LOGIN TO YOUR ACCOUNT

Username
Password
Remember Me
Or use your Academic/Social account:

CREATE AN ACCOUNT

Or use your Academic/Social account:

Congratulations!

You have just completed your registration at OpenAire.

Before you can login to the site, you will need to activate your account. An e-mail will be sent to you with the proper instructions.

Important!

Please note that this site is currently undergoing Beta testing.
Any new content you create is not guaranteed to be present to the final version of the site upon release.

Thank you for your patience,
OpenAire Dev Team.

Close This Message

CREATE AN ACCOUNT

Name:
Username:
Password:
Verify Password:
E-mail:
Verify E-mail:
*All Fields Are Required.
Please Verify You Are Human:
fbtwitterlinkedinvimeoflicker grey 14rssslideshare1
Bernhardt, Dan; Xu Lee, Frances Z. (2016)
Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc.
Languages: English
Types: Article
Subjects: K1

Classified by OpenAIRE into

ACM Ref: ComputingMilieux_LEGALASPECTSOFCOMPUTING
We characterize how the process of publicly-gathering information via discovery affects strategic interactions between litigants. It allows privately-informed defendants to signal throughthe timing of settlement offers, with weaker ones attempting to settle pre-discovery. Discovery reduces the probability of trial. Properly designed limited discovery reduces expected litigation costs. Stronger defendants gain more (lose less) from a given amount of discovery. We find that the court should grant more discovery when defendants are believed to be stronger and should grant discovery on more efficient sources of information, leaving less efficient ones to trial.
  • No references.
  • No related research data.
  • No similar publications.

Share - Bookmark

Cite this article