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Milanovic, Marko (2015)
Publisher: Harvard Law School
Languages: English
Types: Article
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    • 10. Compare Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013) (holding by 5 votes to 4 that a real likelihood that individuals would be subjected to surveillance measures, rather than proof that such measures were actually taken, was not sufficient for standing, which could not be speculative) with Klass v. Germany (Judgment), App. No. 5029/71, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978), available at http://hudoc. echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-73538 (allowing for precisely this kind of speculative standing).
    • 11. See James Ball, Leaked Memos Reveal GCHQ Efforts to Keep Mass Surveillance Secret, The Guardian (Oct. 25, 2013, 1:45 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/oct/25/leaked-memos-gchqmass-surveillance-secret-snowden.
    • 12. Big Brother Watch v. United Kingdom (Communicated Case), App. No. 58170/13, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2013). Similarly, a domestic U.K. case was filed before the Investigatory Powers Tribunal by Privacy International. See Privacy International Files Legal Challenge Against UK Government Over Mass Surveillance Programmes, Privacy Int'l (July 8, 2013), https://www.privacyinternational.org/press-releases/ privacy-international-files-legal-challenge-against-uk-government-over-mass.
    • 13. Colum Lynch et al., Exclusive: Germany, Brazil Turn to U.N. to Restrain American Spies, Foreign Policy (Oct. 24, 2013, 4:18 PM), http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/10/24/exclusive_ germany_brazil_turn_to_un_to_restrain_american_spies. United Nations General Assembly, Third Comm., The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/68/L.45 (Nov. 1, 2013).
    • 14. Colum Lynch, Exclusive: Inside America's Plan to Kill Online Privacy Rights Everywhere, Foreign Policy (Nov. 20, 2013, 1:10 PM), http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/11/20/exclusive_inside_ americas_plan_to_kill_online_privacy_rights_everywhere.
    • 15. United Nations General Assembly, Third Comm., The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/68/L.45/Rev.1 (Nov. 1, 2013).
    • 16. Resolution on the Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, G.A. Res 68/167, U.N. Doc. A/RES/68/ 167 (Jan. 21, 2014).
    • 27. See, e.g., David Cole, We Are All Foreigners: NSA Spying and the Rights of Others, Just Security (Oct. 29, 2013, 12:48 PM), http://justsecurity.org/2013/10/29/foreigners-nsa-spying-rights/; Kenneth Roth, NSA: Our Analogue Spying Laws Must Catch Up with the Digital Era, The Guardian (Nov. 10, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/nov/10/nsa-analogue-spying-laws-surveillancedigital-era.
    • 28. Orin Kerr, A Reply to David Cole on Rights of Foreigners Abroad, Lawfare (Nov. 2, 2013, 1:54 AM), www.lawfareblog.com/2013/11/a-reply-to-david-cole-on-rights-of-foreigners-abroad/.
    • 29. The Fourth Amendment, for its part, speaks of the “people.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.
    • 34. Id. at 798.
    • 35. Kal Raustiala, Does the Constitution Follow the Flag? The Evolution of Territoriality in American Law (2009).
    • 36. Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 Yale L.J. 909 (1991); Gerald L. Neuman, The Extraterritorial Constitution after Boumediene v. Bush, 82 S. Cal. L. Rev. 259 (2009). See also Gerald L. Neuman, Strangers to the Constitution: Immigrants, Borders, and Fundamental Law (1996).
    • 37. See, e.g., David Cole, Enemy Aliens: Double Standards and Constitutional Freedoms in the War on Terrorism (2003).
    • 38. Martin Chulov, Al-Qaida Cleric Anwar al-Awlaki is Dead, says Yemen, The Guardian (Sept. 30, 2011), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/sep/30/anwar-al-awlaki-dead.
    • 39. Sarah Knuckey, Anonymous U.S. Officials Admit CIA Accidentally Killed a Yemeni Child in a Drone Strike, Just Security (Nov. 18, 2013), http://justsecurity.org/2013/11/18/anonymous-officials-admitcia-accidentally-killed-yemeni-child-drone-strike/.
    • 46. See also Marko Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties: Law, Principles, and Policy 67-83 (2011).
    • 47. See Holder, supra note 40.
    • 48. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against a U.S. Citizen Who Is a Senior Operational Leader of al-Qa'ida or An Associated Force, available at http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/ sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf.
    • 49. Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks by the President at the National Defense University (May 23, 2013) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/ 2013/05/23/president-obama-speaks-us-counterterrorism-strategy#transcript).
    • 50. Simultaneously with the speech the administration released a policy guidance. See Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, Fact Sheet: U.S. Policy Standards and Procedures for the Use of Force in Counterterrorism Operations outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities (May 23, 2013) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/fact-sheet-us-policystandards-and-procedures-use-force-counterterrorism. The substantive standards do not distinguish between citizens and non-citizens but do say that “[i]f the United States considers an operation against a terrorist identified as a U.S. person, the Department of Justice will conduct an additional legal analysis to ensure that such action may be conducted against the individual consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Id.
    • 182. See Drozd v. France (Judgment), App. No. 12747/87, 240 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), para. 91 (1992), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57774 (holding that “[t]he term 'jurisdiction' is not limited to the national territory of the High Contracting Parties; their responsibility can be involved because of acts of their authorities producing effects outside their own territory”).
    • 183. See Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom (Judgment), App. No. 55721/07, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. paras. 133, 135.
    • 184. See Ewn MacAskill et al., GCHQ Taps Fibre-Optic Cables for Secret Access to World's Communications, The Guardian (June 21, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/jun/21/gchq-cables-secretworld-communications-nsa.
    • 185. See discussion infra Part V for what constitutes an interference with privacy.
    • 186. See Australia Accused of Using Embassies to Spy on Neighbours, The Guardian (Oct. 30, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/31/australia-accused-embassies-spy-neighbours.
    • 187. See, e.g., Embassy Espionage: The NSA's Secret Spy Hub in Berlin, Spiegel Online (Oct. 27, 2013), http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/cover-story-how-nsa-spied-on-merkel-cell-phone-fromberlin-embassy-a-930205.html (reporting on the use by NSA Special Collection Service operatives of US embassies and consulates in Berlin, Paris, Madrid, Rome, Prague and Geneva); Inside TAO, supra note 162 (reporting on the use of a US military base in Darmstadt).
    • 188. See Al-Saadoon v. United Kingdom (Judgment), App. No. 61498/08, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R.
    • 189. Weber v. Germany (Decision), App. No. 54934/00, 2006-XI Eur. Ct. H.R., available at http:// hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-76586.
    • 190. Id.
    • 191. Id.
    • 192. Liberty v. United Kingdom (Judgment), App. No. 58243/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-87207.
    • 197. See Milanovic, supra note 46, at 110-13.
    • 198. See, e.g., Shimovolos v. Russai (Judgment), App. No. 30194/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 64 (2011), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-105217 (“The Court reiterates that private life is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition. Article 8 is not limited to the protection of an 'inner circle' in which the individual may live his own personal life as he chooses and to exclude therefrom entirely the outside world not encompassed within that circle. It also protects the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world. Private life may even include activities of a professional or business nature. . . . There is, therefore, a zone of interaction of a person with others, even in a public context, which may fall within the scope of 'private life.'”) (citing relevant case law).
    • 199. See Elisabet Fura & Mark Klamberg, The Chilling Effect of Counter-Terrorism Measures: A Comparative Analysis of Electronic Surveillance Laws in Europe and the USA, in Freedom of Expression - Essays in Honour of Nicolas Bratza 463 (Josep Casadevall et al., eds., 2012).
    • 200. The test for what constitutes a search in a constitutionally protected context, originating in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). See generally Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 503 (2007) (discussing the inability of the Supreme Court to provide a single, consistent answer on the nature of a search under the Fourth Amendment).
    • 201. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
    • 202. See Malone v. United Kingdom (Judgment), App. No. 8691/79, 82 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), para. 84 (1984), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-5753 (“As the Government rightly suggested, a meter check printer registers information that a supplier of a telephone
    • 209. Malone v. United Kingdom (Judgment), App. No. 8691/79, 82 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), para. 84 (1984).
    • 210. El Haski c. Belgique [El-Haski v. Belgium] (Judgment), App. No. 649/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 102 (2012) (in French), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-113336.
    • 211. Uzun v. Germany (Judgment), App. No. 35623/05, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 12-13, available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-100293; see also supra note 160.
    • 212. See S. v. United Kingdom (Judgment), App. Nos. 30562/04 & 30566/04, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. paras. 20, 33, available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-90051; Amann v. Switzerland (Judgment), App. No. 27798/95, 2000-II Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 69, available at http:// hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-58497; Leander v. Sweden (Judgment), App. No. 9248/81, 116 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), para. 48 (1987), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/ pages/search.aspx?i=001-57519.
    • 213. See Kennedy v. United Kingdom (Judgment), App. No. 26839/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-98473; Liberty v. United Kingdom (Judgment), App. No. 58243/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008).
    • 214. Weber v. Germany (Decision), App. No. 54934/00, 2006-XI Eur. Ct. H.R.
    • 215. See Huvig v. France (Judgment), App. No. 11105/84, 176-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), para. 35 (1990), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57627.
    • 216. Weber, App. No. 54934/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 78; see also supra note 10, at 4 and accompanying text.
    • 233. See Benjamin Wittes, A Global Human Right to Privacy?, Lawfare Blog (Nov. 11, 2013, 5:05 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/11/a-global-human-right-to-privacy/.
    • 234. See International Principles on the Application of Human Rights to Communications Surveillance, supra note 8, at 2 (discussing legality, legitimate aim, necessity, adequacy, proportionality, a competent judicial authority, due process, user notification, transparency, public oversight, integrity of communications and systems, safeguards for international cooperation, and safeguards against illegitimate access).
    • 235. See generally Christopher Kuner, Transborder Data Flows and Data Privacy Law (2013).
    • 236. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Apr. 4, 2006, 1 BvR 518/ 02, (Ger.).
    • 237. S. v. United Kingdom (Judgment), App. Nos. 30562/04 & 30566/04, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R.
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