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Ireland, Paddy (2001)
Publisher: Hart
Languages: English
Types: Part of book or chapter of book
Subjects: K
  • The results below are discovered through our pilot algorithms. Let us know how we are doing!

    • 2 See David Millon, "Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate Law" (1993) 50 Washington & Lee Law Review 1371.
    • 3 Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law, For a Competitive Economy: The Strategic Framework (London, DTI, 1999).
    • 5 Douglas Branson, "The Death of Contractarianism and the Vindication of Structure and Authority in Corporate Governance and Corporate Law", in Lawrence E. Mitchell (ed), Progressive Corporate Law (Oxford, Westview Press, 1995) 93 at 93-4.
    • 6 See William W. Bratton Jr, "The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History" (1989) 41 Stanford Law Review 1471, reprinted in Sally Wheeler (ed), The Law of the Business Enterprise (OUP, 1994), 117; and David Millon, "Theories of the Corporation" (1990) Duke Law Journal, 201. For other recent explorations of the historical development of American corporate theory which do not consider the rise of agency theory, see Morton Horwitz, "Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory" (1985) 88 West Virginia Law Review, 173; and Gregory A. Mark, "The Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law" (1987) 54 Chicago Law Review, 1441.
    • 13 David Campbell, "The Role of Monitoring and Morality in Company Law" (1997) 7 Australian Journal of Corporate Law, 343 at 345.
    • 14 Charles F.F. Wordsworth, The Law Relating to Railway, Banking, Insurance, Mining and other Joint Stock Companies (London, Henry Butterworth, 1836; enlarged 2nd ed., 1837)
    • 15 See, for example, J.R. Ward, The Finance of Canal Building in Eighteenth-Century England (OUP, 1974).
    • 16 For a detailed discussion of this and issues raised in the following paragraphs, see Paddy Ireland, "Capitalism without the Capitalist: The Joint Stock Company Share and the Emergence of the Modern Doctrine of Separate Corporate Personality" (1996) 17 Journal of Legal History 41.
    • 17 A.M. Honore, "Ownership" in A.G. Guest (ed), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (OUP, 1961) 107. Honore distinguished eleven incidents of ownership.
    • 19 See Paddy Ireland, "Company Law and the Myth of Shareholder Ownership" (1999) 62 Modern Law Review 32.
    • 20 See Peter Rona, letter, 89 Harvard Business Review (Nov-Dec 1989) 198.
    • 21 E. Merrick Dodd, "The Modern Corporation, Private Property and Recent Federal Legislation" (1941) 54 Harvard Law Review 917 at 918.
    • 24 See Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of Business Enterprise (New York, Scribner's, 1904); The Vested Interests and the State of the Industrial Arts (New York, Huebsch, 1919); and Absentee Ownership and Business Enterprise in Recent Times (New York, Huebsch, 1923).
    • 25 Franklin S. Wood, "The Status of Management Stockholders" (1928) 38 Yale Law Journal 57 at 59. For a similar view, see Jerome Frank, Book Review of Berle & Means, 43 Yale Law Journal (1933) 989 at 992.
    • 26 See Paddy Ireland, "Back to the Future: Adolf Berle, the Law Commission and Directors' Duties" (1999) 20 Company Lawyer 203.
    • 27 See, for example, Adolf Berle, "Non-Voting Stock and `Bankers Control'" (1926) 39
    • 31 Edward Mason (ed.), "Introduction", in Edward Mason (ed.), The Corporation in Modern Society (Harvard UP, 1959; reprinted, New York, Atheneum, 1966)) 1 at 2-6, 14-15.
    • 32 See Abram Chayes, "The Modern Corporation and the Rule of Law", in Mason (ed.) n.31 at 25; Bayless Manning, Review of J.A. Livingston, The American Stockholder (1958) in 67 Yale Law Journal (1958) 1477 at 1490-1493.
    • 33 L.C.B Gower, Book Review of Emerson & Latcham, Shareholder Democracy (1954) in 68 Harvard Law Review (1955) 922 at 927.
    • 34 George Goyder, The Responsible Company (Oxford, Blackwell, 1961).
    • 36 See, for example, Adolf Berle, The Twentieth Century Capitalist Revolution (London, Macmillan, 1955).
    • 37 See, for example, J.K.Galbraith, American Capitalism (Oxford, Blackwell, 1956).
    • 38 C.A.R. Crosland, The Future of Socialism, (London, Jonathan Cape, 1956); C.A.R. Crosland, The Conservative Enemy, (London, Johnathan Cape, 1962). Similar views were expressed by John Strachey in Contemporary Capitalism (London, Gollancz, 1956).
    • 41 See, for example, Frank Emerson & Franklin Latcham, Shareholder Democracy (Cleveland, Western Reserve University, 1954)
    • 42 See, for example, J.A. Livingston, The American Stockholder (New York, Lippincott, 1956).
    • 43 See Henry Manne, Review of J.A.Livingston, The American Stockholder (1958) in 5 St Louis University Law Journal (1958) 309 at 311.
    • 44 Henry Manne, "Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics" (1967) 53 Virginia Law Review 259 at 265-66.
    • 45 See William Lazonick, "Controlling the Market for Corporate Control" (1992) 1 Industrial and Corporate Change 445 at 474.
    • 56 Adolf Berle, "Modern Functions of the Corporate System" (1962) 62 Columbia Law Review 433.
    • 57 Ronald Coase, "The Nature of the Firm" (1937) 4 Economica 386. To a large extent, however, Coase merely substituted one black box for another.
    • 58 See Henry Manne, "Introduction" to Henry Manne (ed) Economic Policy and the Regulation of Corporate Securities: A Symposium (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Reseaerch, 1969). For those who would like to put faces to the algorithms, the book provides snapshots of each of the principal contributors.
    • 59 Oliver Williamson, "Corporate Control and the Theory of the Firm" in Manne (ed.) ibid at 373.
    • 66 Michael Jensen & William Meckling, "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure" (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305.
    • 67 Michael Jensen & Richard Ruback, "The Market for Corporate Control" (1983) 11 Journal of Financial Economics 5.
    • 68 See Jensen's wildly unprescient "Eclipse of the Public Corporation" 89 Harvard Business Review (Sept-Oct 1989) 61, suggesting that the LBO Association was about to replace the public corporation.
    • 69 See Bryan Burrough & John Helyar, Barbarians at the Gate (New York, Harper & Row, 1990).
    • 72 David J. Ravenscraft & F.M. Scherer, "The Profitability of Mergers" (1989) 7 International Journal of Industrial Organisation, 101.
    • 73 See, for example, Richard E. Caves, "Mergers, Takeovers, and Economic Efficiency: Foresight vs Hindsight", 7 International Journal of Industrial Organisation (1989) 151.
    • 89 Eugene Fama, "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm" (1980) 88 Journal of Political Economy 288; extracted in Putterman & Kroszner, n.48 at 302. See also Easterbrook & Fischel, "Voting in Corporate Law" (1983) 26 Journal of Law and Economics, 395 at 396.
    • 94 See, for example, Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Cambridge Mass, Harvard UP, 1991) 67-69.
    • 122 Alan Story, "Compensation for Banned Handguns: Indemnifying `Old Property'" (1998) 61 Modern Law Review 188 at 206.
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