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Eide, Erling (2003)
Publisher: Oslo: University of Oslo, Department of Economics
Languages: English
Types: Research
Subjects: H21, Tax evasion; optimal taxation; rank dependent expected utility, Nutzen, H26, Öffentliches Gut, optimal taxation, Optimale Besteuerung, rank dependent expected utility, Erwartungstheorie, D81, Tax evasion, Steuerflucht, Theorie
jel: jel:H21, jel:D81, jel:H26
ddc: ddc:330
In this paper the theory of rank-dependent expected utility (RDEU) is substituted for the theory of expected utility (EU) in a model of optimal provision of public goods. The substitution generalizes the Samuelson rule, previously modified to include deadweight loss and tax evasion loss.
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    • Usher, Dan (1986): Tax Evasion and the Marginal Cost of Public Funds, Economic Inquiry, XXIV, 563-86.
    • Weber, Elke U. and Britt Kirsner (1997): “Reasons for Rank-Dependent Utility Evaluation”. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 14, 41-61 Yaari, M. E. (1987): The Dual Theory of Choice Under Risk. Econometrica, 63, 95-115.
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