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Thiel, Sandra (2005)
Languages: English
Types: Article
textabstractSince the 1980s the number of quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations has increased in most western countries. This article offers a theoretical explanation for politicians’ apparent preference for quangos. The model is based on rational choice sociology, neo-institutional economics and public choice. Hypotheses are formulated on the conditions that are expected to influence politicians’ choice. The statistical analysis, using a database of 124 decisions to establish 392 quangos in The Netherlands between 1950 and 1993, shows that quango proliferation is more a trend than a well-informed choice. This raises new questions for research.
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