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Armour, J.; Deakin, S.; Konzelmann, Suzanne J. (2003)
Publisher: Wiley
Languages: English
Types: Article
Subjects: man
Core institutions of UK corporate governance, in particular the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, the Combined Code on Corporate Governance and the law on directors’ duties, are strongly orientated towards the norm of shareholder primacy. Beyond the core, however, stakeholder interests are better represented, in particular at the intersection of insolvency and employment law. This reflects the influence of European Community laws on information and consultation of employees. In addition, there are signs that some institutional shareholders are redirecting their investment strategies, under government encouragement, away from a focus on short-term returns, in such a way as to favour stakeholder-inclusive practices by firms. On this basis we suggest that the UK system is currently in a state of flux and that the debate over shareholder primacy has not been concluded.
  • The results below are discovered through our pilot algorithms. Let us know how we are doing!

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