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Currie, Gregory Paul (2016)
Languages: English
Types: Article
Subjects:
  • The results below are discovered through our pilot algorithms. Let us know how we are doing!

    • 1. For the Ehrenfest model see Barberousse and Ludwig (2009). For the plum pudding, see Suarez (2009, 162-63).
    • 2. Achinstein (1968) characterised models largely in terms of the known falsity of assumption, useful because they combine simplification and approximation. Vaihinger, more or less the founder of fictionalism, says little about literature or the imagination. There is brief discussion of “aesthetic” and “poetic” fictions, and of mythology; centaurs, griffins, and other nonexistents are said to be important for the theory of existential propositions but of “minor importance for our present theme” (1924, 82).
    • 3. Theories of fiction often appealed to in this context have been Currie (1990), and Walton (1990). For negative assessments of this idea see Giere (2009) and Teller (2009).
    • 4. Later on I will question this way of putting the matter; see below, Section 2.
    • 5. Versions of this view are developed in Walton (1990) and Currie (1990). One dissenter is Matravers (2014), though he does not claim that belief is the appropriate response to fictions. For more dissent, confined to the cinematic case, see Quilty-Dunn (2015).
    • 6. Williams (1973) offered the first of these as the reason why the second is true. There is now a substantial literature on both, with no agreement as to the truth of either or even their best formulations.
    • 7. I ignore some complications here. For more detail see my (2014a).
    • 8. See Walton (1990; 2015).
    • 9. See Lewis (1983), Currie (1990, chapter 3), Byrne (1993).
    • 10. There is currently a debate over whether we can define fiction in terms of its functioning or being intended to secure a distinctive attitude of imagining on the part of an audience (see e.g., Friend 2012; Currie 2014b). But even those who deny this might agree with the sentence above. If they do not, that's one less difference between fiction and nonfiction for me to worry about, at least for the purposes of this paper.
    • 11. I assume here for simplicity that the new beliefs I get cause no revision to the prior set.
    • 12. The right formulation here depends on your views about the ontology of fictional characters; perhaps it is better to say that I imagine actuality to contain someone called “Oliver” who does such and such, and someone called. . . etc. For more on this issue see below, Section 3.
    • Achinstein, P. 1968. Concepts of Science, Johns Hopkins University Press.
    • Barberousse, A. and P. Ludwig 2009. “Models as fictions,” in M. Suarez, ed. 2009.
    • Bokulich, A. 2009. “Explanatory Fictions,” in Suarez, ed. 2009.
    • Brock, S. 2010. “The Creationist Fiction: The Case against Creationism about Fictional Characters,” Philosophical Review 119: 337-64.
    • Byrne, A. 1993. “Truth in Fiction: the Story Continued,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71: 24-35.
    • Cartwright, N. 1999. The Dappled World, Cambridge University Press. “Models: Parables v Fables,” in Frigg and Hunter, eds. 2010, 19-32.
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    • Currie, G. 1990. The Nature of Fiction, Cambridge University Press. 2010. Narratives and Narrators, Oxford University Press. 2013. “On Getting Out of the Armchair to Do Aesthetics,” in M. Haug, ed., Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory? Routledge. 2014a. “Emotions Fit for Fictions,” in S. Roesseler and C. Todd, eds., Emotion and Value, Oxford University Press. 2014b. “Standing in the Last Ditch: On the Communicative Intentions of Fiction Makers,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 72: 351-63. forthcoming. “Does Fiction Make Us Less Empathic?” Theorema.
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    • Friend, F. 2012. “Fiction As a Genre,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112:179-209.
    • Friend, S. 2011. “The Great Beetle Debate,” Philosophical Studies 153: 183-211.
    • Frigg, R. 2010a “Fiction and Scientific Representation,” in Frigg and Hunter, eds. (2010), 97-138. 2010b. “Models and Fiction,” Synthese 172: 251-268. and M. Hunter, eds. 2010. Beyond Mimesis and Convention: Representation in Art and Science, Dordrecht: Springer.
    • Garcıa-Carpintero, M. and G. Martı, eds. 2014. Empty Representations: Reference and Non-Existence, Oxford University Press.
    • Giere, R. 2009. “Why Scientific Models Should Not Be Regarded As Works of Fiction,” in Suarez, ed. 2009.
    • Godfrey-Smith, P. 2009. “Models and Fictions in Science,” Philosophical Studies 143: 101-16.
    • Graham, P. 2006. “Can Testimony Generate Knowledge?” Philosophica 78: 105-27.
    • Kitcher, P. 2013. Deaths in Venice: The Case of Gustav von Aschenbach, Columbia University Press.
    • Kripke, S. 2013. Reference and Existence: The John Locke Lectures, Lecture II, Oxford University Press.
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    • Lewis, D.K. 1983. “Truth in Fiction,” Philosophical Papers vol. 1, Oxford University Press. 1998. “Logic for Equivocators,” Papers in Philosophical Logic, Cambridge.
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    • McGlone, M.S. and J. Tofighbakhsh 2000. “Birds of a Feather Flock Conjointly(?): Rhyme As Reason in Aphorisms,” Psychological Science 11(5): 424-28.
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    • Quilty-Dunn, J. 2015. “Believing Our Eyes: The Role of False Belief in the Experience of Cinema,” British Journal of Aesthetics 55: 269-83.
    • Reber, R. and N. Schwarz 1999. “Effects of Perceptual Fluency on Judgments of Truth,” Consciousness and Cognition 8: 338-42.
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    • Suarez, M. 2009. “Scientific Fictions As Rules of Inference,” in Suarez, ed. 2009. ed. 2009. Fictions in Science: Philosophical Essays on Modelling and Idealization, Routledge.
    • Teller, P. 2009 “Fictions, Fictionalization, and Truth in Science,” in Suarez, ed. 2009.
    • Toon, A. 2012. Models as Make-Believe, Palgrave Macmillan.
    • Vaihinger, H. 1924. Philosophy of 'As If ', trans. C.K. Ogden, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.
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    • Williams, B. 1973. “Deciding to Believe,” in Problems of the Self, Cambridge University Press.
    • Williamson, T. 2014. “Knowing by Imagining,” in Amy Kind, ed., Knowledge through Imagination, Oxford University Press.
    • Wollheim, R., 1984. The Thread of Life, Cambridge University Press.
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