of the Self, (Cambridge University Press; Cambridge).
    • ---- 1978. Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry, (Penguin; Hammondsworth, Middlesex).
    • WILLIAMS, M. 1991. Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Scepticism, (Princeton University Press; Princeton).
    • WILLIAMSON, T. 1995. 'Is Knowing a State of Mind?', Mind, 104: 533-565.
    • WITTGENSTEIN, L. 1969. On Certainty, (Basil Blackwell; Oxford).
  • No related research data.
  • No similar publications.

Share - Bookmark

Download from

Cite this article