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Even under antitrust enforcement, firms may still form a cartel in an infinitely-repeated oligopoly model when the discount factor is sufficiently close to one. We present a linear oligopoly model where the profit-maximizing cartel price converges to the competitive equilibrium price as the discount factor goes to one. We then identify a set of necessary conditions for this seemingly counter-intuitive result.
The results below are discovered through our pilot algorithms. Let us know how we are doing!
Discovered through pilot similarity algorithms. Send us your feedback.