Remember Me
Or use your Academic/Social account:


Or use your Academic/Social account:


You have just completed your registration at OpenAire.

Before you can login to the site, you will need to activate your account. An e-mail will be sent to you with the proper instructions.


Please note that this site is currently undergoing Beta testing.
Any new content you create is not guaranteed to be present to the final version of the site upon release.

Thank you for your patience,
OpenAire Dev Team.

Close This Message


Verify Password:
Verify E-mail:
*All Fields Are Required.
Please Verify You Are Human:
fbtwitterlinkedinvimeoflicker grey 14rssslideshare1
Grout, Paul; Schnedler, Wendelin (2008)
Publisher: Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Bonn
Types: Research
Subjects: power within organizations, J32, L30, H11, M52, Spende, B├╝rokratie, Fundraising, Arbeitsangebot, donated labor, intrinsic motivation, non-profit organizations, power within organizations, Nonprofit-Organisation, 330 Wirtschaft, H42, non-profit organizations, Donated labor, intrinsic motivation, Ehrenamtliche Arbeit, Soziales Verhalten, Theorie
jel: jel:H40, jel:H42, jel:M52, jel:J32, jel:L30, jel:H11, jel:M50, jel:H10
ddc: ddc:330
How does the environment of an organization influence whether workers voluntarily provide effort? We study the power relationship between a non-profit unit (e.g. university department, NGO, health trust), where workers care about the result of their work, and a bu- reaucrat, who supplies some input to the non-profit unit, but has opportunity costs in doing so (e.g. Dean of faculty, corrupt representative, government agency). We find that marginal changes in the balance of power eventually have dramatic effects on donated labor. We also identify when strengthening the non-profit unit decreases and when it increases donated labor.
  • The results below are discovered through our pilot algorithms. Let us know how we are doing!

    • Hansmann, Henry B., \The Role of Nonpro t Enterprise," Yale Law Journal, 1980, 89, 839{901.
    • Hilborn, Robert C., \Sea Gulls, Butter ies, and Grasshoppers: A Brief History of the Butter y E ect in Nonlinear Dynamics," American Journal of Physics, 2004, 72 (11), 425{427.
    • Holmstrom, Bengt, \Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, 1979, 10 (1), 74{91.
    • , \Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, 1982, 13 (2), 324{ 340.
    • , \Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," Review of Economic Studies, 1999, 66, 169{182.
    • and Paul Milgrom, \Multitask Principal-Agent-Analysis: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1991, 7, 24{52. special issue.
    • Ratto, Marisa and Wendelin Schnedler, \Too Few Cooks Spoil the Broth: Division of Labour and Directed Production," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2008, 8 (1, Topics), Article 27.
    • Schnedler, Wendelin, \When is It Foolish to Reward for A While Beneting from B?," Journal of Labor Economics, 2008, 26 (4), 595{619.
    • Shavell, Steven, \Risk-Sharing and Incentives in the Principal-Agent Relationship," Bell Journal of Economics, 1979, 10 (1), 55{73.
    • Sliwka, Dirk, \On the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes," American Economic Review, 2007, 97 (3), 999{1012.
  • No related research data.
  • No similar publications.

Share - Bookmark

Cite this article