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Tubaro, Paola; Lazega, Emmanuel; Mounier, Lise
Languages: English
Types: Unknown
Subjects: HB, HC
Businesses are usually very keen to participate in the governance of their markets (Lazega and Mounier, 2002, 2003). At the inter-organizational level, at least two different sociological traditions deal with the issue of governance of markets, stressing either formal and often exogenous aspects, or informal and endogenous ones. For the first tradition, a socio-legal one, exogenous governance (see for example Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992; Hawkins, 1984; Hawkins and Thomas, 1984; Shapiro, 1984; Weait, 1993; Weaver, 1977) is provided by government agencies backed up by courts. These studies focus, for example, on the decision by government agencies to prosecute deviant companies. Such decisions are not straightforward and they often come out of tradeoffs between official inspectors and company managers. This is especially the case when they face risks such as large-scale losses and layoffs, and sometimes bankruptcy, should the law be strictly enforced. The second tradition focuses on inter-firm arrangements promoting self-governance benefits for firms in their transactions and more informal conflict resolution mechanisms. Because litigation is costly, firms sometimes prefer unofficial dispute resolution whenever possible, especially when they have long term continuing relationships (see for example Macaulay, 1963, 1986; Raub and Weesie, 1993, 1996, 2000; Rooks et al., 2000; Buskens et al., 2003). Here the focus is on pressures to conform by one organization on the other. Pressures are based on resource dependencies and reputation. Thus, these two traditions focus on different kinds of actors intervening in governance, the State and companies themselves –the latter sometimes through industry representatives.
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