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fbtwitterlinkedinvimeoflicker grey 14rssslideshare1
Smith, Paul (2007)
Publisher: Liverpool University Press
Languages: English
Types: Part of book or chapter of book
Subjects: BH, ND
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    • 23 Quoted in Feaver, John Martin, p. 15.
    • 24 'Obituary of Eminent Persons, John Martin, K. L.', 'Town and Table Talk, on Literature, Art, etc.', The Illustrated London News, 24 (25 February 1854), pp. 162-63.
    • 25 Pendered, John Martin, p. 98. When Leslie became a member of the Royal Academy, he ceased all relations with Martin; ibid., pp. 93-94, 98.
    • 26 'Cornotation of George IV', The London Times, 20 July, 1821.
    • 27 The Diary of Henry Crabbe Robinson, ed. D. Hudson (London, 1967), p. 140, 14 March 1835.
    • 28 Flagg, Life and Letters, pp. 140, 226, 367.
    • 29 D. Bjelajac, Millennial Desire and the Apocalyptic Vision of Washington Allston (Washington, DC, 1987), p. 2. For an earlier and essential history of the picture, see W. H. Gerdts, 'Allston's “Belshazzar's Feast”', Art in America, 61 (March-April 1973), pp. 59-66, (May-June 1973), pp. 58-65.
    • 30 That his inability to deliver his work to his subscribers caused him profound suffering is revealed in his letters to John Stevens Cogdell of 27 February 1832 and Leonard Jarvis of 24 June 1836: Flagg, Life and Letters, pp. 258-61, 288-89. OK?
    • 31 N. Wright (ed.), The Correspondence of Washington Allston (Lexington, KY, 1993), pp. 100-01, 9 May 1817.
    • 32 Correspondence of Washington Allston, p. 16.
    • 33 S. Livermore, Jr, The Twilight of Federalism: The Disintegration of the Federalist Party 1815-1830 (Princeton, 1962), pp. 30-46; G. Dangerfield, The Awakening of American Nationalism 1815-1828 (New York, 1965), pp. 22-24.
    • 34 W. Ware, Lectures on the Works and Genius of Washington Allston (Boston, 1852), p. 129.
    • 35 The Private Correspondence of Daniel Webster, ed. F. Webster, 2 vols (Boston, 1857), I, p. 109.
    • 36 Bjelajac, Millennial Desire, pp. 116-18.
    • 37 W. Gribbin, The Churches Militant: the War of 1812 and American Religion (New Haven and London, 1973), pp. 51-52.
    • 38 Monroe rejected a suggestion that he appoint Webster as attorney general to to neutralize Federalist opposition: Livermore, The Twilight of Federalism, pp. 51-52. Naturally, for political purposes Webster and his Federalist allies in Congress tried to work with Monroe and pressure him to subscribe to their agenda.
    • 39 Bjelajac, Millennial Desire, pp. 101-20. Bjelajac also notes the link to Jackson, but only by way of a Jackson-Napoleon association forged by his enemies.
    • 40 Quoted in Gribbin, The Churches Militant, p. 134.
    • 41 C. Seaburg and S. Paterson, Merchant Prince of Boston: Colonel T. H. Perkins, 1764-1854 (Cambridge, 1971), pp. 397-98.
    • 42 For an excellent discussion of the ceremony of the cornerstone laying for the Bunker Hill Monument see D. Bjelajac, Washington Allston, Secret Societies, and the Alchemy of Anglo-American Painting (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 76-80. Lafayette attended the ceremony and Webster delivered the keynote address.
    • 43 Wright (ed.), The Correspondence of Washington Allston, pp. 106-07.
    • 44 The Private Correspondence of Daniel Webster, p. 456.
    • 45 As he wrote to James Stevens Cogdell on 5 December 1839, 'the King of Babylon is at last liberated from his imprisonment, and now holding his Court in my Painting-Room'; The Correspondence of Washington Allston, p. 435. The metaphorical allusions here beg for a political reading of the resumption of his magnum opus.
    • 46 Bjelajac, Millennial Desire, p. 104, points out that Coleridge made this comparison in his Lay Sermons Addressed to the Higher Classes of Society.
    • 47 Quoted in Flagg, Life and Letters, p. 347.
    • 1 For advocates of the primitivist aesthetic, see e.g. Franz Boas, Primitive Art (Oslo: H. Aschehoug, 1927); Robert Goldwater, Primitivism in Modern Painting (New York: Harpers, 1938); George Levitine, The Dawn of Bohemianism: The Barbu Rebellion and Primitivism in Neoclassical France (State College: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1978); William Rubin (ed.), Primitivism in 20th Century Art: Affinity of the Tribal and the Modern (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1984); Colin Rhodes, Primitivism And Modern Art (London: Thames & Hudson, 1994); Frances S. Connelly, The Sleep of Reason: Primitivism in Modern European Art and Aesthetics, 1725-1907 (State College: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995); Jonathan Fineberg, Discovering Child Art: Essays on Childhood, Primitivism, and Modernism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998); E.H. Gombrich, The Preference for the Primitive (London: Phaidon, 2002); and Jack Flam with Miriam Deutch, Primitivism and Twentieth-Century Art: A Documentary History (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003).
    • 2 See Paul Smith, 'Paul Cézanne's Primitive Self and Related Fictions', in Charles G. Salas (ed.), The Life and the Work: Art History and Biography (Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute, 2007), pp??. This draws heavily on Hans Sluga, '“Whose House is That?”: Wittgenstein on the Self', in Hans Sluga and David Stern (eds), The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 320-53.
    • 3 For critiques of the primitivist aesthetic, see e.g. Meyer Schapiro, 'The Nature of Abstract Art', Marxist Quarterly, I (January-March 1937), pp. 77-98; Robert Harbison, Deliberate Regression: The Disastrous History of Romantic Individualism in Thought and Art, from Jean-Jacques Rousseau to Twentieth-Century Fascism (New York: Knopf, 1980); Sally Price, Primitive Art in Civilized Places (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989); Hal Foster, 'The “Primitive” Unconscious of Modern Art', October, XXXIV (autumn 1985), pp. 45-70; Abigail Solomon-Goudeau, 'Going Native: Paul Gauguin and the Invention of Primitivist Modernism', Art in America, LXXVII/7 (July 1989), pp. 119-61; Susan Hiller (ed.), The Myth of Primitivism: Perspectives on Art (London: Routledge, 1992); Gill Perry, 'Primitivism and “The Modern”', in Charles Harrison, Francis Frascina, and Gill Perry, Primitivism, Cubism, Abstraction: The Early Twentieth Century (New Haven: Yale University Press in association with the Open University, 1993), pp. 3-85; Rhodes, Primitivism and Modern Art; Mark Antliff and Patricia Leighten, 'Primitive', in Robert S. Nelson and Richard Shiff (eds), Critical Terms for Art History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), pp. 170- 84; Shelly Errington, The Death of Authentic Primitive Art and Other Tales of Progress (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998); and Flam, Primitivism and Twentieth-Century Art.
    • 4 On this extended usage in later nineteenth-century France, see Martha Ward, Pissarro, Neo-Impressionism, and the Spaces of the Avant-Garde (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), especially pp. 35-45 and 65-75; Richard Shiff, Cézanne and the End of Impressionism: a Study in the Theory, Technique, and Critical Evaluation of Modern Art (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), pp. 166-74; and Robert L. Herbert et al., Seurat and the Making of La Grande Jatte (Chicago: The Art Institute of Chicago in association with the University of California Press, 2004), pp. 102-09.
    • 5 See Ward, Pissarro, p. 73.
    • 6 See Stephen F. Eisenman, Gauguin's Skirt (London: Thames & Hudson, 1997), pp. 78-85.
    • 7 See Sluga, 'Whose House?'
    • 8 The ensuing argument has an affinity with, and perhaps some parentage in, Kant's aesthetics. Kant argues, for example, that 'genius' is capable of 'originality', and of 'producing that for which no definite rule can be given', i.e. 'original nonsense'. Hence, for him, the 'products' of genius are 'models', or 'exemplary', and 'serve ... as a standard or rule of estimating'. Kant also argues: 'it is nature (the nature of the individual) ... that in products of genius gives the rule to art.' See Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Judgement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986 [1928]), §46 and §57, remark I.
    • 9 Wittgenstein argues: 'the meaning of a word is its use in the language' and 'to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life'; see Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995 [1953]), §43 and §19. See also e.g. David Bloor, Wittgenstein: a Social Theory of Knowledge (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1983), pp. 22-49; Oswald Hanfling, Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989), pp. 42-48; and Marie McGinn, Wittgenstein and the Philosophical Investigations (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 82-88.
    • 10 R.P. Rivière and J.F. Schnerb, 'L'atelier de Cézanne', La grande revue, 25 (December 1907), pp. 811- 17 (this quotation, 812). For more on the meaning of this remark, see Smith, 'Paul Cézanne's Primitive Self', pp???.
    • 11 See Shiff, Cézanne, pp. 283-84 for a list of references to Cézanne's 'primitive' nature in contemporary criticism. Gustave Geffroy (whose criticism is cited below) seems to have been the first to call Cézanne 'un primitif', while Emile Bernard appears to have been the first to connect Cézanne and the primitive, having mentioned Cézanne's 'haies primitives' in Les hommes d'aujourd'hui, VIII/387 (February-March 1891).
    • 12 On Cézanne and the Provencal 'blague', see Edmond Jaloux, Les saisons littéraires 1896-1903 (Paris: Plon, 1942), Vol. 1, p. 104.
    • 13 Emile Bernard, 'Souvenirs sur Paul Cézanne et lettres inédites', Mercure de France, LXIX/247 and LXX/248 (1 and 16 October 1907), pp. 385-404 and 606-27 (this quotation, 614).
    • 14 Cf. Gasquet, Cézanne (Paris: Bernheim-Jeune, 1926 [1921]), p. 70; and Jules Borély, 'Cézanne à Aix', L'art vivant, II/37 (1 July 1926), pp. 491-93 (especially 491).
    • 15 Cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982), §385.
    • 16 In a letter to his son of 13 September 1906, Cézanne writes: 'Peut-être eussé-je fait de Bernard un adepte convaincu'. See John Rewald (ed.), Paul Cézanne: correspondence (Paris: Grasset, 1978), p. 325.
    • 17 On the centrality of 'sensation' to Cézanne's theory of art, see Shiff, Cézanne, especially pp. 187-96.
    • 18 Borély, 'Cézanne', p. 493.
    • 19 On Cézanne, Taine and touch, see Richard Shiff, 'Cézanne's Physicality: the Politics of Touch', in Salim Kemal and Ivan Gaskell (eds), The Language of Art History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 129-80 (especially 172-73, note 23); and Paul Smith, Interpreting Cézanne (London: Tate, 1996), pp. 48-50. On Taine and Impressionism, see Charles Stuckey, 'Monet's Art and the Act of Vision', in John Rewald and Frances Weitzenhoffer (eds), Aspects of Monet: a Symposium on the Artist's Life and Times (New York: Abrams, 1984), pp. 106-21; and Joel Isaacson, 'Constable, Duranty, Mallarmé, Impressionism, Plein Air, and Forgetting', Art Bulletin, LXXVI/3 (September 1994), pp. 427-50.
    • 20 For a view of the irreducibility of works of art to artists' statements about them not wholly incompatible with Wittgenstein's thinking, see Mark Roskill, The Interpretation of Cubism (Philadelphia: Art Alliance Press, 1984), pp. 189-95.
    • 21 See Richard Wollheim, Painting as an Art (London: Thames & Hudson, 1987), pp. 17-19. On 'intention in action', see Ludwig Wittgenstein, Notebooks 1914-1916 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979 [1961]), 4.11.16, and Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §615.
    • 22 See G.L. Hagberg, Art as Language: Wittgenstein, Meaning, and Aesthetic Theory (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), pp. 75-117; and David E. Cooper, 'Ineffabillity', in David E. Cooper (ed.), A Companion to Aesthetics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995 [1992]), pp. 221-25.
    • 23 See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 'Cézanne's Doubt', in Galen A. Johnson and Michael B. Smith (eds), The Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reader: Philosophy and Painting (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1993), pp. 59-75 (especially 65). Cf. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception (London: Routledge, 1996 [1962]), p. 218; and The Visible and the Invisible (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2000 [1968]), p. 133. See also Shiff, 'Cézanne's Physicality'.
    • 24 See e.g. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, pp. vii, 90-92, and 175.
    • 25 See e.g. Merleau-Ponty, The Visible, pp. 127, 130-55, and 248-50. Cf. 'Eye and Mind', in Johnson and Michael, The Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reader, pp. 121-49 (especially 125).
    • 26 See Gauguin's letter of January 1885 to Emile Schuffenecker, cited in Victor Merlhès (ed.), Correspondance de Paul Gauguin, documents, témoinages (Paris: Fondation Singer-Polignac, 1984), Vol. 1, p. 88.
    • 27 See Merleau-Ponty, 'Cézanne's Doubt', pp. 63-64.
    • 28 Cézanne confessed in later life that he had attempted to do 'peinture couillarde' in his early work. See Vollard, En écoutant Cézanne, Degas, Renoir (Paris: Grasset, 1938), p. 20.
    • 29 Reported in Emile Bernard, 'Julien Tanguy', Mercure de France, LXXVI/276 (16 December 1908), pp. 600- 16 (this quotation, 607).
    • 30 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value: a Selection from the Posthumous Remains (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998 [1980]), 43e.
    • 31 See John Hyman, 'The Urn and the Chamber-Pot', in Richard Allen and Malcolm Turvey (eds), Wittgenstein, Theory and the Arts (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 137-52.
    • 32 Aesthetic value is transcendental because it belongs entirely to the 'willing' subject, which is not part of the world, but is a solipsistic perspective on to the world from which it is detached; see Wittgenstein, Notebooks, 21.7.16, 2.8.16, 5.8.16, and 4.11.16, and Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (London: Routledge, 1974 [1922]), 5.631, and 6.41-6.421, and 6.522. See Carolyn Wilde, 'Aesthetics and Ethics are One', in P. Lewis (ed.), Wittgenstein, Aesthetics and Philosophy (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), pp. 165-84. Cf. Hyman, 'The Urn', pp. 147-48. Cf. Culture and Value, 6e-7e for a remark of 1930 connecting value in art with its ability to show things 'sub specie aeterni' (and 85e for a remark of 1948, which returns to the idea). Cf. 91e-92e.
    • 33 It is thus to be contrasted to those lines of thought that (like the notion of 'intention in action') first emerge in the early, Tractarian, writings and then migrate more or less unchanged into the later writings. It is also different from those arguments that (like the 'private language' argument) find embryonic expression in the early work, but leave a recognizable, mature descendant in later writings. See Cora Diamond, 'Does Bismark Have a Beetle in his Box?', in Alice Crary and Rupert Read (eds), The New Wittgenstein (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 262-92.
    • 34 See e.g. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 174e. For my understanding of this argument, I am greatly indebted to Barry Curtis, 'Forms of Life and Other Minds', Proceedings of the 20th Anniversary Austrian Wittgenstein Symposium (1998), pp. 123-28.
    • 35 See e.g. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Zettel (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981 [1967]), §541.
    • 36 See e.g. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §244, and Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Occasions 1912-1951 (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993), §381.
    • 37 See Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §244, and Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 36e.
    • 38 Cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty (Oxford: Blackwell, 1969), §475 (and §359).
    • 39 Cf. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §185. On pointing and language-acquisition, see Hanfling, Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy, pp. 55-63, and McGinn, Wittgenstein, pp. 61-70.
    • 40 Cf. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Occasions, §381.
    • 41 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), I, §2. Cf. ibid., I, §35.
    • 42 Ibid., II, §10. Cf. ibid., II, §15.
    • 43 This view, or modified form of it, is of course fundamental to much psychoanalytical aesthetics. See e.g. Hannah Segal, 'A Psychoanalytic Approach to Aesthetics', in J. Phillips and L. Stonebridge, Reading Melanie Klein (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 203-22 (especially 208-09).
    • 44 See John Willats, Art and Representation: New Principles in the Analysis of Pictures (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 272-73.
    • 45 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §§241-2. Wittgenstein's point is logical, not empirical: he only claims that such behaviours are shared by the broad run of human beings. Since being human is a matter of possessing enough of the right kind of features that make up the 'family resemblances' between humans, an inability to respond with concern to the pain of others, or to painting, does not on its own make someone inhuman. Moreover, Wittgenstein says nothing to suggest that different individuals will not attenuate, or develop, different primitive forms of life, to different degrees.
    • 46 See Wollheim, Painting, pp. 44-45, and Flint Schier, 'Painting after Art? Comments on Wollheim', in Norman Bryson, Michael Ann Holly, and Keith Moxey (eds), Visual Theory (Cambridge: Polity, 1991), pp. 151-57 (especially 151-53).
    • 47 See Morris Weitz, 'The Role of Theory in Aesthetics', The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 15 (1956), pp. 27-35; and Morris Weitz, 'Art as an Open Concept', in George Dickie, Richard Sclafani, and Ronald Roblin (eds), Aesthetics: A Critical Anthology (New York: St Martin's Press, 1989), pp. 152-59.
    • 48 See Garry Hagberg, 'The Institutional Theory of Art: Theory and Anti-Theory', in Paul Smith and Carolyn Wilde (eds), A Companion to Art Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), pp. 487-504 (especially 496- 97).
    • 49 Cf. Hyman, 'The Urn', p. 143..
    • 50 Cf. Merleau-Ponty, 'Eye and Mind', pp. 129-30, 139 (on Cézanne) and 141-42. See also Paul Crowther, 'Merleau-Ponty: Perception into Art', British Journal of Aesthetics, 22 (1982), pp. 138-49.
    • 51 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 198e.
    • 52 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §580. In this sense, a criterion is akin to an 'ausserung' (expression' or 'utterance') of an inner experience, which is not identifable independently. See Cooper, 'Ineffability', p. 224, citing Stephen Mulhall, On Being in the World: Wittgenstein and Heidegger on Seeing Aspects (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1990), pp. 11-12. Cf. Bloor, Wittgenstein, pp. 41-46, and Hanfling, Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy, pp. 121-26.
    • 53 Cf. Richard Wollheim, 'On Drawing an Object', in On Art and the Mind: Essays and Lectures (London: Allen Lane, 1973), pp. 3-30 (especially 5).
    • 54 See Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §§318, and 327-41. On the 'private language' argument, see Hanfling, Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy, pp. 88-126, and McGinn, Wittgenstein, pp. 113-42.
    • 55 See Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §§329-30, and §332. Cf. Wittgenstein, Lectures, IV, §2.
    • 56 Cf. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §243. See also Hanfling, Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy, pp. 91-93. This applies not only to normal language, but to neologisms and the like; and it also applies to conversations with oneself (or an imaginary interlocutor).
    • 57 Cf. Philosophical Investigations, §202. We may not, for example, always be able to tell whether we have applied the same rule as we did before. See A.C. Grayling, Wittgenstein (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996 [1988]), p. 82.
    • 58 Cf. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §241. On this point, see Grayling, Wittgenstein, pp. 83-98.
    • 59 Wittgenstein, Zettel, §§429-434. See also Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §429.
    • 60 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §§272-6, and §§380-1. Cf. William H. Brenner, Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1999), pp. 98-100, and McGinn, Wittgenstein, pp. 140-41. For one thing, my 'red' could be your 'blue'. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Occasions, §231. Blind people can also use colour terms perfectly correctly.
    • 61 Colour words often do not call colours to mind when used, or do so only adventitiously, or else by grace of describing something else (as when they identify a colour-sample). Cf. Philosophical Investigations, §244 (on how words 'do not describe' pain).
    • 62 See McGinn, Wittgenstein, pp. 181-89 for a searching analysis.
    • 63 See ibid., pp. 189-95.
    • 64 See ibid., pp. 195-204.
    • 65 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 198e.
    • 66 See McGinn, Wittgenstein, pp. 181-89 and 203-04. Cf. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 196e- 199e.
    • 67 Wittgenstein, Lectures, IV, §5. Cf. Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 49e.
    • 68 Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 59e. Cf. ibid., 19e, 58e, 79e-80e, and 94e. Wittgenstein also suggests that to describe Schubert's music as 'melancholy' amounts to 'giving it a face'. See Wittgenstein, Lectures, I, §0.
    • 69 See especially Wollheim, Painting, pp. 305-55.
    • 70 See Smith, Interpreting Cézanne, pp. 68-69. Cf. Cézanne's anthropomorphic description of the fruit he painted in Gasquet, Cézanne, p. 202.
    • 71 See Adrian Stokes, Colour and Form (London: Faber & Faber, 1950 [1937]), especially pp. 53-54.
    • 72 Gasquet reports Cézanne making this remark in respect of one of his Mont Sainte-Victoire paintings, probably the painting of c. 1885-88 now in the Courtauld Institute, which the artist gave him. See Gasquet, Cézanne, pp. 130-31.
    • 74 Baudelaire, in his 'Salon de 1859', also attributes the expressiveness of Corot's paintings to their ability to capture the proportions of 'la structure humaine'. See Charles Baudelaire, Oeuvres complètes, Vol. 2 (Paris; Gallimard, 1976), pp. 662-63. On correspondence, see Wollheim, Painting, pp. 81-87, and Richard Wollheim, 'Correspondence, Projective Properties, and Expression in the Arts', in Kemal and Gaskell, The Language, pp. 51-66.
    • 75 See Wittgenstein, Lectures, IV, §3. Cf. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 198e, and Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 43e.
    • 76 Félix Fénéon, 'Le néo-impressionnisme', L'art moderne (1 May 1877); reprinted in Joan U. Halperin (ed.), Félix Fénéon: oeuvres plus que complètes (Geneva: Droz, 1970), Vol. 1, p. 73.
    • 77 The difference between my sense of my own pain and my sense of other people's pain is revealed in everyday language, where it makes no sense to say 'I know I am in pain' (except in exceptional circumstances), but it does make sense to say 'I know' someone else in pain. This is because we can only know things we can also legitimately doubt; and while we can doubt the pain of others, we can not (normally) doubt our own. See Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §246, §288, §303, §§403-8, and p. 221e. See also, McGinn, Wittgenstein, pp. 171-73.
    • 78 Cézanne as reported in Stock Album (Paris, 1870); cited in John Rewald, 'Un article inédit sur Paul Cézanne en 1870', Arts, 473 (21-27 July 1954), p. 8.
    • 79 Cf. Wittgenstein, On Certainty, §160. See also, Grayling, Wittgenstein, pp. 95-96.
    • 80 In a letter of 21 September 1906, Cézanne told Bernard that the techniques of art were 'que de simples moyens pour arriver à faire sentir au public ce que nous ressentons nous-mêmes et à nous faire agréer.' See Cézanne, Correspondance, p. 327. Cf. Gasquet, Cézanne, p. 143.
    • 81 Cézanne told Bernard in 1904: 'L'art ne s'addresse qu'à un nombre excessivement restreint d'individus.' See Emile Bernard, 'Paul Cézanne', L'Occident, 32 (July 1904), p. 28.
    • 82 Late in life, Cézanne told Bernard: 'Etre peintre par les qualités mêmes de la peinture, se servir de matériaux grossiers.' See Bernard, 'Souvenirs', p. 400. Cézanne also confided to Rivière and Schnerb: 'Je voulais peindre en pleine pâte, comme Courbet'. See Rivière and Schnerb, 'L'atelier', p. 817.
    • 83 See Edmond and Jules de Goncourt, Manette Salomon (Paris: Lacroix, Verboekhoven & Cie, 1867), Vol. 2, chapter XLIV. Cézanne expressed an enthusiasm for this text on several occasions. See Charles Camoin, 'Souvenirs sur Paul Cézanne', L'Amour de l'art (1920), p. 26; (and citing this) Léo Larguier, Le dimanche avec Cézanne (Paris: L'Edition, 1925), pp. 89-90; Vollard, En écoutant, p. 78; Gasquet, Cézanne, pp. 70 and 110; and Robert Ratcliffe, 'Cézanne's Working Methods' (University of London, unpublished PhD thesis, 1960), pp. 371-72 , which draws this evidence together.
    • 84 Cézanne was attuned to the decorative dimension of painting. In a letter of 3 February 1902 to Charles Camoin, he spoke of the desirability of making copies after 'les grands maîtres décoratifs, Véronèse et Rubens'. See Cézanne, Correspondance, p. 280.
    • 85 See e.g. Cézanne as cited in Bernard, 'Paul Cézanne', pp. 23-24, and Larguier, Le Dimanche, pp. 137- 38.
    • 86 See Ratcliffe, 'Cézanne's Working Methods', especially pp. 280-96.
    • 87 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §83. Cf. ibid., §§204-05, §492, and §567 (on how rules define a game).
    • 88 See Shiff, 'Cézanne's Physicality', pp. 162-66.
    • 89 This was installed in 1900 by the Old Rugbeian committee, who should have known better, and reads: 'THIS STONE COMMEMORATES THE EXPLOIT OF WILLIAM WEBB ELLIS WHO WITH A FINE DISREGARD FOR THE RULES OF FOOTBALL AS PLAYED IN HIS TIME FIRST TOOK THE BALL IN HIS ARMS AND RAN WITH IT THUS ORIGINATING THE DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF THE RUGBY GAME AD 1823'.
    • 90 Kirk Varnedoe, A Fine Disregard: What Makes Modern Art Modern (London: Thames & Hudson, 1990 [1989]), p. 9.
    • 91 See note 57.
    • 92 See Jennifer Macrory, Running with the Ball: the Birth of Rugby Football (London: Collins, 1991), pp. 16- 36, which cites three accounts by Matthew Bloxham of 1876 and 1880 describing Webb Ellis's actions, one of which suggests that 'few and simple were the rules of the game' played in 1823. Other witnesses, whose recollections were published in the Report of the Sub-Committee of the Old Rugbeian Society in 1897, give a different picture. The Reverend Thomas Harris, for example, recalled: 'Our Laws in those days were unwritten and traditionary, so that I can give no authority beyond custom', adding that 'running with the ball was distinctly forbidden'. Thomas Hughes, admittedly some years his junior, recalls differently, stating that 'running with the ball ... was not absolutely forbidden'. And according to the Old Rugbeian Committee Report, handling had a 'doubtful legality' until 1841-42, See Macrory, Running, pp. 26-27, and 34-45. Different schools also observed different rules of football at the time, which may have occasionally added to the flexibility of the rules observed at Rugby. These were eventually written down only in 1845. See Macrory, Running, p. 86.
    • 93 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §§198-9, and §337. Cf. Grayling, Wittgenstein, pp. 82-84, and David Bloor, Wittgenstein, Rules and Institutions (London: Routledge, 2002 [1997]), especially pp. 27-42.
    • 94 On Gauguin's (light-hearted?) attempt to extract Cézanne's 'formula', see John Rewald, The History of Impressionism (London: Secker and Warburg, 1973 [1946]), p. 458.
    • 95 See Smith, 'Paul Cézanne's Primitive Self', pp???.
    • 96 Gasquet, Cézanne, p. 96. See Gustave Geffroy, 'Le sarcophage égyptien', La vie artistique: première série (Paris: Dentu, 1892), pp. 1-10.
    • 97 Gustave Geffroy, 'Le sentiment de l'impossible' in Le coeur et l'esprit (Paris: Charpentier, 1894), pp. 109- 27. On Cézanne's interest in this story, see Christian Limousin, Gustave Geffroy: Paul Cézanne et autres textes (Paris: Séguier, 1995), p. 83.
    • 98 Gustave Geffroy, 'Paul Cézanne', La Vie artistique: troisième série (Paris: Dentu, 1894), pp. 257-58. The passage is cited at greater length in Nina Athanassoglou-Kallmyer, Cézanne and Provence: the Painter in his Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago Pres, 2003), p. 187. See also Shiff, Cézanne, pp. 189-90. In 1895, Geffroy called Cézanne 'un primitif inquiet de vérité'. See Limousin, Gustave Geffroy, p. 29; and Gustave Geffroy, 'Paul Cézanne', La vie artistique: sixième série (Paris: Floury, 1900), pp. 213-20 (this quotation, 220).
    • 99 Reprinted in Gustave Geffroy, 'Les vrais primitifs', La vie artistique: huitième et dernière série (Paris: Floury, 1903), pp. 1-31 (this quotation, 1-2).
    • 100 Geffroy, 'Paul Cézanne' (1894), p. 256.
    • 101 Geffroy, 'Les vrais primitifs', pp. 3 and 7.
    • 102 Ibid, p. 15.
    • 103 Ibid., p. 31.
    • 104 On this, see Limousin, Gustave Geffroy, pp. 5-44, and John Rewald, Cézanne, Geffroy et Gasquet (Paris: Quatre Chemins, 1959).
    • 105 Cf. Wittgenstein, Zettel, §540. See also, Curtis, 'Forms of Life'.
    • 106 Gasquet recalls that Cézanne had copied a section of Emile into one of his sketchbooks. See Gasquet, Cézanne, p. 45.
    • 107 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile: oeuvres complètes, Vol. 1 (Paris: Dalibon, 1826 [1762]), pp. 22-23.
    • 108 Cf. Paul Smith, 'Wittgenstein, Description, and Adrian Stokes (on Cézanne)', in Smith and Wilde (eds), A Companion to Art Theory, pp. 196-214.
    • 109 For all it can seem like mysticism, Wittgenstein's achievement in casting the value of art as public in virtue of its shared, primitive grounding was to rescue it from being something that only a solipsistic, transcendental subject can appreciate.
    • 110 Cf. Wittgenstein, Lectures, I, §§26-31 and §35.
    • 111 See Tamar Garb, 'Paul Cézanne's The Eternal Feminine and the Erotics of Vision', and 'Cézanne's Late Bathers: Modernism and Sexual Difference', in Bodies of Modernity: Figure and Flesh in Fin-deSiècle France (London: Thames & Hudson, 1998), pp. 178-95, and 196-218.
    • 112 Cf. Cézanne's letter to Zola of 24 September 1878. See Cézanne, Correspondance, pp. 173-74.
    • 113 Or until such time as the 'river bed' of human nature shifts. Cf. Wittgenstein, On Certainty, §97.
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