LOGIN TO YOUR ACCOUNT

Username
Password
Remember Me
Or use your Academic/Social account:

CREATE AN ACCOUNT

Or use your Academic/Social account:

Congratulations!

You have just completed your registration at OpenAire.

Before you can login to the site, you will need to activate your account. An e-mail will be sent to you with the proper instructions.

Important!

Please note that this site is currently undergoing Beta testing.
Any new content you create is not guaranteed to be present to the final version of the site upon release.

Thank you for your patience,
OpenAire Dev Team.

Close This Message

CREATE AN ACCOUNT

Name:
Username:
Password:
Verify Password:
E-mail:
Verify E-mail:
*All Fields Are Required.
Please Verify You Are Human:
fbtwitterlinkedinvimeoflicker grey 14rssslideshare1
Allott, N. E. (2007)
Publisher: University of London
Languages: English
Types: Doctoral thesis
Subjects:
This thesis is about the reconciliation of realistic views of rationality with inferential-intentional theories of communication. Grice (1957 1975) argued that working out what a speaker meant by an utterance is a matter of inferring the speaker's intentions on the presumption that she is acting rationally. This is abductive inference: inference to the best explanation for the utterance. Thus an utterance both rationalises and causes the interpretation the hearer constructs. Human rationality is bounded because of our 'finitary predicament': we have limited time and resources for computation (Simon, 1957b Cherniak, 1981). This raises questions about the explanatory status of inferential-intentional pragmatic theories. Gricean derivations of speakers' intentions seem costly, and generally hearers are not aware of performing explicit reasoning. Utterance interpretation is typically fast and automatic. Is utterance interpretation a species of reasoning, or does the hearer merely act as "reasoning Within the framework of cognitive science, mental processing is under stood as transitions between mental representations. I develop a traditional view of rationality as reasoning ability, where this is essentially the ability to make transitions that preserve rational acceptability. Following Grice (2001), I claim that there is a 'hard way' and a 'quick way' of reasoning. Work on bounded rationality suggests that much cognitive work is done by heuristics, processes that exploit environmental structure to solve problems at much lower cost than fully explicit calculations. I look at the properties of heuristics that find solutions to open-ended problems such as abductive inference, particularly sequential search heuristics with aspiration-level stopping rules. I draw on relevance theory's view that the comprehension procedure is a heuristic which exploits environmental regularities due to utterances being offers of information (Sperber & Wilson, 1986). This kind of heuristic, I argue, is the 'quick way' that reasoning proceeds in utterance interpretation.
  • The results below are discovered through our pilot algorithms. Let us know how we are doing!

    • B o n in i, N., T e n to ri, K. & O sh erso n , D. (2004). A d iffe re n t c o n ju n c tio n fallacy. M ind & Language, 19(2), 199-210.
    • Boole, G. (1854). An Investigation o f the Laws o f Thought: On Which Are Founded the M athem atical Theories o f Logic and Probabilities. London: W alton and Maberly.
    • Borges, B., G o ld stein , D . G ., O rtm a n n , A . & G igerenzer, G . (1999)* C a n ignorance beat th e stock m a rk et? In G . G ig eren zer, P. M . T o d d & A B C Research G ro u p (Eds.), Simple heuristics th at make us sm art, (pp. 5 9 -7 2 ). New York: Oxford University Press.
    • Braine, M. D. S. (1978). O n the relation between the natural logic of reasoning and standard logic. Psychological Review, 85(1), 1-21.
    • B raine, M . D . S. (1990). T h e “n a tu ra l lo g ic ” ap proach to reasoning. In W . E O v e rto n (E d.), Reasoning Necessity, an d Logic: D evelopm ental Perspectives. (p p *133-157)* H ills d a le , NJ: E rlb a u m .
    • Braine, M. D. S. & O'Brien, D. P. (Eds.). (1998). M ental Logic. Mahwah, N.J: L. Erlbaum Associates.
    • B raine, M . D . S., Reiser, B. J. & R u m a in , B. (1984)* Som e e m p iric a l ju s tifica tio n fo r a th e o ry o f n a tu ra l p ro p o s itio n a l logic. The Psychology o fLearning and Motivation, 18, 313-371*
    • Brancazio, P. J. (1985). Looking into Chapman's homer: The physics of judging a fly ball American Journal o f Physics, 53, 849.
    • Bratman, M. (1984). Two faces of intention. The Philosophical Review, 93(3), 375- 405.
    • Bratman, M. (1987). Intention, Plans an d Practical Reason. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
    • Breheny, R. (2003). On the dynamic tu rn in the study of meaning and interpretation. In J. Peregrin (Ed.), M eaning in the Dynam ic Turn. (pp. 6 9 - 90). Dordrecht: Elsevier.
    • Breheny, R. (2006). Com m unication and folk psychology. M ind & Language, 21(1), 7 4 -1 0 7 .
    • Brown, H. I. (1988). Rationality. London: Routledge.
    • Burge, T. (1993). Content preservation. The Philosophical Review, 102(4), 457- 488.
    • Byrne, R. M. J. (1989). Suppressing valid inferences with conditionals. Cognition, 31(1), 61-83.
    • Byrne, R. M. J. (1991)* Can valid inferences be suppressed? Cognition, 39(1), 7 1 - 78.
    • Byrne, R. M . J., Espino, O . & Santamaria, C. (1999)* Counterexamples and the suppression of inferences. Journal o fM emory and Language, 40(3), 347-373.
    • Byrne, R. M. J., Espino, O. & Santamaria, C. (2000). Counterexample availability. In W. Schaeken, G. De Vooght & G. d'Ydewalle (Eds.), Deductive Reasoning and Strategies, (pp. 97-119). London: Lawrence Erlbaum.
    • Campbell, R. (1981). Language acquisition, psychological dualism and the d e fin itio n o f prag m atics. In H . P arre t, M . Sbisa & J. V ersch u eren (Eds.), Possibilities and Limitations o fPragmatics, (p p. 9 3 -1 0 3 ). A m s te rd a m : John B en jam in s B.V.
    • Carpenter, M., Nagell, K., Tomasello, M., Butterworth, G. & Moore, C. (1998). Social cognition, joint attention, and communicative competence from 9 to 15 m onths of age. Monographs o f the Societyfo r Research in Child Development, 63(4), i - i 74.
    • C arruthers, P. (2003). On Fodor's problem. M ind & Language, 18(5), 502-523.
    • Carruthers, P. (2007). Simple heuristics m eet massive modularity. In P. Carruthers, S. Laurence & S. Stich (Eds.), The Innate M ind: Culture and Cognition, (pp. 181-198). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    • Carston, R. (1988). Implicature, explicature and truth-theoretic semantics. In R. Kempson (Ed.), M ental Representations: The Interface Between Language and Reality, (pp. 155-181). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    • Carston, R. (2000). The relationship between generative gram m ar and (relevance-theoretic) pragmatics. Language an d Communication, 20, 87-103.
    • Carston, R. (2002a). Linguistic meaning, com m unicated meaning and cognitive pragmatics. M ind & Language, 17(1/2), 127-148.
    • Carston, R. (2002b). Thoughts and Utterances: The Pragmatics o f Explicit Communication. Oxford: Blackwell.
    • Carston, R. (2003). Conversational implicatures and pragmatic mechanisms, abstract for the conference of the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 2003. 2005-08-02 edition. Retrieved 2005-08-02, http:/ /www.eurospp.org/2003/papers/Doc2003/Carston2o6%2oLIN%20.doc
    • C h en g , P. W . & H o ly o a k , K . J. (1985). P rag m atic re as o n in g schemas. Cognitive Psychology, 17(4), 3 9 1 -4 1 6 .
    • Cheng, P. W. 8c Holyoak, K. J. (1989). On the natural selection of reasoning theories. Cognition, 33(3), 285-313.
    • Cheng, P. W., Holyoak, K. J., Nisbett, R. E. 8c Oliver, L. M. (1986). Pragmatic versus syntactic approaches to training deductive reasoning. Cognitive Psychology, i8{3), 293-328.
    • Cherniak, C. (1981). Minimal rationality. M ind, 90(358), 161-183.
    • Cherniak, C. (1986). M inim al Rationality. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
    • Chomsky, N. (1959)- A review of B. F. Skinner, 'Verbal Behavior', 1957. Language, 35, 26-58.
    • Chomsky, N. (1964). Current Issues in Linguistic Theory. The Hague: Mouton.
    • Chomsky, N. (1966). Cartesian Linguistics. Harper 8c Row.
    • Chomsky, N. (1986). Knowledge o f Language: Its Nature, Origin, and Use. New York: Praeger.
    • Chomsky, N. (1988). Language and Problems o f Knowledge: The M anagua Lectures. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
    • C h o m sky, N . (1991a). L in g uistics and adjacent fields: A p erso n al view . In A . K ash er (E d.), The Chomskyan Turn. (pp. 3 -2 5 ). O x fo rd : Basil B lackw ell.
    • Chomsky, N. (1991b). Linguistics and cognitive science: Problems and mysteries. In A. Kasher (Ed.), The Chomskyan Turn. (pp. 26-55). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
    • Chomsky, N. (1992). Language and interpretation: Philosophical reflections and empirical enquiry. In J. Earman (Ed.), Inference, Explanation and Other Frustrations: Essays in the Philosophy o f Science, (pp. 99-128). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
    • Chomsky, N. (1995). Language and nature. M ind, 104(413), 1-6 1.
    • Chomsky, N. (2003). Replies. In L. M. Antony & N. Hornstein (Eds.), Chomsky an d his Critics, (pp. 253-328). Malden, MA: Blackwell.
    • Clark, H. (1977). Bridging. In P. Johnson Laird & J. Wason (Eds.), Thinking: Readings in Cognitive Science, (pp. 411-420). Cambridge University Press.
    • Clements, W. A. & Perner, J. (1984). Implicit understanding of belief. Cognitive Development, 9, 377-395-
    • Cohen, L. J. (1981). Can hum an rationality be dem onstrated experimentally? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 4, 317-370.
    • Cohen, L. J. (1992). Rationality. In J. Dancy & E. Sosa (Eds.), A Companion to Epistemology. (pp. 417-420). Cambridge, Mass: Blackwell.
    • Collins, P. D. B., Martin, A. D. & Squires, E. J. (1989)- Particle Physics and Cosmology. New York: Wiley.
    • Conan Doyle, A., Sir. (1892a). Silver Blaze (from 'The Memoirs of Sherlock Holmes'). Retrieved 10-12-06, http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Silver_Blaze
    • Conan Doyle, A., Sir. (1892b). The Adventure of the Speckled Band (from 'The Adventures of Sherlock Holmes'). Retrieved 16-12-06, http:/ /en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Adventure_of_the_Speckled_Band
    • Conlisk, J. (1996). Why bounded rationality? Journal o fEconomic Literature, 34(2), 669-700.
    • Cosmides, L. (1989). The logic of social exchange: Has natural selection shaped how humans reason? Studies with the Wason selection task. Cognition, 31(3), 187-276.
    • Cosmides, L. & Tooby, J. (1992). Cognitive adaptations for social exchange. In J. Barkow, L. Cosmides & J. Tooby (Eds.), The A dapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation o f Culture, (pp. 163-228). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    • Cosmides, L., Tooby, J., Fiddick, L. & Bryant, G. A. (2005). Detecting cheaters. Trends in Cognitive Science, 9(11), 505-6; author reply 508-10.
    • Dancy, J. (2003). Aspects of reason I (Review o f 'Aspects of Reason', Paul Grice, 2001). The Philosophical Quarterly, 53(211), 274-279(6).
    • Davidson, D. (1963). Actions, reasons and causes. Journal o fPhilosophy, 60, 685- 700.
    • Davidson, D. (1980a). Essays on Actions an d Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    • Davidson, D. (1980b). Psychology as philosophy. In Essays on Actions an d Events. (pp. 229-244). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    • Day, J. M. (Ed.). (1994). Plato's Meno in Focus. London: Routledge.
    • Dehaene, S. (1999). The N um ber Sense: How the M ind Creates M athem atics. London: Penguin. (Originally published Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997-)
    • D ennett, D. C. (1971). Intentional systems. The Journal o f Philosophy, 68(4), 87- 106.
    • D ennett, D. C. (1987). The Intentional Stance. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
    • Descartes, R. (1912). A Discourse on M ethod Etc. (J. Veitch, Trans.). London: Everyman's Library; J M Dent. (Originally published 1637.)
    • Dienes, Z. & Perner, J. (1999). A theory of implicit and explicit knowledge. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22(05), 735-808.
    • Douven, I. & Uffink, J. (2003). The preface paradox revisited. Erkenntnis, 59(3)> 389-420.
    • Dreier, J. (2004). Decision theory and morality. In A. R. Mele & P. Rawling (Eds.), The Oxford H andbook o f Rationality, (pp. 156-181). New York: Oxford University Press.
    • Dulany, D. E. & Hilton, D. J. (1991). Conversational implicature, conscious representation, and the conjunction fallacy. Social Cognition, 9(1), 85-110.
    • Dum m ett, M. A. E. (1973). Frege: Philosophy o fLanguage. London: Duckworth.
    • Ellsberg, D. (1961). Risk, ambiguity, and the Savage axioms. The Quarterly Journal o fEconomics, 75(4), 643-669.
    • Elster, J. (1983). Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion o fRationality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    • Enfield, N. J. & Levinson, S. C. (2006). Introduction: Human sociality as a new interdisciplinary field. In N. J. Enfield & S. C. Levinson (Eds.), Roots o fHuman Sociality: Culture, Cognition and Interaction, (pp. 1-35). Oxford: Berg.
    • Erickson, T. D. & M attson, M. E. (1981). From words to meaning: A semantic illusion. Journal o f Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 20(5), 540-551.
    • Evans, J. S. B. T., Handley, S. J., Harper, C. N. J. & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1999). Reasoning about necessity and possibility: A test of the mental model theory of deduction. Journal o fE xperim ental Psychology. Learning Memory, and Cognition, 25(6), 1495-1513.
    • Evans, J. S. B. T. (1972). Interpretation and matching bias in a reasoning task. Quarterly Journal o fExperim ental Psychology, 2 4 ,193-199.
    • Evans, J. S. B. T. (1984)- Heuristic and analytic processes in reasoning. British Journal o f Psychology, 75(4), 541-568.
    • Evans, J. S. B. T. (1989). Bias in Human Reasoning: Causes and Consequences. London: Erlbaum.
    • Evans, J. S. B. T. (1996). Deciding before you think: Relevance and reasoning in the selection task. British Journal o fPsychology, 87(2), 223-240.
    • Evans, J. S. B. T. (1998). Matching bias in conditional reasoning: Do we understand it after 25 years? Thinking & Reasoning, 4(1), 45-110.
    • Evans, J. S. B. T. (1999). The influence of linguistic form on reasoning: The case of matching bias. The Quarterly Journal o fExperim ental Psychology: Section A, 52(1), 185-216.
    • Evans, J. S. B. T. (2003). In two minds: Dual-process accounts of reasoning. Trends in Cognitive Science, 7(10), 454-459.
    • Evans, J. S. B. T. (2006). The heuristic-analytic theory of reasoning: Extension and evaluation. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 13(3), 378-395-
    • Evans, J. S. B. T., Barston, J. L. & Pollard, P. (1983). O n the conflict between logic and belief in syllogistic reasoning. M emory & Cognition, 21(3), 295-306.
    • Evans, J. S. B. T., Ellis, C. E. & Newstead, S. E. (1996). On the mental representation of conditional sentences. The Quarterly Journal o f Experimental Psychology: Section A, 49(4), 1086-1114.
    • Evans, J. S. B. T. & Lynch, J. S. (1973)- Matching bias in the selection task. British Journal o fPsychology, 64(3). 391-397-
    • Evans, J. S. B. T., Newstead, S. E. & Byrne, R. M. J. (1993)- Hum an Reasoning: The Psychology o fDeduction. Hove: Psychology Press.
    • Evans, J. S. B. T. Sc Over, D. E. (1996). R ationality an d Reasoning Hove: Psychology Press.
    • Fiedler, K. (1988). The dependence of the conjunction fallacy on subtle linguistic factors. Psychological Research, 50(2), 123-129.
    • Fodor, J. A. (1975). The Language o f Thought. New York: Crowell.
    • Fodor, J. A. (1983). The M odularity o fMind: A n Essay on Faculty Psychology. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
    • Fodor, J. A. (1985a). Precis of the m odularity of mind. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 8(1), 1-42.
    • Fodor, J. A. (1985b). Fodor's guide to mental representation: The intelligent auntie s vade-mecum. M ind, 94(373), 76-100.
    • Fodor, J. A. (1987). Psychosemantics: The Problem o fMeaning in the Philosophy o f Mind. Cambridge, Mass: M IT Press.
    • Fodor, J. A. (2000). The M ind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits o f Computational Psychology. Cambridge, Mass: M IT Press.
    • Fodor, J. A. (2005). Reply to Steven Pinker 'So how does the mind work?'. M ind & Language, 20(1), 25-32.
    • Fodor, J. A. (2007). The revenge of the given. In B. McLaughlin & J. Cohen (Eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy o fMind. Blackwell.
    • Frege, G. (1964)- The Basic Laws o fArithmetic; Exposition o f the System (M. Furth, Trans.). Berkeley: University of California Press.
    • Frege, G. (1979)- Posthumous Writings (P. Long & R. W hite, Trans.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
    • Frege, G. (1984)- Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy (M. Black, Trans.). Oxford: B. Blackwell.
    • Gamut, L. T. F. (1990). Logic, Language and Meaning: Volume 1, Introduction to Logic. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
    • Garcia-Carpintero, M. (2001). Gricean rational reconstructions and the semantics-pragmatics distinction. Synthese, 128, 93-131.
    • Garner, B. A. 8c Black, H. C. (2004). Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed.). St. Paul, MN: Thomson/West.
    • Gauthier, D. P. (1986). Morals By Agreement. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    • Gentzen, G. (1964)- Investigations into logical deduction. American Philosophical Quarterly, 288-306.
    • Gergely, G., Bekkering, H. & Kiraly, I. (2002). Rational im itation in preverbal infants. Nature, 415(6873)1 755-
    • Gigerenzer, G. (1996). O n narrow norm s and vague heuristics: A reply to Kahneman and Tversky (1996). Psychological Review, 103(3), 592-596.
    • Gigerenzer, G. (2000). A da ptive Thinking: R ationality in the Real World. New York: Oxford University Press.
    • Gigerenzer, G. (2001). Decision making: Non-rational theories. In N. J. Smelser & P. B. Baltes (Eds.), International Encyclopedia o f the Social an d Behavioral Sciences, Volume V. (1st ed., pp. 3304-3309). Amsterdam: Elsevier.
    • Gigerenzer, G. (2004). Striking a blow for sanity in theories of rationality. In M. Augier & J. G. M arch (Eds.), M odels o f a M an: Essays in M em ory o f H erbert A. Simon, (pp. 389-409). Cambridge, Mass: M IT Press.
    • Gigerenzer, G. (2005). I think, therefore I err. Social Research: An International Quarterly o f Social Sciences, 72(1), 1-24.
    • Gigerenzer, G., Czerlinski, J. & M artignon, L. (2002). How good are fast and frugal heuristics? In R. Elio (Ed.), Common sense, reasoning, & rationality, (pp. 148-173). New York: Oxford University Press.
    • Gigerenzer, G. & Goldstein, D. G. (1996). Reasoning the fast and frugal way: models of bounded rationality. Psychological Review, 103(4), 650-669.
    • Gigerenzer, G. & Hoffrage, U. (1995). How to improve Bayesian reasoning w ithout instruction: Frequency formats. Psychological Review, 102(4), 6 8 4 - 704.
    • Gigerenzer, G., Hoffrage, U. & Kleinbolting, H. (1991). Probabilistic m ental models: A Brunswikian theory of confidence. Psychological Review, 98(4), 506-528.
    • Gigerenzer, G. 8c Selten, R. (Eds.). (2001). Bounded Rationality: The A daptive Toolbox. Cambridge, Mass: M IT Press.
    • Gigerenzer, G. & Todd, P. M. (1999). Simple Heuristics That M ake Us Smart. New York: Oxford University Press.
    • Gilhooly, K. J. (2004). W orking m em ory and reasoning. In J. P. Leighton & R. J. Sternberg (Eds.), The N ature o f Reasoning, (pp. 49-77). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    • Gilhooly, K. J., Logie, R. H., W etherick, N. E. & Wynn, V. (1993). Working m em ory and strategies in syllogistic-reasoning tasks. M em ory an d Cognition, 21(1), 115-124.
    • Girotto, V., Kemmelmeier, M., Sperber, D. & van der Henst, J. B. (2001). Inept reasoners or pragmatic virtuosos? Relevance and the deontic selection task. Cognition S, 81(2), B69-76.
    • Goldman, A. I. (1970). A Theory o f Human Action. Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall.
    • Goldstein, D. G. & Gigerenzer, G. (1999). The recognition heuristic: How ignorance makes us smart. In G. Gigerenzer, P. M. Todd & the ABC Research Group (Eds.), Simple Heuristics That M ake Us Smart, (pp. 37-58). New York: Oxford University Press.
    • Goldstein, D. G. & Gigerenzer, G. (2002). Models of ecological rationality: The recognition heuristic. Psychological Review, 109(1), 75-90.
    • G oodm an, N. (1954). Fact, Fiction an d Forecast. London: University of London.
    • Gould, S. J. (1991). Bullyfo r Brontosaurus: Reflections in Natural History. London: Hutchinson Radius.
    • Grice, P. (1957). Meaning. The Philosophical Review, 66, 377-388.
    • Grice, P. (1968). U tterer's meaning, sentence meaning and word meaning. Foundations o fLanguage, 4, 225-242.
    • Grice, P. (1974). M ethod in philosophical psychology (from the banal to the bizarre). Proceedings and Addresses o f the American Philosophical Association, 48, 23 -53 .
    • Grice, P. (1975). Logic and conversation. In P. Cole & J. Morgan (Eds.), Syntax & Semantics 3: Speech Acts. (pp. 41-58).
    • Grice, P. (1981). Presupposition and conversational implicature. In P. Cole (Ed.), R adical Pragmatics, (pp. 183-198). New York: Academic Press.
    • Grice, P. (1989a). Logic and conversation. In Studies in the Way o f Words, (pp. 22-40). Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. (Originally published in P. Cole and J. Morgan, (Ed.s), 'Syntax and Semantics'. Academic Press, New York, 1975.)
    • Grice, P. (1989b). Retrospective Epilogue. In Studies in the Way of Words, (pp. 339-385). Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
    • Grice, P. (1989c). Studies in the Way o f Words. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
    • Grice, P. (2001). Aspects o f Reason. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    • Griggs, R . A. & Cox, J. R. (1982). The elusive thematic-materials effect in Wason's selection task. British Journal o f Psychology, 73(f), 407-420.
    • G rig g s, R. A . & C o x, J. R. (1993)- P erm issio n schem as and the selection task. The Quarterly Journal o fExperim ental Psychology: A. Human Experimental Psychology, 46(4), 6 3 7 -6 5 1 .
    • Hacking, I. (1979). W hat is logic? The Journal o fPhilosophy, 76(6), 285-319.
    • Hare, R. M. (1952). The Language o f Morals. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    • H arm an, G. (1984). Logic and reasoning. Synthese, 60(1), 107-127.
    • Harm an, G. (1986). Change in View: Principles o f Reasoning. Cambridge, Mass: M IT Press.
    • Harm an, G. (1999). Reasoning M eaning and Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    • Harman, G. (2003). Aspects of reason II (Review o f 'Aspects of Reason', Paul Grice, 2001). The Philosophical Quarterly, 53(211), 280-284.
    • Harm an, G. (2004). Practical aspects of theoretical reasoning. In A. R. Mele & P. Rawling (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook o fRationality, (pp. 45-56). New York: Oxford University Press.
    • Hauser, M. D. (2003). Knowing about knowing: Dissociations between perception and action systems over evolution and during developm ent Annals o f the New York Academy o f Sciences, 1001(1), 79-103. /www.si.umich.edu/ICOS/gentleintro.html
    • Johnson-Laird, P. N., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V. & Legrenzi, M. S. (2000). Illusions in reasoning about consistency. Science, 288(5465), 531-532.
    • Johnson-Laird, P. N. & Savary, F. (1996). Illusory inferences about probabilities. A cta Psychologica, 93, 69-90.
    • Johnson-Laird, P. N. & Wason, P. C. (Eds.). (1977)- Thinking: Readings in Cognitive Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    • Jones, M. A. (2002). Textbook on Torts (8th ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    • Kahneman, D. & Frederick, S. (2002). Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment. In T. Gilovich, D. W. Griffin & D. Kahneman (Eds.), Heuristics and biases: the psychology o f intuitive judgment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    • Kahneman, D., Slovic, P. & Tversky, A. (1982). Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics an d Biases. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    • Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A. (1973)- On the psychology of prediction. Psychological Review, 80(4), 237-251.
    • Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A. (1979)- Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica, 47(2), 263-292.
    • Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A. (1982). On the study of statistical intuitions. Cognition, 11(2), 123-141.
    • Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A. (1996). On the reality of cognitive illusions. Psychological Review, 103(3), 582-91; discusion 592-6.
    • Kamp, H. (2002). A theory of truth and semantic representation. In P. Portner 8c B. H. Partee (Eds.), Formal Semantics: The Essential Readings, (pp. 189-222). Oxford: Blackwell. (Originally published in Groenendijk, J. Janssen, T. & Stokhof, M. (Ed.s) 1981, T ru th , Interpretation and Information, pp 1-41. Dordrecht: Foris.)
    • Kasher, A. (1976). Conversational maxims and rationality. In A. Kasher (Ed.), Language in Focus: Foundations, M ethods and Systems, (pp. 197-216). Dordrecht, Holland: Reidel Publishing Company.
    • Kasher, A. (1982). Gricean inference revisited. Philosophica, 29, 25-44.
    • Kasher, A. (1991). Pragmatics and Chomsky's research program. In A. Kasher (Ed.), The Chomskyan Turn. (pp. 122-149). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
    • Kasher, A. (no date). Rationality and pragmatics. Retrieved 2006-09-07, http:/ /www.tau.ac.il/~kasher/prprag.htm
    • Kenny, A. J. P. (1963). Action, Emotion an d Will. London: Routledge 8c K. Paul.
    • Keynes, J. M. (1921). A Treatise on Probability. London: Macmillan.
    • Kroger, J. K., Cheng, P. W. 8c Holyoak, K. J. (1993). Evoking the permission schema: The impact of explicit negation and a violation-checking context The Q uarterly Journal O fExperim ental Psychology A: Human Experim ental Psychology, 46(4), 615-635.
    • Kubovy, M. & Epstein, W. (2002). Internalization: A m etaphor we can live w ith o u t Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24(f), 618-625.
    • Lakatos, I. (1970). Falsification and the methodology of scientific research program mes. In I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave (Eds.), Criticism an d the Growth o f Knowledge, (pp. 91-195). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    • Land, S. K. (1974). From Signs to Propositions: The Concept o f Form in Eighteenth-Century Sem antic Theory. London: Longman.
    • Lavie, N. (2000). Selective attention and cognitive control: Dissociating a tte n tio n a l fu n c tio n s th ro u g h d iffe re n t types o f load. In S. M o n s e ll & J. D r iv e r (E d s.), Control o f Cognitive Processes: A ttention an d Performance XVIII. (p p. 1 7 5 -1 9 4 )- C a m b rid g e , M ass: M I T Press.
    • Lavie, N. (2006). The role of perceptual load in visual awareness. Brain Research, io 8o(1), 91-100.
    • Lavie, N. & Tsai, Y. (1994). Perceptual load as a major determ inant of the locus of selection in visual attention. Perceptual Psychophysics, 56(2), 183-197-
    • Lemmon, E. J. (1978). Beginning Logic. Indianapolis: Hackett.
    • Levinson, S. C. (2006). O n the hum an 'interactional engine! In N. J. Enfield & S. C. Levinson (Eds.), Roots o f H um an Sociality: Culture, Cognition an d Interaction, (pp. 39-69). Oxford: Berg.
    • Liszkowski, U. (2005). Hum an twelve-month-olds point cooperatively to share interest with and helpfully provide information for a communicative partner. Gesture, 5(1-2), 135-154-
    • Liszkowski, U. (2006). Infant pointing at twelve months: Communicative goals, motives, and social-cognitive abilities. In N. J. Enfield & S. C. Levinson (Eds.), Roots o f Human Sociality: Culture, Cognition an d Interaction, (pp. 153-178). Oxford: Berg.
    • Liszkowski, U., Carpenter, M., Henning, A., Striano, T. & Tomasello, M. (2004). Twelve-month-olds point to share attention and interest Developm ental Science, 7(3)> 297-307.
    • Liszkowski, U., Carpenter, M., Striano, T. & Tomasello, M. (2006). 12-and 18- m onth-olds point to provide inform ation for others. Journal o f Cognition an d Developm ent, 7(2), 173-187.
    • Liszkowski, U., Carpenter, M. 8c Tomasello, M. (2007). Reference and attitude in infant pointing. Journal o f Child Language, 34(1), 1-20.
    • Lopez, F. J., Cobos, P. L., Cano, A. 8c Shanks, D. R. (undated). An associationist view of biases in causal and probabilistic judgm ent ELSE working papers, 003.
    • M acbeth, D. (2005). Frege's Logic. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
    • M acchi, L. (1995). Pragmatic aspects of the base-rate fallacy. The Quarterly Journal O fExperimental Psychology A. Hum an Experim ental Psychology, 48(1), 188-207.
    • M akinson, D. C. (1965). The paradox of the preface. Analysis, 25(6), 205-207.
    • Malle, B. F., Moses, L. J. 8c Baldwin, D. A. (2001). Introduction: The significance o f intentionality. In B. F. Malle, L. J. Moses 8c D. A. Baldwin (Eds.), Intentions a n d Intentionality: Foundations o f Social Cognition, (pp. 1-26). Cambridge, M assachusetts: Bradford Books, M IT Press.
    • Manktelow, K. I. (1999)- Reasoning a n d Thinking. Hove: Psychology Press.
    • Manktelow, K. I. & Over, D. E. (1993). Rationality: Psychological and Philosophical Perspectives. London: Routledge.
    • M arch, J. G. & Simon, H. A. (1958). Organizations. New York: Wiley.
    • Marr, D. (1982). Vision: A C om putational Investigation Into the Hum an Representation a n d Processing o f Visual Information. San Francisco: Freeman.
    • M a rs h , B., T o d d , P. M . & G ig e re n ze r, G . (2 0 0 4 ). C o g n itiv e heu ristics: R easoning th e fast an d fru g a l w ay. In J. P. L eig h to n & R. J. S tern b erg (Eds.), The N ature o f Reasoning, (p p . 273-287). C a m b rid g e : C a m b rid g e U n iv e rs ity Press.
    • M artin, E. A. (2002). A D iction ary o f Law (5th ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    • Matsui, T. (2000). Bridging a n d Relevance. Amsterdam: J. Benjamins.
    • M cClennen, E. F. (1990). R ation ality an d D ynam ic Choice: Foundational Explorations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    • McGilvray, J. (2005). M eaning and creativity. In J. McGilvray (Ed.), The Cambridge Com panion to Chomsky, (pp. 204-222). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    • McLeod, P. & Dienes, Z. (1996). Do fielders know where to go to catch the ball or only how to get there? Journal o f Experim ental Psychology: Human Perception an d Performance, 22(3), 531-543-
    • McLeod, P., Reed, N. & Dienes, Z. (2001). Toward a unified fielder theory: W hat we do not yet know about how people run to catch a balL Journal o f Experim ental Psychology: Hum an Perception an d Performance, 27,1347-1355.
    • McLeod, P., Reed, N. & Dienes, Z. (2003). How fielders arrive in time to catch the ball. Nature, 426, 244-245.
    • McLeod, P., Reed, N. & Dienes, Z. (2006). The generalized optic acceleration cancellation theory of catching. Journal o f Experim ental Psychology: Human Perception & Performance, 32(1), 139-148.
    • Mele, A. R. (1997a). Introduction. In A. R. Mele (Ed.), The Philosophy o fAction. (pp. 1-26). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    • Mele, A. R. (Ed.). (1997b). The Philosophy o fAction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    • Mele, A. R. (2001). Acting intentionally: Probing folk notions. In B. F. Malle, L. J. Moses & D. A. Baldwin (Eds.), Intentions and Intentionality: Foundations o f Social Cognition, (pp. 27-44). Cambridge, Massachusetts: Bradford Books, M IT Press.
    • Mele, A. R. & Rawling, P. (2004a). Introduction: Aspects of rationality. In A. R. Mele & P. Rawling (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook o fRationality, (pp. 3-16). New York: Oxford University Press.
    • Mele, A. R. & Rawling, P. (Eds.). (2004b). The Oxford Handbook o f Rationality. New York: Oxford University Press.
    • Meltzoff, A. N. (1988). Infant im itation after a l-week delay: Long-term memory for novel acts and m ultiple stim uli D evelopm ental Psychology, 24(4), 470- 4 7 6 .
    • Meltzoff, A. N. & Brooks, R. (2001). “Like me” as a building block for understanding other minds: Bodily acts, attention and intention. In B. F. Malle, L. J. Moses & D. A. Baldwin (Eds.), Intentions an d Intentionality: Foundations of Social Cognition. (pp. 171-192). Cambridge, Mass: Bradford Books, MIT Press.
    • Mill, J. S. (1856). System o fLogic, Ratiocinative an d Inductive: Being a Connected View o f the Principles o fEvidence and the M ethods o f Scientific Investigation. London: John W. Parker.
    • Millikan, R. G. (1984). Language, Thought an d O ther Biological Categories. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
    • Millikan, R. G. (1987). W hat Peter thinks when he hears M ary speak (Reply to Sperber and Wilson, Precis of 'Relevance: Com m unication and Cognition). Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 10, 725-726.
    • Millikan, R. G. (1993). White Queen Psychology an d Other Essaysfo r Alice. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
    • Millikan, R. G. (2003). In defense of public language. In L. M. Antony & N. Hornstein (Eds.), Chomsky an d His Critics, (pp. 215-237). Oxford: Blackwell.
    • Millikan, R. G. (2005). Semantics/pragmatics: Purposes and cross-purposes. In Language: A Biological Model, (pp. 187-220). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    • Mitchell, P., Robinson, E. J. & Thompson, D. E. (1999)- Children's understanding that utterances emanate from minds: Using speaker belief to aid interpretation. Cognition, 72(1), 45-66.
    • M orton, A. (2006). Review o f 'Understanding People: Normativity and Rationalizing Explanation', Alan Millar, 2004. M ind, 115(459), 777-78o.
    • Murphy, D. (2006). On Fodor's analogy: W hy psychology is like philosophy of science after all. M ind & Language, 21(5), 553-564.
    • Nadelhoffer, T. (2006). On trying to save the simple view. M ind & Language, 21(5), 565-586.
    • Neale, S. (1992). Paul Grice and the philosophy of language. Linguistics and Philosophy, 15(5), 509-559-
    • Neeleman, A. & van de Koot, H. (2004). The Grammatical Code. Ms. UCL.
    • Nehemas, A. (1994). Meno s Paradox and Socrates as a teacher. In J. M. Day (Ed.), Plato's Meno In Focus, (pp. 221-248). London: Routledge.
    • Newell, A. & Simon, H. A. (1976). Com puter science as empirical inquiry: symbols and search. Communications o f the Association fo r Computing Machinery, 19(3), 113-126.
    • Newstead, S. E., Pollard, P., Evans, J. S. B. T. & Allen, J. L. (1992). The source of belief bias effects in syllogistic reasoning. Cognition, 45(3), 257-284.
    • Nickerson, R. S. (2004). Teaching reasoning. In J. P. Leighton & R. J. Sternberg (Eds.), The Nature o fReasoning, (pp. 410-442). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    • Nicolle, S. & Clark, B. (1999). Experimental pragmatics and what is said: A response to Gibbs and Moise. Cognition, 69(3), 337-354-
    • Nietzsche, F. W. (1968). Basic Writings o fNietzsche. New York: M odern Library.
    • Nisbett, R. E. & Borgida, E. (1975). Attribution and the psychology of prediction. Journal o fPersonality and Social Psychology, 32(5). 932-943-
    • Noveck, I. (2001). W hen children are more logical than adults: Experimental investigations of scalar implicature. Cognition, 78(2), 165-188.
    • Noveck, I. A. & O'Brien, D. P. (1996). To what extent do pragmatic reasoning schemas affect performance on Wason's selection task? The Quarterly Journal o fExperimental Psychology: Section A, 49(2), 463-489.
    • Noveck, I. A. & Prado, J. (2007). Intelligence and reasoning are not one and the same. Commentary on Jung, R. E. & Haier, R. J. 'The Parieto-Frontal Integration Theory (P-FIT) of intelligence: Converging neuroimaging evidence'. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30(2), 163-164.
    • Noveck, I. A. & Sperber, D. (2007). The why and how of experimental pragmatics: The case of 'scalar inferences! In N. Burton-Roberts (Ed.), Pragmatics, (pp. 184-212). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
    • Nozick, R. (1973). Distributive justice. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 3(1), 45- 126.
    • Nozick, R. (1974). Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic Books.
    • Nuti, M. (2003). Ethnoscience: Examining Common Sense. PhD thesis, University College London.
    • O'Brien, D. P. (2004). Mental-logic theory: W hat it proposes, and reasons to take this proposal seriously. In J. P. Leighton & R. J. Sternberg (Eds.), The Nature o f Reasoning, (pp. 205-233). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    • O 'Neill, D. K. (1996). Two-year-old children's sensitivity to a parent's knowledge state when making requests. Child Development, 67(2), 659-677.
    • Oaksford, M. & Chater, N. (1993). Reasoning theories and bounded rationality. In K. I. Manktelow & D. Over (Eds.), Rationality: Psychological and Philosophical Perspectives, (pp. 31-60). London: Routledge.
    • Onishi, K. H. & Baillargeon, R. (2005). Do 15-month-old infants understand false beliefs? Science, 308(5719), 255-258.
    • Origgi, G. & Sperber, D. (2000). Evolution, communication, and the proper function of language. In P. Carruthers & A. Chamberlain (Eds.), Evolution and the Human Mind: Modularity, Language and Meta-Cognition, (pp. 140-169). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    • Osherson, D. N. (1975a). Logic and models of logical thinking. In R. Falmagne (Ed.), Reasoning: Representation and process in children and adults, (pp. 81- 91). Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum.
    • Osherson, D. N. (1975b). Reasoning in Adolescence: Deductive Inference. Hillsdale, N.J.: L. Erlbaum Associates.
    • Parikh, P. (1991). Communication and strategic inference. Linguistics and Philosophy, 14, 473-513-
    • Parikh, P. (2001). The Use o f Language. Stanford, California: CSLI Publications.
    • Pashler, H. E. (1998). The Psychology o fAttention. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
    • Perner, J. & Lopez, A. (1997). Children's understanding of belief and discontinuing visual evidence. Cognitive Development, 12, 463-475.
    • Piattelli-Palmarini, M. (1994). Inevitable Illusions: How Mistakes o f Reason Rule
    • P inker, S. (2005). So h o w does th e m in d w ork? M ind & Language, 20(1), 1-24.
    • Poe, E. A . (1841). T h e M u rd e rs in the Rue M o rg u e . R e triev ed 15-01-2007, h ttp :/ /e n .w ik is o u rc e .o rg /w ik i/T h e _ M u rd e rs _ in _ th e _ R u e _ M o rg u e
    • Poggio, T., T o rre , V. & K och, C . (1985). C o m p u ta tio n a l visio n and re g u la riza tio n th eo ry. Nature, 3i7{6035), 314-319.
    • Poletiek, E (2001). Hypothesis Testing Behavior. Philadelphia: Psychology Press.
    • Politzer, G. (1990). Immediate deduction between quantified sentences. In K. J. Gilhooly, M. T. G. Keane, R. H. Logie & G. Erdos (Eds.), Lines o f Thinking: Reflections on the Psychology o f Thought, (pp. 85-97). London: John Wiley.
    • Politzer, G. (2004). Reasoning, judgement and pragmatics. In I. A. Noveck 8c D. Sperber (Eds.), Experimental Pragmatics, (pp. 94-115). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
    • Politzer, G. (2005). Uncertainty and the suppression of inferences. Thinking & Reasoning, 11(1), 5-33-
    • P o litzer, G. & B o u rm a u d , G. (2002). D e d u c tiv e reasoning fro m u n c erta in prem ises. British Journal o f Psychology, 93(3), 345-38i.
    • Politzer, G. & Macchi, L. (2005). The representation of the task: The case of the Lawyer-Engineer problem. In The Shape o f Reason. Essays in Honour o f P. Legrenzi. (pp. 119-135). Hove: Psychology Press.
    • Politzer, G. 8c Nguyen-Xuan, A. (1992). Reasoning about conditional promises and warnings: Darwinian algorithms, mental models, relevance judgements or pragmatic schemas? The Q uarterly Journal o fExperimental Psychology A: H uman Experim ental Psychology, 44(3), 401-421.
    • Politzer, G. & Noveck, I. A. (1991). Are conjunction rule violations the result of conversational rule violations? Journal o f Psycholinguistic Research, 20(2), 83- 103.
    • Popper, K. R. (1959). The Logic o f Scientific Discovery. London: Hutchinson.
    • Pouscoulous, N. 8c Noveck, I. (2004). Investigating scalar implicature, abstract for workshop on implicature and conversational meaning, 16-20 August, Nancy. 2005-08-04 edition. Retrieved 2005-08-04, http://www.ru.nl/filosofie/ implicatures/abstracts/pouscoulous.pdf
    • Progovac, L., Paesani, K., Casielles, E., 8c Barton, E. (Eds.). (2006). The Syntax o f Nonsententials: Multidisciplinary Perspectives. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
    • R aw ls, J. (1993). Political Liberalism. N e w York: C o lu m b ia U n iv e rs ity Press.
    • Reber, A . S. (1993). Implicit Learning and Tacit Knowledge: A n Essay on the Cognitive Unconscious. O xfo rd : C la re n d o n Press.
    • Recanati, F. (1989). The pragmatics of what is said. M ind & Language, 4, 295-329.
    • Recanati, F. (2002a). Unarticulated constituents. Linguistics and Philosophy, 25(3), 2 9 9 - 345.
    • Recanati, F. (2002b). Does linguistic communication rest on inference? M ind & Language, 17,105-126.
    • Recanati, F. (2004). Literal Meaning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    • Reid, T. (1855). Essays on the Intellectual Powers o fM an (6th ed.). Boston, Mass: Phillips, Sampson and Company. (Originally published 1785-)
    • Reid, T. (2004). Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind, edited by Jonathan F. Bennett. Retrieved 2-09-2007, http:/ /www.earlymoderntexts.com/pdfbig/reidabig.pdf (Originally published 1788.)
    • Rips, L. J. (1983). Cognitive processes in propositional reasoning. Psychological Review, 90(1), 38-71.
    • Rips, L. J. (1994). The Psychology o f Proof: D eductive Reasoning in Human Thinking. Cambridge, Mass: M IT Press.
    • Rips, L. J. (1997)- Goals for a theory of deduction: Reply to Johnson-Laird. M inds an d Machines, 7(3), 409-424.
    • Roberts, M. J. (2004). Heuristics and reasoning I: Making deduction simple. In J. P. Leighton & R. J. Sternberg (Eds.), The N ature o f Reasoning, (pp. 234-272). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    • Roberts, M. J. & Newton, E. J. (2001). Inspection times, the change task, and the rapid-response selection task. The Q uarterly Journal o fE xperim ental Psychology A, 54,1031-1048.
    • Roberts, M. J. & Newton, E. J. (2003). Individual differences in the development of reasoning strategies. In D. H ardm an & L. Macchi (Eds.), Thinking: Psychological Perspectives On Reasoning Judgment, and Decision Making, (pp. 23-44). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
    • Rockwell, T. (2005). A ttractor spaces as modules: A semi-eliminative reduction of symbolic AI to dynamic systems theory. M inds and Machines, 15(1), 23-55.
    • Ruffman, T. & Perner, J. (2005). Do infants really understand false belief? Response to Leslie. Trends in Cognitive Science, 9(10), 462-463.
    • Russell, B. (1983). Am I an atheist or an agnostic? In K. Blackwell (Ed.), The collected papers o fB ertrand Russell. (M cM aster University ed., pp. 89-92). London: G. Allen & Unwin.
    • Ryan, S. (1991)- The preface paradox. Philosophical Studies, 64(3), 293-307.
    • Ryle, G. (1949)- The Concept o fM ind. London: Hutchinson's University Library.
    • Samuels, R. & Stich, S. (2004). Rationality and psychology. In A. R. Mele & P. Rawling (Eds.), The Oxford H andbook o f R ationality, (pp. 279-300). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    • Samuels, R., Stich, S. & Bishop, M. (2002). Ending the rationality wars: How to make disputes about hum an rationality disappear. In R. Elio (Ed.), Common Sense, Reasoning and R ationality, (pp. 236-268). New York: Oxford University Press.
    • Sargent, T. J. (1993)- Bounded R ation ality in Macroeconomics: The Arne Ryde M em orial Lectures. Oxford: C larendon Press.
    • Saul, J. M. (2002a). Speaker meaning, what is said, and what is implicated. Nous, 36(2), 228-248.
    • Saul, J. M. (2002b). W hat is said and psychological reality; Grice's project and relevance theorists' criticisms. Linguistics a n d Philosophy, 25(3), 347-372. Press.
    • Simon, H. A. (1983). Reason in H um an Affairs (Harry Camp lectures at Stanford University: 1982). Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press.
    • Simon, H. A. (1990). Invariants of hum an behavior. A nnual Review of Psychology, 4i ( i)» 1-19-
    • Simon, H. A. (1997). A dm inistrative Behavior: A Study o fDecision-M aking Processes in Adm inistrative Organizations (4th ed.). New York: Free Press.
    • Simon, H. A. (2000). Bounded rationality in social science: Today and tomorrow. M ind & Society, i(i), 25-39.
    • Simon, H. A. & Newell, A. (1958). Heuristic problem solving: The next advance in operations research. Operations Research, 6(1), 1-10.
    • Simpson, J. A. & Weiner, E. S. C. (1991). The C om pact Oxford English Dictionary. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    • Sloman, S. A. (1996). The empirical case for two systems of reasoning. Psychological Bulletin, 119(1), 3-22.
    • Smith, M. (2004). Humean rationality. In A. R. Mele & P. Rawling (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook o f R ationality, (pp. 75-92). New York: Oxford University Press.
    • Smith, N. V. (1999). Chomsky: Ideas and Ideals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    • S m ith , N . V. & T s im p li, I .- M . (1995). The M ind o f a Savant: Language Learning a n d M odularity. Oxford: Blackwell.
    • Sorensen, R. (2004). Paradoxes of rationality. In A. R. Mele 8c P. Rawling (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook o f Rationality, (pp. 257-275). New York: Oxford University Press.
    • Southgate, V., Senju, A. & Csibra, G. (2007). Action anticipation through attribution of false belief by 2-year-olds. Psychological Science, 18(7), 587-592.
    • Southgate, V., van Maanen, C. 8c Csibra, G. (2007). Infant pointing: communication to cooperate or comm unication to learn? Child Development, 78(3), 735- 7 4 0 .
    • Sperber, D. (1994)- Understanding verbal understanding. In W hat is Intelligence? (pp. 179-198). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    • Sperber, D. (1995)- How do we communicate? In J. Brockman & I<. M atson (Eds.), How Things Are: A Science Toolkit to the M ind. (pp. 191-199). New York: W. Morrow.
    • Sperber, D. (1997)- Intuitive and reflective beliefs. M in d and Language, 12(1), 6 7 - 83.
    • Sperber, D. (2000). M etarepresentations in an evolutionary perspective. In Metarepresentations: A M ultidisciplinary Perspective, (pp. 117-137). New York: Oxford University Press.
    • Sperber, D. (2001). An evolutionary perspective on testim ony and argumentation. Philosophical Topics, 29, 401-403.
    • Sperber, D., Cara, F. & Girotto, V. (1995). Relevance theory explains the selection task. Cognition, 57(1), 31-95-
  • No related research data.
  • No similar publications.

Share - Bookmark

Download from

Cite this article

Collected from