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Bain, D.T. (2003)
Publisher: Blackwell Publishing
Languages: English
Types: Article
Subjects: BD, BF, B1
Pain may appear to undermine the radically intentionalist view that the phenomenal character of any experience is entirely constituted by its representational content. That appearance is illusory. After categorizing versions of pain intentionalism along two dimensions, I argue that an 'objectivist' and 'non-mentalist' version is the most promising, if it can withstand two objections concerning (a) what we say when in pain, and (b) the distinctiveness of pain. I rebut these objections, in a way available to both opponents of and adherents to the view that experiential content is entirely conceptual.
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