LOGIN TO YOUR ACCOUNT

Username
Password
Remember Me
Or use your Academic/Social account:

CREATE AN ACCOUNT

Or use your Academic/Social account:

Congratulations!

You have just completed your registration at OpenAire.

Before you can login to the site, you will need to activate your account. An e-mail will be sent to you with the proper instructions.

Important!

Please note that this site is currently undergoing Beta testing.
Any new content you create is not guaranteed to be present to the final version of the site upon release.

Thank you for your patience,
OpenAire Dev Team.

Close This Message

CREATE AN ACCOUNT

Name:
Username:
Password:
Verify Password:
E-mail:
Verify E-mail:
*All Fields Are Required.
Please Verify You Are Human:
fbtwitterlinkedinvimeoflicker grey 14rssslideshare1
Shackel, Nicholas (2014)
Publisher: Springer
Languages: English
Types: Article
Subjects: B1
In his important recent book Schroeder proposes a Humean theory of reasons that he calls hypotheticalism. His rigourous account of the weight of reasons is crucial to his theory, both as an element of the theory and constituting his defence to powerful standard objections to Humean theories of reasons. In this paper I examine that rigourous account and show it to face problems of vacuity and consonance. There are technical resources that may be brought to bear on the problem of vacuity but implementation is not simple and philosophical motivation a further difficulty. Even supposing vacuity is fixed, the problems of consonance bring to light a different obstruction lying in Schroeder’s path. There is a difference between the general weighing of reasons and the context specificity of the correct placing of weight on them in deliberation and this difference cannot be fixed by the resources in the account. For these reasons we are still waiting for a plausible Humean theory of reasons.
  • The results below are discovered through our pilot algorithms. Let us know how we are doing!

    • Dancy, J. 2000. Practical Reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    • Dancy, J. 2004. Ethics without Principles. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    • Dancy, J. 2012. Response to Mark Schroeder's Slaves of the Passions. Philosophical Studies, 157 (3), pp. 455-62.
    • Kolodny, N. 2005. Why Be Rational? Mind, 114 (455), pp. 509-63. July 1, 2005. Online at http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/114/455/509
    • Lehrer, K. & Paxson, T., Jr. 1969. Knowledge: Undefeated Justified True Belief. The Journal of Philosophy, 66 (8), pp. 225-37. Online at http://www.jstor.org/stable/2024435
    • McPherson, T. 2012. Mark Schroeder's Hypotheticalism : Agent-Neutrality, Moral Epistemology, and Methodology. Philosophical Studies, 157 (3), pp. 445-53.
    • Russell, B. 1918. The Philosophy of Logical Atomism. In Logic and Knowledge: Essays 1901-1950. Ed. Marsh, R. C. London: Unwin Hyman.
    • Schroeder, M. A. 2007a. Slaves of the Passions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    • Schroeder, M. A. 2007b. Weighting for a Plausible Humean Theory of Reasons. Nous, 41 (1), pp. 138-60.
    • Schroeder, M. A. 2010. Value and the Right Kind of Reasons. In Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Vol. 5. Ed. Shafer-Landau, R. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    • Schroeder, M. A. 2012a. Precis of Slaves of the Passions. Philosophical Studies, 157 (3), pp. 431-4.
    • Schroeder, M. A. 2012b. Reply to Shafer-Landau, Mcpherson, and Dancy. Philosophical Studies, 157 (3), pp. 463-74.
    • Schroeder, M. A. 2012c. Reviewer # 1 Comments.:
    • Schroeder, M. A. 2012d. The Ubiquity of State-Given Reasons. Ethics, 122 (3), pp. 457- 88. Online at http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/664753
    • Shafer-Landau, R. 2012. Three Problems for Schroeder's Hypotheticalism. Philosophical Studies, 157 (3), pp. 435-43.
  • No related research data.
  • Discovered through pilot similarity algorithms. Send us your feedback.

Share - Bookmark

Cite this article