LOGIN TO YOUR ACCOUNT

Username
Password
Remember Me
Or use your Academic/Social account:

CREATE AN ACCOUNT

Or use your Academic/Social account:

Congratulations!

You have just completed your registration at OpenAire.

Before you can login to the site, you will need to activate your account. An e-mail will be sent to you with the proper instructions.

Important!

Please note that this site is currently undergoing Beta testing.
Any new content you create is not guaranteed to be present to the final version of the site upon release.

Thank you for your patience,
OpenAire Dev Team.

Close This Message

CREATE AN ACCOUNT

Name:
Username:
Password:
Verify Password:
E-mail:
Verify E-mail:
*All Fields Are Required.
Please Verify You Are Human:
fbtwitterlinkedinvimeoflicker grey 14rssslideshare1
Sultany, Nimer
Languages: English
Types: Article
Subjects: 4000, 8500
This Article examines the role of religious law in constitutionalism by focusing on Egypt and Tunisia as two main case studies: Egypt is an example of the so-called “Islamic constitutionalism” and Tunisia is an example of a more secular variety. Both cases are analyzed against the backdrop of U.S. constitutional theory and law. I begin by rejecting conceptualist approaches which focus on abstract concepts in order to assess the compatibility of religion, like Islam, with democracy. I show the futility of this kind of debate through a comparison to American debates between “living constitutionalists” and “originalists.” I then elaborate a pragmatic account that assesses the consequences of different institutional arrangements. For that purpose Part I rejects the normative and political-realist arguments supporting the constitutionalization of religion, according to which constitutionalization of religion in a largely-liberal constitution is either an ideal compromise or a historical dictate. I focus on four assumptions that underlie these arguments: that popular acceptance requires Islamic constitutionalism; that people’s identity includes religious law and should be reflected in Islamic constitutionalism; that Islamic law’s indeterminacy belittles the possible risks of its constitutionalization; and that the legal order’s transparency requires an acknowledgment of the religious aspect.\ud \ud Part II considers two of the primary arguments supporting the U.S. Establishment Clause: alienation; political division and distraction; and corruption of religion. The first two arguments have been subjected to growing critiques in the United States. I defend these two arguments by connecting between alienation and internal effects within religious minorities, and between political division and instability and violence. Specifically, I argue that, first, the constitutionalization of religion is likely to produce an unequal status for religious groups given the pluralist conditions in Egypt and Tunisia. Second, constitutionalization is likely to polarize and destabilize the political system in these states. Finally, this polarization happens for the wrong reasons and may produce bad effects: the dominance of the debate over the constitutionalization of religion may distract the citizenry in these states from addressing other socio-economic and political questions that are not necessarily reduced to concerns over religious law; constitutionalization is an anti-participatory move because it empowers few jurists to make decisions rather than collective decision-making; delegating controversial religious questions to the judiciary is a form of secular escapism; and a constitutionalization of religion is part of a constitutional fetishism which—along with judicial empowerment—unduly legalizes political questions. The implication of these effects is to neglect political responsibility. Thus, the Article ends with a call for a Weberian consequences-driven ethics of responsibility. This ethical stance, in turn, should be part and parcel of the recognition of value pluralism and the attempt to transform politics into an adversarial “agonistic pluralism.”\ud \ud By displacing the conceptualist debate, the Article seeks to avoid the generalizing tendency of conceptual debates; evade the unwarranted optimism of the normative argument; and reject the realist argument’s despondency and uncritical acceptance of reality. Additionally, the Article seeks to demystify Islamic constitutionalism by grounding the discussion in American constitutional debates. Finally, the Article argues against Islamic constitutionalism without falling prey to essentialism.
  • The results below are discovered through our pilot algorithms. Let us know how we are doing!

    • 1 See infra Part I.A.
    • 2 Carlotta Gall, Liberal Opposition Leader is Assassinated in Tunisia, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2013, at A4; Carlotta Gall, Protesters Gather as Slain Tunisian Politician is Buried, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2013, at 12.
    • 3 See, e.g., Khaled Fahmy, 'We Did Not Risk Our Lives Simply to Change the Players', CNN (July 3, 2013), http://edition.cnn.com/2013/07/03/opinion/egypt-morsy-khaled-fahmy.
    • 4 See, e.g., David D. Kirkpatrick & Kareem Fahim, By the Millions, Egyptians Seek Morsi's Ouster, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2013, at A1.
    • 5 See, e.g., David D. Kirkpatrick, Egypt Army Ousts Morsi, Suspends Charter, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2013, at A1; Abigail Hauslohner, William Booth & Sharaf al-Hourani, Egypt's Military Ousts Morsi, WASH. POST, July 3, 2013, at A1.
    • 6 David D. Kirkpatrick, Hundreds of Egyptians Killed in Government Raids; Emergency Declared as Sectarian Violence Spreads, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2013, at A1; Egypt: Security Forces Used Excessive Lethal Force: Worst Mass Unlawful Killings in Country's Modern History, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Aug. 19, 2013), http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/08/19/egypt-security-forces-used-excessive-lethal-force; Amnesty Int'l, Egypt's Disastrous Bloodshed Requires Urgent Impartial Investigation (Aug. 16, 2013), http://www.amnesty. org/en/news/egypt-s-disastrous-bloodshed-requires-urgent-impartial-investigations-2013-08-16.
    • 7 Hamza Hendawi, Egypt: Islamists Hit Christian Churches, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 18, 2013, available at LEXIS, International News.
    • 13 NATHAN J. BROWN, CONSTITUTIONS IN A NONCONSTITUTIONAL WORLD: ARAB BASIC LAWS AND THE PROSPECTS FOR ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNMENT 143-45, 161-65 (2002).
    • 14 See, e.g., Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Law and Religion in the Muslim Middle East, 35 AM. J. COMP. L. 127, 138-39 (1987).
    • 15 Article 2, Section 1, Subsection A, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] of 2005.
    • 16 See, e.g., David Landau, Constitution Making Gone Wrong, 64 ALA.. L. REV. 923, 980 (2013) (arguing that constitution-making processes should not be idealized).
    • 17 DRAFT CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT art. 2, 30 Nov. 2012; CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 11 Sept. 1971, as amended, May 22, 1980, May 25, 2005, March 26, 2007.
    • 18 David D. Kirkpatrick, A Vague Role for Religion in Egyptian Draft Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2012, at A4.
    • 19 Kareem Fahim, Tunisia Says Constitution Will Not Cite Islamic Law: Party Favors Unity Over Religious Pressure, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2012, at A10.
    • 20 Article 1, Dustur al-Jumhuriyya al-Tunisiyya [Constitution of the Tunisian Republic] of 2014; Fahim, supra note 19, at 10.
    • 26 See infra Part II.A.2.
    • 27 See infra notes 397-403.
    • 28 See, e.g., S. E. FINER, VERNON BOGDANOR & BERNARD RUDDEN, COMPARING CONSTITUTIONS 1-5 (1995).
    • 29 See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, The Stakes of Law, or Hale and Foucault!, 15 LEGAL STUD. FORUM 327 (1991).
    • 30 See, e.g., Ian F. Haney-López, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1994).
    • 31 See generally, CHANTAL MOUFFE, THE DEMOCRATIC PARADOX (2000).
    • 32 See RAN HIRSCHL, CONSTITUTIONAL THEOCRACY (2010); Larry Catá Backer, Theocratic Constitutionalism: An Introduction to a New Global Legal Ordering, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 85 (2009), for theories that focus on Islamic-majority states.
    • 36 Kirkpatrick, supra note 18.
    • 37 James Feuille, Note, Reforming Egypt's Constitution: Hope for Egyptian Democracy?, 47 TEX. INT'L L.J. 237, 239-40 (2013).
    • 38 Id.
    • 39 Rescrit Royal No. 42 de 1923 établissant le Régime Constitutionnel de l´Etat Egyptien (Establishing the Constitutional Regime of the Egyptian State), Journal officiel du gouvernement égyptien, 19 Apr. 1923, art. 149 (Egypt) (“L'Islam est la religion de l´Etat; l´arabe est sa languo officielle.”).
    • 40 See PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC, 5 Mar. 1958 (Egypt) (omitting the provision regarding Islam as the religion of the state and Arabic as the language of the state).
    • 41 MOHAMED CHERIEF BASSIOUNI & MOHAMED HELAL, AL-JOMHORIYYA AL-THANEYAH FI MISR [THE SECOND REPUBLIC IN EGYPT] 263 (2012), available at http://shorouknews.com/sites/republicII/ (noting the change in positioning the religion article in Egyptian constitutions).
    • 42 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 23 Mar. 1964, art. 5
    • 43 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 16 Jan. 1956, art. 2.
    • 44 See Mayer, supra note 14, at 135-38.
    • 45 See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 13, at 10-13.
    • 46 Id. at 11-13.
    • 47 CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 11 Sept. 1971, art. 2, amended by May 22, 1980, May 25, 2005, March 26, 2007.
    • 48 Id.
    • 49 BASSIOUNI & HELAL, supra note 41, at 252 (mentioning Sadat's attempt to rehabilitate the regime after the 1967 defeat inter alia through introducing a constitution).
    • 50 See id. at 253; Islam and the State Under Sadat, ISLAMOPEDIA ONLINE, http://www.islamopediaonline. org/country-profile/egypt/islam-and-nation-building/islam-and-state-under-sadat.
    • 51 CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, May 22, 1980, art. 2, amended May 25, 2005, March 26, 2007.
    • 52 Mayer, supra note 14, at 138 (“Egypt, by a 1980 referendum, changed its Constitution to make the shari'a “the main source” of legislation, rather than “a main source” of legislation . . . to placate Islamic fundamentalist critics of the Sadat government.”).
    • 53 Law No. 48 of 1979 (Law on the Supreme Constitutional Court), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, 9 June 1979, art. 25, amended by Law No. 168 of 1998 (Egypt); Supreme Constitutional Court, ST. INFO. SERV., http:// www.sis.gov.eg/En/Templates/Articles/tmpArticles.aspx?CatID=250# (last visited Apr. 2, 2014) http://www. sis.gov.eg/En/Templates/Articles/tmpArticles.aspx?CatID=250# (last visited Apr. 2, 2014).
    • 54 Tamir Moustafa, Law Versus the State: The Judicialization of Politics in Egypt, 28 LAW. & SOC. INQUIRY 883, 889-90 (2003).
    • 55 See Feuille, supra note 37, at 241-42.
    • 56 See Moustafa, supra note 54, at 890.
    • 57 Id. at 908-13; see also Ran Hirschl, Constitutional Courts vs. Religious Fundamentalism: Three Middle Eastern Tales, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1819, 1825-26 (2004).
    • 58 BASSIOUNI & HELAL, supra note 41, at 265-68.
    • 59 Haider Ala Hamoudi, Ornamental Repugnancy: Identitarian Islam and the Iraqi Constitution, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 692 (2010).
    • 60 See CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 8 July, 2013, art. 29 (Egypt).
    • 61 Tom Perry, Egypt Islamists Say Clerics Must Approve IMF Loan, REUTERS, Feb. 12, 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/12/us-egypt-islamists-imf-idUSBRE91B1DA20130212.
    • 62 DRAFT CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 30 Nov. 2012, art. 219; Clark Lombardi & Nathan J. Brown, Islam in Egypt's New Constitution, FOREIGN POL'Y (Dec. 13, 2012), http://mideastafrica. foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/12/13/islam_in_egypts_new_constitution..
    • 63 Lombardi & Brown, supra note 62.
    • 64 Id.
    • 65 Id.
    • 66 Id.
    • 67 Subpart C of the Introduction below analogizes the debate on Islamic constitutionalism to the debate between U.S. originalists and living constitutionalists. In the United States, the ascendance of originalism has led some progressive scholars to adopt and provide a progressive version of it by seeking to bridge the gap between living constitutionalism and originalism and claiming that progressive goals are consistent with original intent or public meaning. See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 3-6, 16-20 (2011). Additionally, originalism can be abused and manipulated with respect to religious questions. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Phony Originalism and the Establishment Clause, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 727-30 (2009). Therefore, the attempt in Article 219 to force the judges to utilize medieval sources does not necessarily lead to conservative outcomes.
    • 68 CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, February 2014.
    • 69 CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 11 Sept. 1971, as amended, May 22, 1980, May 25, 2005, March 26, 2007, art. 10.
    • 70 Id.
    • 71 See CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 23 Mar. 1964, art. 7.
    • 72 See CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 11 Sept. 1971, as amended, May 22, 1980, May 25, 2005, March 26, 2007, art. 9.
    • 73 IR. CONST., 1937 , art. 41.
    • 74 DRAFT CONSTITUTION OF THE TUNISIAN REPUBLIC, 1 June 2013, art. 7.
    • 75 See CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 11 Sept. 1971, ch. 2, art. 11.
    • 76 DRAFT CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 30 Nov. 2012 .
    • 77 Mayer, supra note 14, at 147. Mayer writes: “Another indication that many countries of the Muslim Middle East are not secular states is that they have constitutional provisions indicating that the shari'a is either 'a source' or 'the source' of legislation.” Id. at 138.
    • 78 BROWN, supra note 13, at 3.
    • 79 CONSTITUTION OF THE TUNISIAN REPUBLIC, 26 Apr. 1861. The British colonizers abolished the shortlived 1882 Egyptian constitution. See CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 7 Feb. 1882; Brown, supra note 13, at 16-20, 26-29.
    • 80 CONSTITUTION OF THE TUNISIAN REPUBLIC, 1 June 1959.
    • 81 See Malika Zeghal, Public Institutions of Religious Education in Egypt and Tunisia: Contrasting the Post-Colonial Reforms of Al-Azhar and the Zaytuna, in TRAJECTORIES OF EDUCATION IN THE ARAB WORLD 111, 112 (Osama Abi-Mershed ed., 2010).
    • 82 Id.
    • 83 CONSTITUTION OF THE TUNISIAN REPUBLIC, 1 June 1959, art. 1.
    • 84 See Malika Zeghal, Veiling and Unveiling Muslim Women: State Coercion, Islam, and the 'Disciplines of the Heart', in THE CONSTRUCTION OF BELIEF: REFLECTIONS ON THE THOUGHT OF MOHAMMED ARKOUN 127 (Abdou-Filali-Ansary & Aziz Esmail eds., 2012).
    • 85 Chehabi, supra note 34, at 78-81. Chehabi argues that although religion was politicized in Iran, that did not create an institutionalized Church-like hierarchy-especially given the opposition of traditional clergy to their inclusion in the bureaucratic theocratization-. Id. at 81-84. After the passing away of Khomeini the separation became clear between political and religious authority given the failure to formalize charismatic leadership. Id. at 84-87.
    • 86 Zeghal, supra note 84, at 127, 129-30.
    • 87 PARTHA CHATTERJEE, THE NATION AND ITS FRAGMENTS: COLONIAL AND POSTCOLONIAL HISTORIES 116 (1993).
    • 88 Zeghal, supra note 84, at 130.
    • 89 Id. at 137.
    • 90 Zeghal, supra note 81, at 115-16.
    • 91 Id.
    • 92 Id.
    • 93 Id. at 116; see also LEONARD BINDER, ISLAMIC LIBERALISM: A CRITIQUE OF DEVELOPMENT IDEOLOGIES 80 (1988).
    • 94 Malika Zeghal, Religion and Politics in Egypt: The Ulema of al-Azhar, Radical Islam, and the State (1952-94), 31 INT'L J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 371, 372 (1999) (“Far from having had a negative effect on the ulema's political vitality, the modernizing process radically transformed their political identity because it inadvertently offered them a political forum as well as a basis for the expansion of their educational institution.”).
    • 95 Tamir Moustafa, Conflict and Cooperation Between the State and Religious Institutions in Contemporary Egypt, 32 INT'L J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 3, 12 (2000).
    • 96 Zeghal, supra note 94, at 396.
    • 97 See Malika Zeghal, Competing Ways of Life: Islamism, Secularism, and Public Order in the Tunisian Transition, 20 CONSTELLATIONS 254, 261 (2013).
    • 98 DRAFT CONSTITUTION OF THE TUNISIAN REPUBLIC, 1 June 2013, arts. 1, 2.
    • 99 Id. art. 6.
    • 100 Tunisia: Fix Serious Flaws in Draft Constitution, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/09/13/tunisia-fix-serious-flaws-draft-constitution.
    • 101 DRAFT CONSTITUTION OF THE TUNISIAN REPUBLIC, 1 June 2013, art. 6.
    • 102 This article existed in previous drafts and was criticized by human rights groups. See, Tunisia: Revise the Draft Constitution, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 13, 2012), http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/05/13/tunisiarevise-draft-constitution. In the final ratified version in 2014 the article's number is 74. CONSTITUTION OF THE TUNISIAN REPUBLIC, 27 January 2014, art. 74.
    • 103 See infra Part II.B.
    • 104 This does not imply that the constitution-making process has been flawless. See, e.g., CARTER CTR., THE CARTER CENTER ENCOURAGES INCREASED TRANSPARENCY AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN TUNISIA'S CONSTITUTION DRAFTING PROCESS; CALLS FOR PROGRESS TOWARD ESTABLISHMENT OF INDEPENDENT ELECTION MANAGEMENT BODY (May 11, 2012), http://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/pr/tunisiastatement-051112-en.pdf.
    • 105 Nimer Sultany, Against Conceptualism: Islamic Law, Democracy, and Constitutionalism in the Aftermath of the Arab Spring, 31 B.U. INT'L L.J. 435, 439 (2013).
    • 106 Id. at 439-46 (developing the argument in greater detail).
    • 107 The literature attempting to reconcile between Islamic law and democracy, or discussing efforts of scholars and constitutional courts reconciling Islamic law and democracy, is vast. See e.g., MUHAMMAD ABED AL-JABRI, DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LAW IN ISLAMIC THOUGHT (2009); MUHAMMAD ABED ALJABRI, AL-DIMOKRATIYYA WA HOQOOQ AL-INSAN [DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS] (1994) (Arabic);
    • 316 Sherif Tarek, Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood and Ruling military: Deal or No deal? AHRAM ONLINE, (Sept. 28, 2011), http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/22042/Egypt/Politics-/Egypts-MuslimBrotherhood-and-ruling-military-Deal.aspx.
    • 317 Wyre Davies, Resurgence of revolt where Arab Spring began, BBC, Feb. 7, 2013, http://www.bbc.co. uk/news/world-africa-21377369.
    • 318 Mohammad Hajjaj, 'Al-Ikhwan': Maseerat Al-Tanahhi Leiskat 'Morsi' Inkilab 'ala Al-Demokratiyya wa Istinsakh le Al-Thawra. . . [The 'Brotherhood': Resignation marches to overthrow 'Morsi' are a coup against democracy and a cloning of the revolution. . . AL-YOUM AL-SABE'A, Feb. 11, 2013 (Arabic), http:// www1.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=941521&SecID=12.
    • 319 Paul DiMaggio, John Evans & Bethany Bryson, Have Americans' Social Attitudes Become More Polarized? 102 AM. J. SOC. 690, 692-93 (1996).
    • 320 Id. at 693; see ADRIENNE LEBAS, FROM PROTEST TO PARTIES: PARTY BUILDING AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN AFRICA 254-56 (2013).
    • 321 RANDOLPH ROTH, AMERICAN HOMICIDE 145 (2009). Roth writes:
    • 328 See supra Part I.A.1.
    • 329 Egypt's Flawed Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2012, at A26 (noting that the low turnout in the referendum “reflects disgust with a political process that included violent street protests and a president who, for a time, asserted dictatorial powers.”)
    • 330 Ben Ahmad, supra note 148.
    • 331 AFP, Tunis, Tunisia's secular opposition unites against Islamists, AL-ARABIYA NEWS, (Mar. 23, 2012, 6:03 AM) http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/03/23/202572.html.
    • 332 Kareem Fahim, Tunisia Says Constitution Will Not Cite Islamic Law, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2012, at [1] (quoting Al-Nahda leader).
    • 333 Lyse Doucet, Tunisians' Frustration, Two Years On, BBC NEWS (Dec. 10, 2012, 10:24 AM), http:// www.bbc.com/news/world-20663981 (explaining Tunisia's revolution caused by economic discontent).
    • 334 Amnesty Int'l, supra note 231.
    • 335 Wajdi al-Kumi, Intellectuals Call for Amending the Constitution's Article 2, AL-YOUM AL-SABE'A (Feb. 19, 2011), http://www.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=354432&SecID=94&IssueID=153 (Arabic).
    • 336 Id. The group has also created a website calling for a secular state: http://www.dawlamadaneya.com/ ar/.
    • 337 Egypt's Islamists Rush Through New Constitution, USA TODAY (Nov. 30, 2012), http://www. usatoday.com/story/news/world/2012/11/29/egypt-islamists-constitution/1735643/; Hamza Hendawi & Maggie Michael, Egypt's Islamists Rush through New Constitution, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 29, 2012, available at LEXIS, International News.
    • 338 Noha El-Hennawy, In Battle Over Sharia, Salafis Lay Groundwork for the Future, EGYPT IND. (July 11, 2012, 11:08 PM), http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/battle-over-sharia-salafis-lay-groundworkfuture-0.
    • 339 Al-Masry Al-Youm, Churches, Salafis Disagree Over New Constitution, EGYPT INDEP. (July 2, 2012, 10:18 PM), http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/churches-salafis-disagree-over-new-constitution.
    • 340 Id.
    • 341 Marwa Awad, Islamists Protest for Shari'a as Egypt Debates Constitution, REUTERS, Nov. 9, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/09/us-egypt-islamists-protest-idUSBRE8A81AR2012 1109.
    • 342 CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 2012, as amended, Sept 11, 1971, Mary 22, 1980, Mary 25, 2005, March 26, 2007.
    • 343 Id.
    • 344 See supra Subpart B.1 of the Introduction.
    • 345 Al-Kumi, supra note 335.
    • 346 Awad, supra note 341.
    • 347 AZMI BISHARA, DOHA INST., CAN WE SPEAK OF A 'COPTIC QUESTION' IN EGYPT? 7 (2011).
    • 348 Ruti Teitel, Partial Establishments of Religion Post-Communist Transitions, in THE LAW OF RELIGIOUS IDENTITY: MODELS FOR POST-COMMUNISM 103 (Shlomo Avineri & Andras Sajo. eds, 1998).
    • 349 Keddie, supra note 149, at 30 (mentioning the possibility of backlash when state institutions impose secularism).
    • 350 Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.- C.L. L. REV. 373, 389 (2007).
    • 351 Ashraf El-Sherif, Egypt's Post-Mubarak Predicament, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE (Jan. 29, 2014), http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/01/29/egypt-s-post-mubarak-predicament/gzg2.
    • 352 See, e.g., EYAL PRESS, ABSOLUTE CONVICTIONS: MY FATHER, A CITY, AND THE CONFLICT THAT DIVIDED AMERICA (2006).
    • 353 The Patriarch of the Coptic Church Tawadros II expressed on February 2013 his view of the 2012 Constitution as divisive and discriminatory: “The only common bond between all Egyptians is that they are all citizens. . . the constitution, the base for all laws, must be under the umbrella of citizenship and not a religious one. . . Subsequently, some clauses were distorted by a religious slant and that in itself is discrimination because the constitution is supposed to unite and not divide.” Coptic Pope Tawadros II Criticises Egypt's Islamist Leadership, New Constitution, AHRAM ONLINE (Feb. 5, 2013), http://english.ahram.org.eg/ NewsContent/1/64/64135/Egypt/Politics-/Coptic-Pope-Tawadros-II-criticises-Egypts-Islamist.aspx.
    • 354 El-Gaili, supra note 194, at 511.
    • 355 D. Amr Shubaki, La Tosadeko anna Al-Shari'a fi Khatar [Do Not Believe That The Law Is In Danger], EGYPT INDEP. (Dec. 10, 2012), http://today.almasryalyoum.com/article2.aspx?ArticleID=363334.
    • 356 Egyptian author and columnist Ahdaf Soueif raised this option in a couple of occasions. Ahdaf Soueif, Al-Hajah Al-Mulehha Ila Al-Dostoor [The Pressing Need for a Constitution], AL-SHOROUK ( Sept. 7, 2011), http://shorouknews.com/columns/view.aspx?cdate=07092011&id=c2e63e7e-2d17-40a5-9bb0-be30f351d0aa (noting that the question of the constitution itself became one of the most divisive platforms); Leno'ajjel hatha Al-Dostoor [Let Us Delay . . . This Constitution], AL-SHOROUK (Dec. 19, 2012), http://shorouknews.com/ columns/view.aspx?cdate=19122012&id=c1e649e9-b3f6-4539-9991-acc42ad05322.
    • 356 Id.
    • 357 Id..
    • 358 Abdel-Rahman Hussein & Julian Borger, Egypt Opposition Group to Boycott 'Irresponsible' Vote on New Constitution, GUARDIAN, Dec. 9, 2012, at 17.
    • 359 CONSTITUTION OF THE TUNISIAN REPUBLIC, 1 June 1959.
    • 360 CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 2012, as amended, Sept 11, 1971, Mary 22, 1980, Mary 25, 2005, March 26, 2007.
    • 368 Mohamed-Salah Omri, The Perils of Identity Politics in Tunisia, AL-JAZEERA, (Jan. 7, 2013, 4: 15 PM), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/01/2013127142856170386.html.
    • 369 CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 2012, as amended, Sept 11, 1971, Mary 22, 1980, Mary 25, 2005, March 26, 2007.
    • 370 Fahmi Howeidi, La Hia Khilafa aw 'Ailmanyyah [Succession Is Not A Secular OrNeither Caliphate Nor Secularism], AL-SHOROUK (July 8, 2012, 8:50), http://shorouknews.com/columns/view.aspx?cdate=0807 2012&id=89f2c8bc-2804-448f-b587-86682ea7361c.
    • 371 Id.
    • 372 Al-Kumi, supra note 336.
    • 373 Nathan J. Brown, Egypt's Constitution: It's Not Really About the Religious Clauses, GUARDIAN, (Feb. 15, 2012, 3:00).
    • 374 Egypt Approves Constitutional Changes, AL-JAZEERA, (Mar. 20, 2011, 5:57 PM), http://www. aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/03/2011320164119973176.html.
    • 375 Salma Shukrallah & Yassin Gaber, What Was Religion Doing in the Debate on Egypt's Constitutional Amendments? AHRAM ONLINE (Mar. 22, 2011), http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/8267.aspx.
    • 376 Amr Hamzawy, Al-Gha'eb 'an Al-Nikash Al-Siyasi [The Absent From Political Debate, AL-SHOROUK (June 2, 2011, 8:17), http://shorouknews.com/columns/view.aspx?cdate=02062011&id=8ee890a4-799c-41c5- 916c-b59c8065ef47.
    • 377 Id.
    • 378 Amr Hamzawy, Al-Muwatana Al-Muhaddada [Threatened Citizenship], AL-SHOROUK, (May 5, 2011), http://shorouknews.com/columns/view.aspx?cdate=05052011&id=4eabb258-43f2-4fa5-a454-c325fd684430.
    • 379 Abdel Fattah Madi, Misr Ba'ada Al-Dostoor.. Ta'azzom am Intikal? [Egypt After the Constitution. . . Crisis or Transition?], AL-JAZEERA, (Dec. 29, 2012), http://www.aljazeera.net/opinions/pages/F48D2318- E277-4EDF-80FD-15B3E34F84E5.
    • 380 IAN SHAPIRO, THE STATE OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 128 (2003).
    • 381 He became a deputy to the prime minister in the government after the army deposed President Morsi on July 3, 2013. Joel Gulhane, Ziad Bahaa El-Din Appointed Deputy PM, DAILY NEWS EGYPT (July 12, 2013), http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/07/12/ziad-bahaa-el-din-appointed-deputy-pm/.
    • 382 Ziad Bahaa al-Dein, Ishakaleyyat Al-'Adalah Al-Ijtima'aeyyah [The Problematic of Social Justice], AL-SHOROUK (Feb. 12, 2013), http://www.shorouknews.com/columns/view.aspx?cdate=12022013&id= c75ed0de-e0aa-4583-aed5-92ad6f6d674e.
    • 383 Id.
    • 384 Id.
    • 393 See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Supreme Court, 2005 Term-Foreword: The Court's Agenda-And the Nation's, 120 HARV. L. REV. 4, 54 (2006).
    • 394 Id. at 54 (noting that American agencies have more expertise in technical matters than judges).
    • 395 See, e.g., Jerry Frug, Administrative Democracy, 40 U. TORONTO L. J. 559 (1990); Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 411, 412 (2005).
    • 396 See, e.g., THE DESECULARIZATION OF THE WORLD: RESURGENT RELIGION AND WORLD POLITICS (Peter L. Berger ed., 1999).
    • 397 See, e.g., id.
    • 398 PIPPA NORRIS & RONALD INGLEHART, SACRED AND SECULAR: RELIGION AND POLITICS WORLDWIDE 4 (2004).
    • 399 Masoud, supra note 392.
    • 400 Id.
    • 401 Labor union leaders accused the leaders of the National Salvation Front, which opposed the Muslim Brotherhood, in a meeting on February 16, 2013, of ignoring them and their unions. See Ashraf 'Azzoz, 'AlInkath': la Hadith 'an Intikhabat wal Bilad Tanhar. . . ['Salvation': No talk on elections when the country is collapsing. . .], AL-YOUM AL-SABE'A (Feb 16, 2013), http://www1.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID= 947746&SecID=12; see also Dan Murphy, Egypt's political elites and their estrangement from the poor, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Feb 19, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Backchannels/2013/0219/Egypts-political-elites-and-their-estrangement-from-the-poor (mentioning that elites within and outside the Muslim Brotherhood are estranged from the poor Egyptians).
    • 402 Ahdaf Soueif, Al-Hajah Al-Mulehha Ila Al-Dostoor [The Pressing Need for a Constitution], ALSHOROUK (Sept. 7, 2011), http://shorouknews.com/columns/view.aspx?cdate=07092011&id=c2e63e7e-2d17- 40a5-9bb0-be30f351d0aa .
    • 403 The Egyptian army has issued in the past constitutional declarations in the aftermath of the July 23, 1952 Free Officers' coup. See, e.g., I'alan Dostori men Al-Ka'ed Al-'am lil Kuwwat Al-Musallaha wa Ka'ed Thwarat Al-Jaysh [A Constitutional Declaration from the Chief of the Armed Forces and the Leader of the Army's Revolution], SIS (Feb. 10, 1953), http://www.sis.gov.eg/Newvr/dostorpdf/1953.pdf.
    • 404 Neil MacFarquhar, Egyptian Voters Approve Constitutional Changes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2011, at A4.
    • 405 CONSTITUTIONAL DECLARATION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 23 March 2011.
    • 406 English Text of SCAF Amended Egypt Constitutional Declaration, AHRAM ONLINE (June 18, 2012), http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/45350.aspx.
    • 407 See, e.g., Constitutional Declaration Can Be Amended Without Referendum: SCAF, AHRAM ONLINE (May 22, 2012), http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/42325/Egypt/Politics-/Constitutionaldeclaration-can-be-amended-without-.aspx.
    • 408 Ahmad Yassin Mohammad Ali, 41 I'atilafan le Da'am Hamlat Al-Dostoor Awwalan [41 Coalitions Supporting the Constitution First Campaign], AL-AHRAM AL-MASA'AI (June 14, 2011), http://massai.ahram. org.eg/News/34328.aspx; Haitham al-Tabe'ai & Asma'a Nassar, Hamlat Al-Dostoor Awwalan Tajma'a 5 Malayeen Tawkee'a wa Tantather Mosharakat Sharaf [Constitution First Campaign Gathers 5 Million Signatures and Awaits [Prime Minister] Sharaf's Participation], ASHARQ AL-AWSAT (June 23, 2011), http://www.aawsat.com/print.asp?did=627813&issueno=11895.
    • 409 Al-Tabe'ai & Nassar, supra note 408; Ahdaf Soueif, 'An al-dostoor wa Al-Ta'alof wa Al-Ibda'a [On the Constitution, Harmony and Creativity], AL-SHOROUK (July 22, 2011), http://shorouknews.com/columns/ view.aspx?cdate=22072011&id=39a172f4-b872-48d6-8294-f6d5a6df50fd.
    • 410 English text of Morsi's Constitutional Declaration, AHRAM ONLINE (Nov. 22, 2012), http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/58947.aspx.
    • 411 Article II states that they cannot be appealed or annulled by judicial power. Id.
    • 412 Id.
    • 413 Abigail Hauslohner & Ingy Hassier, Egypt's Opposition Split Over Next Step After Morsi Cancels Decree, WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 2012, at A11.
    • 414 Michael J. Klarman, Constitutional Fetishism and the Clinton Impeachment Debate, 85 VA. L. REV. 631, 657 (1999).
    • 415 Id. at 651.
    • 416 See, e.g., Egypt's Constitutional Crisis, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2012, at A16; Q&A: Egypt Constitutional Crisis, BBC (Dec. 24, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-20554079.
    • 417 Louis Michael Seidman, Let's Give Up on the Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2012, at A19.
    • 418 KENNEDY, supra note 210, at 236.
    • 419 See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346, 1353 (2006).
  • No related research data.
  • No similar publications.

Share - Bookmark

Download from

Cite this article