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Leibowitz, Uri D. (2014)
Publisher: Brill
Languages: English
Types: Article
In this paper I assess the viability of a particularist explanation of moral knowledge.\ud First, I consider two arguments by Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge that purport to\ud show that a generalist, principle-based explanation of practical wisdom—understood\ud as the ability to acquire moral knowledge in a wide range of situations—is superior\ud to a particularist, non-principle-based account. I contend that both arguments\ud are unsuccessful. Then, I propose a particularist-friendly explanation of knowledge\ud of particular moral facts. I argue that when we are careful to keep separate the\ud various explanatory tasks at hand we can see that a particularist-friendly explanation\ud of the fact that (e.g.,) Jane knows that A is morally right might not be so difficult\ud to come by. Moreover, I suggest that a particularist approach to explaining knowledge\ud of particular moral facts may go some way towards discharging the challenge of moral\ud scepticism.
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