Remember Me
Or use your Academic/Social account:


Or use your Academic/Social account:


You have just completed your registration at OpenAire.

Before you can login to the site, you will need to activate your account. An e-mail will be sent to you with the proper instructions.


Please note that this site is currently undergoing Beta testing.
Any new content you create is not guaranteed to be present to the final version of the site upon release.

Thank you for your patience,
OpenAire Dev Team.

Close This Message


Verify Password:
Verify E-mail:
*All Fields Are Required.
Please Verify You Are Human:
fbtwitterlinkedinvimeoflicker grey 14rssslideshare1
Schreuders, ZC; Payne, C; McGill, T (2013)
Languages: English
Types: Article
This paper presents the functionality-based application confinement (FBAC) access control model. FBAC is an application-oriented access control model, intended to restrict processes to the behaviour that is authorised by end users, administrators, and processes, in order to limit the damage that can be caused by malicious code, due to software vulnerabilities or malware. FBAC is unique in its ability to limit applications to finely grained access control rules based on high-level easy-to-understand reusable policy abstractions, its ability to simultaneously enforce application-oriented security goals of administrators, programs, and end users, its ability to perform dynamic activation and deactivation of logically grouped portions of a process's authority, its approach to process invocation history and intersection-based privilege propagation, its suitability to policy automation techniques, and in the resulting usability benefits. Central to the model are 'functionalities', hierarchical and parameterised policy abstractions, which can represent features that applications provide; 'confinements', which can model simultaneous enforcement of multiple sets of policies to enforce a diverse range of types of application restrictions; and 'applications', which represent the processes to be confined. The paper defines the model in terms of structure (which is described in five components) and function, and serves as a culmination of our work thus far, reviewing the evaluation of the model that has been conducted to date. © 2013 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.
  • The results below are discovered through our pilot algorithms. Let us know how we are doing!

    • 1. Yee, B., Sehr, D., Dardyk, G., Chen, J.B., Muth, R., Ormandy, T., Okasaka, S., Narula, N., Fullagar, N.: Native Client: A Sandbox for Portable, Untrusted x86 Native Code. Communications of the ACM 53(1), 91-99 (2010)
    • 2. Gong, L., Mueller, M., Prafullchandra, H., Schemers, R.: Going Beyond the Sandbox: An Overview of the New Security Architecture in the Java Development Kit 1.2. In: USENIX Symposium on Internet Technologies and Systems, Monterey, CA, USA 1997. Prentice Hall PTR
    • 3. Whitaker, A., Shaw, M., Gribble, S.D.: Denali: Lightweight Virtual Machines for Distributed and Networked Applications. In: 5th USENIX Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation, Boston, MA, USA 2002. USENIX Association
    • 4. Madnick, S.E., Donovan, J.J.: Application and Analysis of the Virtual Machine Approach to Information Security. In: ACM Workshop on Virtual Computer Systems, Cambridge, MA, USA 1973. Harvard University
    • 5. Kamp, P.-H., Watson, R.: Jails: Con ning the Omnipotent Root. In: 2nd International System Administration and Networking Conference (SANE 2000), Maastricht, The Netherlands 2000
    • 6. Tucker, A., Comay, D.: Solaris Zones: Operating System Support for Server Consolidation. In: 3rd Virtual Machine Research and Technology Symposium Worksin-Progress, San Jose, CA, USA 2004
    • 7. Boebert, W.E., Kain, R.Y.: A Practical Alternative to Hierarchical Integrity Policies. In: 8th National Computer Security Conference, Gaithersburg, MD, USA 1985. NIST
    • 8. Goldberg, I., Wagner, D., Thomas, R., Brewer, E.A.: A Secure Environment for Untrusted Helper Applications: Con ning the Wily Hacker. In: 6th USENIX Security Symposium, San Jose, CA, USA 1996. USENIX Association
    • 9. Provos, N.: Improving Host Security with System Call Policies. In: 12th USENIX Security Symposium, Washington, DC, USA, August 2002. USENIX Association
    • 10. Cowan, C., Beattie, S., Kroah-Hartman, G., Pu, C., Wagle, P., Gligor, V.: SubDomain: Parsimonious Server Security. In: USENIX 14th Systems Administration Conference, New Orleans, LA, USA 2000. USENIX Association
    • 11. Loscocco, P., Smalley, S.: Integrating Flexible Support for Security Policies into the Linux Operating System. In: FREENIX Track: 2001 USENIX Annual Technical Conference, Boston, MA, USA 2001. USENIX Association
    • 12. Harada, T., Horie, T., Tanaka, K.: Task Oriented Management Obviates Your Onus on Linux. In: Linux Conference 2004, Tokyo, Japan 2004
    • 13. Sandhu, R., Ferraiolo, D., Kuhn, R.: Role Based Access Control. In. American National Standards Institute / International Committee for Information Technology Standards (ANSI/INCITS), (2004)
    • 14. Walker, K., Sterne, D., Badger, M., Petkac, M., Sherman, D., Oostendorp, K.: Con ning Root Programs with Domain and Type Enforcement. In: 6th USENIX Security Symposium, San Jose, CA, USA 1996. USENIX Association
    • 15. Schreuders, Z.C.: Thesis. A Role-Based Approach to Restricting Application Execution. Murdoch University (2005)
    • 16. Raje, M.: TRCS 99-12: Behavior-based Con nement of Untrusted Applications. University of Calfornia (1999)
    • 17. Acharya, A., Raje, M.: MAPbox: Using Parameterized Behavior Classes to Con ne Applications. In: 9th USENIX Security Symposium, Denver, CO, USA 2000. USENIX Association
    • 18. Giuri, L., Iglio, P.: Role Templates for Content-based Access Control. In: 2nd ACM Workshop on Role-based Access Control, Fairfax, VA, USA 1997. ACM Press
    • 19. Yao, W., Moody, K., Bacon, J.: A Model of OASIS Rolebased Access Control and its Support for Active Security. In: 6th ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies, Chantilly, VA, USA 2001. ACM Press
    • 20. Ferraiolo, D., Cugini, J.A., Kuhn, R.: Role-Based Access Control (RBAC): Features and Motivations. In: 11th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC), Gaithersburg, MD, USA 1995. IEEE Computer Society Press
    • 21. Johnson, M., Karat, J., Karat, C.-M., Grueneberg, K.: Optimizing a Policy Authoring Framework for Security and Privacy Policies. In: 6th Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS), Redmond, Washington, DC, USA 2010. ACM Press
    • 22. Wagner, D.A.: Janus: An Approach for Con nement of Untrusted Applications. In: Electrical Engineering and Computer Sciences. University of California, Berkeley, CA, USA, (1999)
    • 23. Berman, A., Bourassa, V., Selberg, E.: TRON: ProcessSpeci c File Protection for the UNIX Operating System. In: Winter USENIX Conference, New Orleans, LA, USA 1995. USENIX Association
    • 24. Hallyn, S.E., Kearns, P.: Domain and Type Enforcement for Linux. In: 4th Annual Linux Showcase and Conference, Atlanta, GA, USA 2000
    • 25. Zanin, G., Mancini, L.V.: Towards a Formal Model for Security Policies Speci cation and Validation in the SELinux System. In: 9th ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies, Yorktown Heights, NY, USA 2004. ACM Press
    • 26. Hallyn, S.E., Morgan, A.G.: Linux Capabilities: Making Them Work. In: The Linux Symposium, Ottawa, ON, Canada 2008
    • 27. Edge, C., Barker, W., Hunter, B., Sullivan, G.: Enterprise Mac Security: Mac OS X Snow Leopard, Second Edition. Apress, (2010)
    • 28. Ferraiolo, D.F., Sandhu, R., Gavrila, S., Kuhn, D.R., Chandramouli, R.: Proposed NIST Standard for RoleBased Access Control. ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) 4(3), 224-274 (2001)
    • 29. Tidswell, J., Potter, J.: An Approach to Dynamic Domain and Type Enforcement. In: Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy, Syndey, NSW, Australia 1997. Springer
    • 30. Ott, A.: The Role Compatibility Security Model. In: 7th Nordic Workshop on Secure IT Systems (NordSec), Karlstad, Sweden 2002
    • 31. Hinrichs, S., Naldurg, P.: Attack-based Domain Transition Analysis. In: 2nd Annual Security Enhanced Linux Symposium, Baltimore, MD, USA 2006
    • 32. Hardy, N.: The Confused Deputy: Or Why Capabilities Might Have Been Invented. ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review 22(4), 36-38 (1988)
    • 33. Fournet, C., Gordon, A.D.: Stack Inspection: Theory and Variants. ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS) 25(3), 360-399 (2003)
    • 34. Wallach, D.S., Felten, E.W.: Understanding Java Stack Inspection. In: 19th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, Oakland, CA, USA 1998. IEEE Computer Society
    • 35. Besson, F., Blanc, T., Fournet, C., Gordon, A.D.: From Stack Inspection to Access Control: A Security Analysis for Libraries. In: 17th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, Asilomar, CA, USA 2004. IEEE Computer Society
    • 36. Hunt, G., Larus, J., Abadi, M., Aiken, M., Barham, P., Fhndrich, M., Hawblitzel, C., Hodson, O., Levi, S., Murphy, N., Steensgaard, B., Tarditi, D., Wobber, T., Zill, B.: An Overview of the Singularity Project. In. Microsoft Research, Redmond, WA, USA, (2005)
    • 37. Schreuders, Z.C.: The Functionality-Based Application Con nement Model and its Linux Prototype FBACLSM (Presentation). In: linux.conf.au - LCA2009, Tasmania, Australia 2009
    • 38. Schreuders, Z.C.: FBAC-LSM: Protect Yourself From Your Apps. http://schreuders.org/FBAC-LSM (Accessed 2011)
    • 39. Harada, T., Horie, T., Tanaka, K.: Towards a Manageable Linux Security. In: Linux Conference 2005 (Japanese), Japan 2005
    • 40. Morris, J.: Filesystem Labeling in SELinux. Linux Journal(126), 22-24 (2004)
    • 41. Schau er, C.: The Simpli ed Mandatory Access Control Kernel. In: http://schau er-ca.com/. (2008)
    • 42. Department of Defense: Trusted Computer Security Evaluation Criteria. DOD 5200.28-STD. (1985)
    • 43. Boebert, W.E., Kain, R.Y.: A Practical Alternative to Hierarchical Integrity Policies. Proceedings of the 8th National Computer Security Conference, 18-27 (1985)
    • 44. Schreuders, Z.C., Payne, C.: Reusability of Functionality-Based Application Con nement Policy Abstractions. In: 10th International Conference on Information and Communications Security (ICICS 2008), Birmingham, UK 2008. Springer
    • 45. Schreuders, Z.C., Payne, C., McGill, T.: A Policy Language for Abstraction and Automation in Applicationoriented Access Controls: The Functionality-based Application Con nement Policy Language. In: IEEE International Symposium on Policies for Distributed Systems and Networks (POLICY 2011), Italy, Pisa 2011. IEEE Computer Society
    • 46. Schreuders, Z.C., Payne, C., McGill, T.: Techniques for Automating Policy Speci cation for Applicationoriented Access Controls. In: 6th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES 2011) Vienna, Austria 2011. IEEE Computer Society
    • 47. Schreuders, Z.C., McGill, T., Payne, C.: Towards Usable Application-oriented Access Controls: Qualitative Results from a Usability Study of SELinux, AppArmor and FBAC-LSM. International Journal of Information Security and Privacy 6(1), 57-76 (2012)
    • 48. Schreuders, Z.C., McGill, T., Payne, C.: Empowering End Users to Con ne Their Own Applications: The Results of a Usability Study Comparing SELinux, AppArmor and FBAC-LSM. ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) 14(2), 1-28 (2011) return [has privilege](operation, privilege, arguments)
  • No related research data.
  • Discovered through pilot similarity algorithms. Send us your feedback.

Share - Bookmark

Download from

Cite this article